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ABSTRACT 
Tourism is widely perceived as an easy access, low-impact means to achieving economic 
growth and development. In South Africa, community-based tourism has been promoted as a 
way of delivering resources and services to historically marginalised areas, and as a means by 
which rural communities can begin to exercise more control over the decisions and resources 
that directly affect the quality of their lives. A history of deliberate underdevelopment during 
apartheid, has left the Wild Coast region with high unemployment, widespread socio-economic 
poverty, limited infrastructure; and a pristine coastline of 'untapped' tourism potential. Given 
its incompatibility to other forms of development, tourism has been identified by government as 
a key sector for driving economic development and poverty alleviation along the Wild Coast. 
This study reviews four tourism enterprises in operation along the Pondoland Wild Coast in 
terms of their 'pro-poor' credentials (net benefits to local communities), socio-economic 
impact, participation and ownership by local communities, institutional establishment, and 
environmental sustainability. The selected operations exemplify different models of community 
and private sector involvement in tourism development on communal land. A wide range of 
investigative methodologies from primary and secondary data analysis, interviews, structured 
questionnaires, surveys, and quantitative assessment criteria, were employed in this study. The 
key findings and recommendations from the case studies are then considered in light of the 
developmental opportunities and constraints pertaining to the region. 
This study revealed that the Pondoland Wild Coast is faced with numerous socio-economic and 
environmental challenges. The principal limitations to sustainable tourism development include 
lack of basic infrastructure and services, prevailing tenure insecurity, unclear legislation and 
overlapping jurisdictional mandates, direct environmental threats such as a proposed toll road 
and mining, haphazard/illegal developments, and a poorly defined spatial planning framework. 
Whilst all four tourism enterprises appeared to be underpinned by sustainable development 
principles, they differed widely in the nature and size of benefits they provided, and then-
degree of institutional, economic and environmental sustainability. The findings and 
conclusions drawn from this study are intended to contribute towards the theory, practice and 
sustainability of 'pro-poor,' 'community-based', and 'responsible' tourism development, and 
assist future tourism development planning in the region. 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
Featuring undisturbed coastline, large indigenous forests, pristine grasslands and deep estuarine 
valleys, the Pondoland Wild Coast, in the Eastern Cape of South Africa, is highly acclaimed 
for its tourism potential. Furthermore, it is recognised as one of the most important centres of 
plant diversity and endemism in Africa (van Wyk & Smith, 2001; Cooper, 2003). A history of 
deliberate under-development under the apartheid political regime has left the region with 
exceptionally limited infrastructure and widespread economic and social poverty. This era of 
stifled development, has however, served to protect the natural integrity of the region from 
unharnessed coastal ribbon development, such has occurred on Kwazulu-Natal's South Coast 
(PondoCROP, 2001a; Russell & Kuiper, 2001). 
After a number of politically-motivated acts of violence during the death throes of apartheid 
(the late 1980's), the Wild Coast region1 experienced a considerable slump in tourism but is 
once again gaining popularity with tourists seeking a nature experience or 'off-the-beaten track' 
destinations (Huggins, 2002; Fong et al, 2004). In a region characterised by unemployment 
levels exceeding 70%, and with over a third of rural households receiving no formal source of 
income (SA Municipal Demarcations Board, 2004), tourism has been mooted as a key sector, 
for driving economic development and poverty alleviation along the Wild Coast (DEAET, 
2000; Kepe, 2001; ECTB, 2003). 
Tourism has been perceived not only as a means of delivering resources and services to those in 
need, or engaging rural communities in an industry which has historically excluded them, but 
also as a way of initiating a process which could result in people exercising more control over 
the decisions and resources that directly affect the quality of their lives (DEAT, 1996; DEAET, 
1 The terms • Pondoland','Transkei Wild Coast', and 'Wild Coast', are used interchangeably throughout 
this study. 'Wild Coast' refers to that stretch of coastline in the Eastern Cape Province spanning 
approximately 300kms from the Great Kei River in the south to the Umtamvuna river in the north (the 
boundary between Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal province), and formerly belonged to the 
'independent' homeland of Transkei 'Pondoland' (the focus area of this research) is the northernmost 
section of the Wild Coast. The northern Pondoland region is included by any reference to 'Wild Coast'. 
l 
2000; Ashley et al., 2001). South Africa's National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 
supports development which is "socially, environmentally and economically sustainable" (RSA, 
1998: 10). The Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative, a nationally conceived agri-tourism 
development strategy was one such attempt at 'unlocking' the inherent economic potential of 
the region. In regions of unique scenic attraction and ecological value, such as the Pondoland 
Wild Coast, tourism initiatives which combine natural resource management and sustainable 
development in collaborative partnerships between communities, private sector and the 
statutory authorities, continue to be endorsed (Kepe, 2000, 2001; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). 
However, since the democratic elections of 1994, communities living along the Wild Coast 
have borne major political upheaval and have had scores of development promises made to 
them, but in reality, seen little delivery on the ground (CIETafrica, 2001; Kepe, 2001; Ntshona 
& Lahiff, 2003a). Product development has lagged as a result of a multitude of factors which 
include: difficulties around securing rights to land by communities; unclear and overlapping 
jurisdictional mandates pertaining to natural resource protection and development; insecure and 
protracted tenure reform; poor access to the coast; political power struggles; and an unclear and 
lengthy development approval process (Kepe, 2001; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002; Ntshona & 
Lahiff, 2003a, b; Lahiff, 2003). Indeed, the northern Pondoland stretch of the Wild Coast (the 
focus of this research) is characterised by a relatively low-density population, high ecological 
and scenic value, but is a virtual 'blank slate' with respect to tourism development (Haynes, 
2003). 
Of late, the region has come under the media spotlight for other development proposals with 
considerable socio-economic and environmental implications for the area - particularly, the N2 
Wild Coast Toll Road and dune mining at Xolobeni in Northern Pondoland (Luscombe, 2004; 
Olver, 2004; SANRAL, 2004a; WESSA, 2004). These developments follow in me wake of an 
R 85 million European Union Funded Support Programme, designed to promote community-
based tourism development along the Wild Coast (DEAT & EU, 2001). 
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1.2 Rationale for the Study 
This research is an investigation of different tourism models, currently in operation on the 
Pondoland Wild Coast, in terms of their 'pro-poor' credentials (i.e. their net benefits to 
neighbouring rural communities), socio-economic impacts, participation and ownership by local 
communities, institutional establishment and environmental sustainability. Considering the 
ecological importance of the environment in which this tourism takes place, and the dire need 
for development and income-earning opportunities in the region (DEAET, 2000; Castley, 2001; 
CIETafrica, 2001); the key findings, successes, and lessons learnt from these tourism 
enterprises should be of assistance to local and regional tourism / development planners; future 
(and existing) tourism operator's on the Wild Coast; as well as provide an important 
contribution to the theory, practice and sustainability of 'pro-poor,' 'community-based', and 
'responsible' tourism development. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to undertake a critical appraisal of tourism developments in operation 
on the Pondoland Wild Coast in terms of their 'pro-poor' impact, socio-economic, and 
environmental sustainability. 
More specifically, the objectives of this study are to: 
i) Critically appraise existing tourism literature, and its construct as a platform for 
'sustainable development'. 
ii) Present a contextual overview of the socio-economic, environmental and 
developmental factors affecting tourism development on the Wild Coast, with 
particular reference to the region described as 'Pondoland'. 
iii) Provide a case-based assessment of four selected tourism enterprises representing 
different 'models' of community and private sector involvement in tourism 
development on communal land. A critique of the socio-economic impacts, and 
where applicable, environmental sustainability of each operation will be undertaken. 
3 
iv) Identify and compare the main successes and constraints pertaining to the selected 
case studies, with documentation of the key findings, recommendations, and lessons 
learnt, intended to assist future tourism development planning and policy in the 
region. 
1.3.1 Critical Research Questions 
The critical questions to be answered by this research are: 
i) Do the tourism operations being assessed adhere to sustainable development 
principles? 
ii) Are they exemplars for 'sustainable tourism' - i.e. are they socially, 
environmentally and economically sustainable developments? 
iii) What success indicators and lessons can be learnt from the documented tourism 
operations and their contributions to the sustainable tourism schools of 'pro-poor', 
'community-based', and 'eco'- tourism? 
iv) How do the different tourism operations along the Pondoland Wild Coast -
representing different ownership and management models - compare in terms of the 
net socio-economic benefits to their local region(s) and neighbouring communities 
(i.e. their "pro-poor' credentials); environmental and socio-economic sustainability? 
v) What key findings can be found from a critique of mese selected tourism operations 
that would benefit sustainable development planning in the region? 
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1.4 Research Methodology 
A wide range of investigative and field research techniques were employed in this study. 
Quantitative methodology (such as Geographical Information System mapping, and economic 
indices) which involved the deduction of empirical data, was employed in the research process, 
whilst qualitative techniques (such as semi-structured and in-depth interviews, participant and 
field observations, and a community perception survey) was a principal source of enquiry 
(Kitchen & Tate, 2000; Neuman, 2000). 
1.4.1 The Literature Review 
"Theory informs our thinking which, in turn, assists us in making research decisions and sense 
of the world around us. Our experiences of doing research and its findings, in its turn, 
influences our theorising" 
May, 1993: 20. 
According to Valentine (2001) a literature review serves as a critical appraisal to the way in 
which a particular subject has been historically addressed, helps to define the strengths of 
weaknesses of previous research and methodologies, and provides the theoretical foundation, 
from which to dispute, compare or contribute to existing knowledge. 
A thorough literature review and background study was undertaken through an examination of 
secondary resource material, which included: policy documents, local and provincial 
government plans, organisational reports, white papers, journal articles, published research and 
books, electronic (primarily university and government department web pages and online 
search engines i.e. Sabinet and Ebscohost), commercial media sources (i.e. newspaper, serial 
and television), archival records, academic dissertations and conference papers presented at 
meetings of professional societies. However, primary data in the form of semi-structured 
discussions, interviews, and a Geographical Information System Package used to create location 
maps and plot the alignment of the proposed N2, also supplemented the contextual overview 
(Chapter 3) of the research. 
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The literature review considers tourism, and specifically 'sustainable tourism* strategies, as a 
platform for sustainable development. A critique of the existing literature helped to identify, 
and refine, the broad research aim and objectives. It also helped to conceptualise the relevance 
of the research within contemporary academic debate regarding 'sustainable', 'community-
based' and 'pro-poor' tourism development (Wilkinson, 2000; Limb & Dwyer, 2001). 
A broad contextual study of the research area was also done prior, and concurrently to, the case 
study investigations). This comprehensive review addresses the main socio-economic and 
environmental conditions of the region and considers other development initiatives with 
potentially significant implications for tourism development in the region. It is intended that this 
background review will be of particular value to existing and future tourism operators on the 
Wild Coast, as well as local and regional tourism planning authorities, and will be disseminated 
to them and other interested and affected parties (I&APs), on Compact Disk. 
1.4.2 Case Study Research 
According to Buhner (1983): the case study is a superior methodological approach when one is 
interested in gaining a holistic view of the perceptions, values and events that drive or shape a 
particular place, institution, organisation, or group of persons. A number of preliminary site 
visits (including an eight-day hike which traversed the extent of the study area) and 'pilot' 
investigations (informal interviews / discussions with NGO's, CBO's and tourism operators in 
the area) aided the selection of the tourism operations documented by this research. 
A wide range of investigative methodologies from active participation, direct observation, 
ethnography, interview and questionnaire designs, to site validation and quantitative assessment 
criteria were employed in the case study research (as recommended by Hoggart et al., 2002; 
and Buhner, 1983). Triangulation2 of the different research techniques enabled more extensive 
and in-depth analysis, as well as an information cross-check. 
2 Triangulation: the process of drawing upon different sources of information and perspectives 
by employing a range of research methodology. It is derived from a surveying term, where it 
describes using different bearings to give a correct position. In the same manner, researchers can 
use multiple methods or sources of information to try maximise understanding on a particular 
research question (Valentine, 2001:45) 
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Interviews, with a wide range of stakeholders, constituted the primary source of information for 
the case studies. A diversity of approaches were employed, from the more structured case-
study interview schedule to informal open-ended discussions, as a means to instil confidence, 
gain the trust of the interviewee, and elicit the necessary information from respondents. In most 
interview situations a combination of both structured questions and an exploration of 
interrelated themes ensued (Robinson, 1998; Kitchen & Tate, 2000). One-on-one semi 
structured interviews, were found to be most suited to fulfilling the research objectives 
especially where in-depth information was required, the subject matter was potentially 
sensitive, and/or the issues under review would benefit from expansion and additional insight, 
which a standardised questionnaire could not provide (Robinson, 1998; Wilkinson, 2000). 
Over 60 individuals were interviewed during the course of this study. This number excludes 
those persons surveyed in the Mbotyi Household Survey (30 Mbotyi Households) and 
individual tourists (25 individuals) who were interviewed using a semi-structured tourist 
perception questionnaire. The tourist survey, though not an individual component of discussion, 
helped to provide useful insight into the target market, demand and product appraisal 
component of the selected case studies. Appendix 1 provides a list of the persons interviewed 
during the course of this research, the organisation or corps of persons they represent, and the 
form the interview took. Key interviewees for the case studies and study site review are listed 
under 'Personal Communications' in the main reference list. E-mail correspondence constituted 
another source of information (Appendix 1). 
Field and in-depth discussions were frequently employed as a means to educe comment on a 
wide scope of issues, personal perceptions and views, and varied in style from the more 
structured interview schedules, as employed in the case study questionnaires. 'Focus Group' 
discussions, such as those amongst members of an extended household, or co-workers of the 
same organisation (such as the staff at Mbotyi Hotel), were useful at providing insight into how 
particular organisations operate, the broad perceptions they hold, and the internal dynamics 
which exist within such groups (Wilkinson, 2000; Limb & Dwyer, 2001). 
A potential pitfall of case-based research identified by Bulmer (1983): is that it runs a 
comparatively high risk of researcher bias, whilst the specific methodologies employed are not 
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necessarily replicable in other situations or contexts. This constraint has been recognised. The 
selected case studies are not diametrically comparable. Each have their own unique socio-
economic and historical contexts, but an attempt has been made to document them with 
common objectives and research 'themes' in mind. 
Since the principal aim of the research was to critique different tourism models (exemplified by 
the selected case studies) in terms of their 'pro-poor* and 'sustainable development* credentials 
- i.e. to appraise successful and impeding factors, lessons learnt, and be able to make 
supportive recommendations for (sustainable) future tourism development - the broad-based 
themes of the documented operations included: 
• nature and degree of community participation and ownership; 
• benefit-sharing arrangements; 
• socio-economic impacts (i.e. job creation, community training and capacity building); 
• economic and social spin-offs (i.e. SMME creation, education and infrastructural 
improvements); 
• the procedural environment surrounding the operation's inception and its subsequent 
influence on policy directives; 
• institutional sustainability; and finally 
• where the enterprises' future directly relied upon continued access to, or use of the 
natural environment and specific resources: the potential environmental impacts and 
sustainability of the operation was critically appraised. 
A case-specific, detailed, questionnaire framework was tailored for each of the documented 
operations informed by South Africa's 'Community Based Natural Resource Management' 
(DEAT, 2002a); 'Responsible Tourism'(DEAT, 20026); and 'Fair Trade and Tourism'(Seif, 
2002) guidelines. Quantitative indices were employed in assessing the economic impact and 
future sustainability of the selected operations. Appendix 2, the Ufudu Case Study 
Questionnaire, provides an example of this framework. 
Furthermore, a detailed Household Questionnaire Survey was undertaken of thirty households 
within the Mbotyi district (refer to Figure 3.1 / 6.1) to give a community perspective on the 
hotel and joint-venture campsite case studies (Appendix 3). The 'General Household 
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Information', 'Natural Resource Management' and Trust Awareness' components of this 
survey were based upon, and comparable to, the Natural Resource and Socio-Economic Survey 
conducted by PondoCROP on the same number of households in the Amadiba Region. This 
survey helped to inform the Amadiba and Ufudu projects, the other two selected case studies of 
this research. The household questionnaire used a combination of open-ended, open-response 
option, and closed-ended questions (after Crawford, 1997). Care was taken not to use 'leading' 
questions, whilst potentially sensitive questions (such as household income) were only asked 
towards the end of the interview depending on the level of repoi re and trust established with the 
interviewee (Devereux & Hoddinott, 1993). The questionnaire schedule was piloted with 
respondents from similar socio-economic backgrounds (though different area) to the targeted 
survey group. This served to identify ambiguities, repetitive or irrelevant questions, and where 
and if, the questionnaire had lost focus (Crawford, 1997). 
In the community perception survey, each household was interviewed personally by the 
researcher, aided by a local translator. A number of persons were eager to fulfil the role of 
translator, but a young man who is currently attending the South African Wildlife College (and 
therefore had a good understanding of the natural resource and tourism components of the 
survey), was proficient in English, and would not be deemed a 'threat' or have too much 
political clout in the community, was selected. The same individual was employed on both 
survey visits, so as to ensure consistency. 
1.4.3 Selected Case Studies 
Four (operational) Pondoland tourism ventures, representing different models of private sector 
- community management / ownership, were selected as case studies. The rationale behind 
these selections, and focus of the documented enterprises, was as follows: 
i) The Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail: This case study exemplifies a 'sole' 
community venture, and is one of the more established community-owned and managed 
tourism operations in South Africa. It has nonetheless, received extensive NGO and 
external donor support, the merits and failings of which will be considered. 
ii) The Amadiba-Ufudu Partnership: A case study of a private sector - community 
partnership around a high value natural resource. The driving forces shaping diis 
agreement, institutional and partnership relationships, socio-economic impacts, and die 
community/operator's perspective of die venture will be assessed. 
iii) The Mbotyi River Lodge: A private sector owned and operated tourism enterprise 
- one of few places on die Wild Coast where the owners have tide to die land. A 
detailed case study has been made of die socio-economic impacts and contributions diat 
the hotel has made to die local economy in its two and a half years since inception. The 
Mbotyi Community Perception Survey, cottage-owner interviews, and die tourist 
perception survey contribute to this case study. 
iv) The Mbotyi Campsite: A joint-venture initiative between Mbotyi Community 
and the Mbotyi River Lodge Partners: This is a Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism (DEAT) Poverty Relief funded Project, with die Mbotyi River Lodge 
owners partnering die community in a 50/50 partnership on a campsite development 
opposite die hotel. A promising development, which has been beset by early institutional 
conflict. A critique of tiiese 'teediing' problems provides valuable insight into die 
lessons learnt and recommendations for future joint-venture tourism initiatives. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The following chapter, the literature review, briefly considers the principles and evolution of 
development, and tourism as a dais for 'sustainable development'. An exploration of tourism's 
emergent role as a key development strategy in the third world, its links with globalisation, and 
its evolution from the mass tourism model to more ecologically and socially-sensitive 
alternatives, is carried out. 
A detailed examination is undertaken of those tourism strategies, mooted by government and 
local development agents, to be the most suitable tourism option(s) for the Wild Coast region, 
notably: Ecotourism, Community-Based Tourism (as a form of Natural Resource Management) 
and Pro-Poor tourism (incorporating a 'Sustainable Livelihoods' approach). An investigation 
into the various institutional and ownership approaches to state, private sector and community 
partnerships in tourism, and South Africa's experience in community based tourism is 
reviewed. Finally, the role and contribution of tourism to South Africa's economy, and the 
policy framework supporting 'responsible' and 'sustainable' tourism development is examined. 
Chapter three provides a contextual overview of the study region. Background information 
pertaining to the socio-economic profile, history and administration of the area is provided, 
followed by a brief overview of development initiatives with significant implications for future 
tourism development on the Wild Coast. A description of Pondoland's natural environment and 
developments with potentially negative consequences for tourism, biodiversity (i.e. the 
proposed N2 and mining) and natural resource utilisation, is also considered. 
Since the issue of land tenure presents one of the principal obstacles to development along the 
Wild Coast, the policy environment and tenure reform strategies relating to communal land 
ownership, is comprehensively addressed. This includes a short case study of a proposed 
tourism development, which has failed to materialise as a consequence of contractual insecurity 
and protracted tenure reform. 
The issue of legal and illegal cottage development on the Wild Coast is also considered in the 
background review, in addition to the overlapping institutional mandates of various government 
departments regarding land, natural resource management and development on the Wild Coast. 
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Finally, a critique of the Wild Coast tourism development planning, market demand, and policy 
environment is made, with reference to the key policy documents for tourism planning in the 
region. 
Chapters four to seven constitute the documented case studies. An examination of the 
community-based horse and hiking trail, Amadiba Adventures, is made in Chapter four, whilst 
Chapter five looks at the private sector-community partnership between Ufudu Flyfishing and 
the Amadiba Coastal Communities Development Association. The Mbotyi River Lodge (a 
private sector owned hotel) is case studied in Chapter six whilst the Lodge's partnership with 
the community in a joint-venture campsite constitutes Chapter seven. 
Chapter eight provides a critical evaluation of the selected case studies in relation to the key 
questions proposed by this study and tourism development theory. The main findings, lessons 
learnt, and recommendations from the case studies are discussed in light of the key 
opportunities and constraints pertaining to tourism development on the Pondoland Wild, 
followed by concluding comments to this study. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Doctrine of Development: A modern day discourse? 
The term 'development* has rendered an array of different meanings through time (Rist, 
1999). Modern day definitions construe it to be a process of "enlarging people's choices"; of 
enhancing participatory democratic processes; and of providing people with the "opportunity 
to develop to their fullest potential". Time and again, the idea of development is coupled with 
that of state sovereignty, defined as a means to "carry out a nation's development goals", and 
promote "economic growth, national self-reliance and equity" (Cowen & Shenton, 1996: 1; 
Rist, 1999). 
Although the goal of 'universal human improvement' is not a modern-day aspiration, American 
president, Truman's, post-Second World War speech, unwittingly unleashed what was to 
become known as the 'modern day development epoch' (Esteva, 1992; Cowen & Shenton, 
1996; Rist, 1999). Truman used the term "underdeveloped areas" (Truman, cited in by Rist, 
1999: 249) as a synonym for Third World or economically repressed regions, which however 
unintentionally, modified the meaning of 'development' forever. The word 'development' 
began to take on a transitive meaning, corresponding with the principles of economic growth 
and social modernisation, whilst 'underdevelopment', came to be regarded as a naturally 
occurring state of affairs. This new modern day conception of development measured 
'progress' along a western linear model of economic growth (Esteva, 1992; Coetzee, 2001), 
with Gross National Product (GNP), essentially an accounting measure of production, 
becoming the universal litmus test for national 'well-being' (Schuurman, 1993; Connelly & 
Smith, 1999). 
One of the principal failings of this 'modernisation' paradigm, was that it assumed a single 
development strategy, that of 'diffusion of innovation', to be the principal means by which 
Third World countries could attain development. The approach was also distinctly pro-urban 
biased, with ideas and technology targeted predominantly at towns and cities, and the erroneous 
assumption that they would disseminate into the rural areas via a 'trickle-down' process (Leys, 
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1996; Wall, 1997; Graaf and Venter, 2001; Wang, 2002). Furthermore, modernisation theory 
employed a linear model of communication, which assumed western knowledge to be 
universally superior, and hence little effort was made to involve locals or to consider 
indigenous knowledge in the design and implementation of 'grand development schemes' 
(Sardar, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 1999; 2001). According to Tucker (1999), modernisation 
theorists became so preoccupied with discrediting the cultural and economic arrangement(s) of 
Third World countries that they failed to hold their own myth of unlimited progress and 
development up for inspection. 
During the 1970's - 1980's, a new generation of dependency theorists emerged, who argued 
that the Third World was struggling not because of their own 'backwardness' (as the 
modernisation paradigm assumed), but because of the exploitive policies enforced upon them 
by me First World (Lewellen, 1995; Graaf & Venter, 2001). In other words, Third World 
countries remain 'undeveloped' because of their subjugation to the developed First World. In 
order to dissociate or break ties with this repressive relationship, a road to self-determination 
and sufficiency was advocated (Servaes, 1991 cited in Wang, 2002; Schuurman, 1993). 
However, despite the dependency paradigm developing in reaction to an exploitive 
modernisation paradigm, it shared many of the same failings. Both paradigms employed top-
down strategies, which neglected to obtain participation from the purported beneficiaries, and 
used economic indices as their principal gauge of 'success'. Development practitioners, on the 
whole, did not consider rural people in Third World countries as having anything meaningful or 
useful to say, thus depriving them of the opportunity to contribute or participate in their own 
development (Lewellen, 1995; Leys, 1996; Haines, 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2001). 
2.1.1 A move towards 'Sustainable Development' 
"We cannot persist in talking about development as the harbinger of human emancipation. It 
would seem that the model of development now widely pursued is part of the problem rather than 
the solution" 
(Tucker, 1999:1). 
Although development intervention has received extensive criticism, this for the most part, has 
been levelled at the poor execution of the ideal; rather than the ideal itself. The response of 
development and aid agencies has always been to seek out more effective means of 
implementing development. In recent years this has meant emphasising the need for better 
consultation with, and understanding of, the professed beneficiaries. The current propensity 
towards 'participatory approaches' explicates this view (Latouche, 1993; Gardner & Lewis, 
1996 cited in Crewe & Harrison, 1998). 
When development flounders (which it so-often has), self-criticism tends to be limited to an 
admittance that there was 'insufficient understanding' of the situation as it exists on the ground. 
Crewe and Harrison (1998:15) contend that whilst the "colonial denigration of the customs of 
the natives" may long be gone, the reification of "culture as a barrier to development'' is still a 
widely employed excuse in the failure of development projects. 
The dictum of 'alternative' development, is that there is no universal model for development. 
Since every society, community, or locality, has a unique set of circumstances, it should be 
encouraged, through the broadest participation of its members, to fashion its own development 
strategy. As a consequence, there are an ever-increasing number of new recipes reputed to 
'pave the path' towards development. To name but a few: autocentric development; meeting 
basic needs; ethno-development; spontaneous development; and the most recent paradigm: 
sustainable development (Latouche, 1993; Leys, 1996). 
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2.2 Sustainable Development 
"The modern sustainable development debate has tended to shift the focus away from growth 
versus the environment to one of the potential complementarity of growth and environment" 
(Pearce et al., 1989, cited in Connelly and Smith, 1999: 57). 
It has been almost two decades since the term 'sustainable development' was adopted into the 
everyday lexicon of politicians, planners, academics and neo-liberal free-marketeers, alike 
(Butler, 1998; Connelly & Smith, 1999). The term was first coined in 1980 by the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN), but was only brought to prominence after the publication of the 
1987 Brundtland Report: Our Common Future. The Report attributed the failings of 
development to poverty and the short-sighted way in which we have traditionally pursued 
'prosperity' - i.e. the linear economic growth model. It recognised that many parts of the 
(Third) world are caught in a vicious cycle whereby they are forced to overuse their natural 
environment to ensure their daily survival, but in doing so, their survival is "ever more difficult 
and uncertain'' (WCED, 1987: 27). 
The Report defined sustainable development as: 
"Development that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs'' (WCED, 1987: 43) 
This broad and rather ambiguous definition has since been adopted by a diverse array of actors, 
and applied within a wide range of contexts, in an attempt to address developmental and 
environmental imperatives simultaneously (Butler, 1998; Connelly & Smith, 1999; Hallowes & 
Bond, 2002). Essentially, the concept of 'sustainability' entails the need to balance current 
consumption and use of natural resources, to predicted patterns of future use, such that demand 
does not outstrip the capacity of these resources to provide in the long-term (Connelly & Smith, 
1999; Meethan, 2001). 
Initially the concept was radical because it called for a critical assessment of existing practice. 
Its underpinning principles: belief in inter- and intra-generational justice, stewardship and 
moral responsibility towards mankind and the non-human environment, have not been disputed 
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(Reid, 1995;Hall & Lew, 1998). Rather, it is the apparent universal adoption of the ideal by 
members of society who were previously content to live by a generally unexamined belief in 
economic progress, that has been the greatest cause for concern amongst its genuine proponents 
(Hallowes, 1993; Connelly & Smith, 1999). 
Although the B rundtland report managed to raise the profile of the environment on the political 
agenda, it advocated that action be taken along a discourse of 'ecological modernisation'. For 
environmentalists, this philosophy was regarded as no more than a form of 'green capitalism', 
with its appeal weighted towards a greening of the production process rather than a basic 
reassessment of the core problem: that of superfluous production and consumption (Jacobs, 
1993; Connelly & Smith, 1999; Hallowes & Bond, 2002). 
Due to the all-encompassing nature of the concept, some academics (Turner et al., 1994, cited 
in Swarbrooke, 1999) have redefined the term along a continuum from very weak to very strong 
sustainability. A 'strong' interpretation of the concept recognises the value in maintaining the 
functional integrity of ecosystems over and above human resource utilisation, whilst 'very 
strong sustainability' would advocate a steady-state economy with zero population growth and 
no substitution of natural resource stocks (Douthwaite, 1999; Swarbrooke, 1999). 
In contrast, a 'weak' interpretation of sustainable development is distinctly anthropocentric, 
utilitarian, and growth orientated. It permits the substitution of natural capital with human-made 
capital through an unexamined belief in the global free market, which operates around 
satisfying consumer choice (Swarbrooke, 1999). By adopting a 'weak' interpretation of the 
concept, free-marketeers, developers and some politicians have granted themselves the green 
light to continue 'business as usual' (Redclift, 1987; Sachs, 1993; Connelly & Smith, 1999). 
In not questioning the logic of uninhibited growth, many of those who have adopted 
'sustainable development' as their mantra, have failed to challenge the modern value system 
which lies at the heart of our ecological crises: over-development, over-consumption, and 
'profit' as the salient arbitrator of progress and wealth (Jacobs, 1993; Hunter & Green, 1995; 
Connelly & Smith, 1999). 
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Many eminent scholars have argued that 'sustainable development' should not be about 
economic development after all, but a new paradigm of wisdom based on sufficiency and 
equity, prioritising needs over wants, and supported (but not dominated) by modest technology 
that is appropriate, lean and responsible (Schumacher, 1973; Schuurman, 1993, Robertson, 
1998; Connelly & Smith, 1999; Sachs, 1999; Emmot & Shiva, 2000). It has been suggested 
that tourism is one industry which lends itself to such an approach. Since tourism is dependent 
upon unspoilt environments and a diversity of cultures, it follows that tourism has both a 
responsibility for, and a need to, invest in sustainable approaches (Wahab & Pig ram, 1997a; 
Mowforth & Munt, 1998; Honey, 1999). 
2.3 Tourism: The 'Smokeless' Industry? 
"Everything seems to suggest that developing countries look upon tourism consumption as 
manna from heaven that can provide a solution to all their foreign difficulties'' 
(Robert Erbes, 1973, cited in Wahab, 1997: 129). 
With over 700 million international travellers, spending in excess of $ 4.74 trillion dollars in 
2002 (as recorded by the World Tourism Organisation (WTO), 2003), tourism is now one of 
the biggest contributors to global economics and employment. At the turn of the century it 
accounted for 11 % of global GDP and one in twelve persons worldwide, were employed by the 
industry (Roe & Urquhart, 2001; WTO, 2003). It is estimated that by 2011, tourism will 
account for 19% of global employment, equating to more than 260 million jobs (Moosa, 
2002a). 
It was however, only during the late 1960's that tourism, as a distinct development strategy, 
shifted focus from the West to the unchartered territories of the developing world (Weaver, 
1998; Gayle & Goodrich 1993 cited in Meethan, 2001). Growing weary of pre-packaged 'sea 
and ski' holidays, a new class of leisure tourist began to look to the Third World to experience 
new landscapes, people and cultures. The media played an instrumental role in the 
dissemination of 'exotic' images from these virgin lands (Wahab, 1997; Mclaren, 1998; Honey, 
1999). 
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According to Honey (1999) in the mid-1970's, only eight percent of First World tourists opted 
to visit developing countries on holiday. By die 1980's this number had increased to 17%, and 
recent statistics from the World Tourism Organisation (WTO, 2003) show it to be over 30%, 
and increasing annually. Since 1990, international tourism arrivals to developing countries have 
averaged an increase of 9.5% per annum, compared with 4.1% worldwide (Roe & Urquhart, 
2001). 
With today's speedlinks in communication, transportation, and global policies promoting free 
trade, the culture and natural assets of previously inaccessible places have never been within 
closer reach of those persons seeking adventure, culture, or life-enhancing travel (Honey, 
1999; Duffy, 2002). The phenomenon of 'mass-tourism', that swept through Europe and 
America after the industrial revolution, was welcomed by many developing countries as a 
'smokeless' industry that could boost employment, national income, foreign exchange earnings, 
and perceived as leading to 'development' (Cooper et al„ 1993; Harrison, 1994; Wahab, 
1997). Furthermore, it was considered (albeit, erroneously) a 'soft' development option, 
requiring relatively little in terms of specific planning or resources (Wall 1991; cited in Wahab 
& Pigram, 1997ft). 
However, since tourism comprises a host of products and services, not easily disaggregated 
from one another, calculating the true socio-economic and environmental costs of tourism, is no 
easy task (Cooper et al., 1993; Coccossis & Nijkamp, 1995). Research that emerged during the 
1970's and early 1980's, began to reveal the economic benefits from tourism in the developing 
world, as 'marginal' in the light of high social and environmental costs (de Kadt, 1990; 
Martha, 1993; Honey, 1999). The model of 'mass tourism' being exported to such countries, 
came under heavy criticism for endorsing capitalist values, displacing people, destroying 
nature, and advancing western consumerism in previously self-reliant economies (McLaren, 
1998; Mowforth & Mum, 1998; Fennel, 1999). Mclaren (1998) and Fennell (1999) argue that 
over-development, environmental pollution and invasion by culturally insensitive and 
economically disruptive foreigners, have become many of the hallmarks for mass tourism in the 
developing world. 
Over the last few decades, however, many host countries, and tourists themselves, have 
become increasingly disillusioned with this form of tourism (Honey, 1999). By the late 1980's -
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early 1990's, in the wake of greater environmental consciousness and a shift in thinking 
towards 'sustainable development', more socially and ecologically benign alternatives (to mass 
tourism) began to be sought (de Kadt, 1990; Zeppel, 1998). 
2.3.1 Sustainable Tourism 
The World Tourism Organisation (2004: 1) defines 'Sustainable Tourism' as: 
"... development that meets the needs of present tourists and host regions while 
protecting and enhancing opportunities for the future. It is envisaged as leading to 
management of all resources in such a way that economic, social and aesthetic needs 
can be fulfilled while maintaining cultural integrity, essential ecological processes, 
biological diversity and life support systems." 
'Sustainable tourism' was initially referred to as 'green tourism' with a focus on minimising the 
environmental affects from mass tourism. It has since been embraced by many government's, 
in both the north and south, as an opportunity to put their 1992 UNCED3 commitments to 
practice (Butler, 1998; Swarbrooke, 1999). 
However, like the wider philosophy in which it is rooted, the practical implications of 
sustainable tourism are not always clear. Phrases such as 'appropriate', 'responsible' and 
'alternative' have all been used interchangeably by a wide array of stakeholders. To some, 
sustainable tourism is all about 'green products' and 'eco-friendly' tourists; to others it is a set 
of underlying principles to which the tourism industry should aspire (Hunter and Green, 1995; 
Neale & Nicholson, 1999). Much of this confusion comes from the endeavours of many to use 
'mass tourism' as their gross point of reference. In this respect, terms such as 'soft post-
industrial', 'responsible', 'alternative', 'rural', 'low-impact' and 'nature' or 'eco-based' have 
all been used to denote this perceived move away from the mass tourism genre (de Kadt, 1990; 
Mowforth & Munt, 1998; Honey, 1999). 
3 UNCED: The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also referred to as Earth 
Summit I, held in Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992. 
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Sustainability, nonetheless, is often context specific, with a particular type of tourism being 
appropriate for one geographic or social environment, but entirely unsustainable for the next. 
Even when tourism seems sustainable today, it cannot be guaranteed that it will be sustainable 
in the future (Nitsch & Van Straaten, 1995; Spenceley, 2003a). 
Cronin (1990, cited in Moran, 1998) made the following suggestions in making tourism 
development more sustainable: 
Sustainable Tourism needs to: 
i. follow ethical principles which respect the culture and environment of the target 
destination, the economy and indigenous ways of life, as well as traditional leadership 
and political systems; 
ii. involve local people from the outset and proceed only with their full approval. This 
includes having local people in management capacity; 
iii. should be undertaken with both inter- and intra-generational justice in mind. It is 
imperative that there is a fair distribution of costs and benefits among ail stakeholders 
both now and in the future; and 
iv. be planned in a holistic, integrated manner which can be monitored on an ongoing 
basis to counteract negative impacts. 
Many researchers insist that it is in me long-term best interests of both developed and 
developing countries to agree on the principles, policies and management tools that would 
facilitate tourism as an engine for economic growth, whilst conserving the natural resource base 
upon which it depends (de Kadt, 1990; Wahab & Pigram, 1997a; Swarbrooke, 1999; Spenceley 
et al., 2002). As a consequence, many countries are developing responsible tourism guidelines, 
to assist individual tourism operations in becoming more sustainable. Ashley and Roe (2002a) 
and Spenceley et al. (2002) believe that enterprises, given practicable recommendations and a 
forum to report responsible behaviour or activities (as in changing to enviro-friendly waste 
disposal, or increasing local produce purchases) will over time, result in a more sustainable 
tourism industry. 
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Where as before tourism may have been considered a 'soft' development option, requiring little 
in terms of institutional planning and resource allocation, the implications of sustainable 
tourism development are manifold. Sound organisational, marketing, planning and technical 
expertise have been identified as key requisites in making future tourism development more 
sustainable. In order to achieve this, a strong interpretation of what sustainable development 
entails, both principally and practically, is imperative (Hunter & Green, 1995; Wahab & 
Pigram, 1997*; Deloitte & Touche, 1999). 
2 . 3 . 2 Alternative Tourism(s) 
"What distinguishes more recent forms of tourism development from previous manifestations, 
driven by notions of modernisation, is the fact that it is difference, rather than similarity, -which 
is striven for and tourism arguably encourages the commodification of uniqueness " 
(Meethan, 2001: 65). 
Alternative tourism (AT) is a generic term, encompassing a wide range of different tourism 
strategies, which profess to be more socially and ecologically benign alternatives to 
conventional mass tourism. 'Appropriate', 'eco', 'small-scale', 'community-based', 'green', 
'low-impact', and 'nature' tourism are some examples classified under this broad classification 
(Weaver, 1998; Fennell, 1999; Swarbrooke, 1999). What these different brands of AT have in 
common, is that they proclaim to place the natural and cultural resources of the host destination 
at the forefront of development planning, rather than as an afterthought. They place greater 
emphasis on 'self-determination' and 'participation' from host communities, such that decision-
making power remains with the people that shoulder the cost of tourism development, rather 
than outside investors and multinational corporations (Murphy, 1994; Weaver, 1998). 
Nonetheless, not all tourism scholars are convinced that alternative tourism has emerged as a 
reaction to the 'failings' of mass tourism. Uny (1990, cited in Meethan, 2001: 60) believes that 
'alternative tourism' may be "little more than reflecting the wants of particular consumer niches 
underpinned by a romanticised view of nature and a western moral agenda". Meethan (2001: 
60) further explicates this opinion, by saying that the shift from mass to alternative forms of 
tourism development, stems from modern societies desire to experience the "otherness of 
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places untainted by modernity". Alternative forms of tourism development are thus a form of 
market segmentation, rather than purported remedies to the ills of modernity. 
A critique of the following 'alternative tourism' models will be made, as they have been 
mooted in one form or another, as the most 'sustainable' (tourism) development options for the 
Wild Coast region: 
• Eco-tourism 
• Community Based Tourism and Community Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBRM); and 
• Pro-Poor Tourism. 
2.3.3 Ecotourism 
"Real ecotourism, is travel to fragile, pristine, and usually protected areas that strives to be 
low impact and (usually) small scale. It helps educate the traveller; provides funds for 
conservation; directly benefits the economic development and political empowerment of local 
communities; and fosters respect for different cultures and for human rights" 
(Honey, 1999: 25). 
Ecotourism is purported to be the most rapidly expanding sector of the global tourism industry; 
but this is because it is often lumped together with all forms of nature, wildlife and adventure 
tourism. It should in fact be distinct from these forms of tourism, for whilst nature, wildlife and 
adventure tourism are defined principally by the activities undertaken by tourists; ecotourism -
at least a resolute form of it - is defined by its benefits to both people and conservation in the 
host region (Fennell, 1999; Honey, 1999). 
Ecotourism has become one of the leading 'sustainable tourism' strategies, with international 
development agencies, under the banner of 'sustainable rural development', donating millions 
of dollars towards ecotourism developments in the Third World. The World Travel 
Organisation (WTO) has developed definitions and guidelines, initiated ecotourism 
programmes, and held numerous conferences on the subject, whilst existing tourism 
organisations have undergone massive restructuring and media campaigning in an effort to 
'green' their image (Boo, 1992; Honey, 1999; Duffy, 2002). 
In the years since its inception, there have however, been many disputes regarding the precise 
objectives and implications of ecotourism. Nonetheless, there is general consensus that 
ecotourism should at least subscribe to the following criteria: 
• Contribute to conservation of biodiversity; 
• Sustain the well-being of local people; 
• Include a learning experience; 
• Involve responsible action on the part of the tourist and tour operator; 
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• Be delivered primarily to small groups by small-scale operatives i.e. a deviation away 
from mass tourism; 
• Require the lowest possible consumption of non-renewable resources; and 
• Stress local participation, ownership and business opportunities, particularly for rural 
people 
(UNEP, 2001). 
Ecotourism is, or should be, far more than a 'nature experience*. The concept implies that 
benefits should remain with the people supplying the product, but without harming the 
environment or host community in the process. In essence, ecotourism advocates resource 
sustainability, minimum negative impact on environment and culture, participation, and 
economic viability (Handley, 1996 cited in Naguran, 1999; Beeton, 1998). According to Reid 
(1999), active involvement of local communities, in the decision-making and management of 
local tourism ventures, is also a critical constituent of ecotourism. 
However, ecotourism as a vehicle to sustainable development is still a highly contested issue. 
Much of the evidence to date suggests that the majority of 'ecotourists' are motivated more by 
their desire to see untouched and native ecosystems first hand, than a wish to protect the 
environment or traditional societies (Swarbrooke, 1999). 
If ecotourism grows in a particular region, as it has in many areas (particularly where 
regulations have been lax), there is the potential for this type of tourism to become even more 
harmful than mainstream forms of tourism. This is because it tends to take place in rare and 
fragile ecosystems, which have become "ever more off the beaten track" (Neale & Nicholson, 
1998: 33). In Honey's (1999) opinion, ecotourism is still a far cry from fulfilling its promise to 
reform the way in which conventional mass tourism is conducted. "With few exceptions, it has 
failed to move beyond a rather narrow niche tourism sector, to a broader set of principles and 
practices that infuse the entire tourism industry" (Honey, 1999: 394). 
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2.3.4 Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
and Community Based Tourism (CBT) 
In the last ten to fifteen years there has been increased recognition that effective natural 
resource management should be linked to issues of equitable access to natural resources and 
promotion of sustainable livelihoods. In an era where 'community development' and 'natural 
resource management' have become the guiding principles for rural development, the need to 
involve local people in decision-making, planning and implementation of Community Based 
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) projects has been well acknowledged. CBNRM is 
thus a move towards more active participation by communities in the management of their 
natural environment and resources (LIED, 1994; Twyman, 2000). 
Socially and ecologically responsible tourism development, has been identified as a (relatively) 
easy entry pathway towards sustainable development and effective natural resource 
management. Murphy (1985) argued that top-down, centralised tourism planning, on the whole, 
had only served to marginalise host communities in pursuit of western economic growth. This, 
in turn, resulted in failed expectations and outward hostility from host communities, and since 
tourism often depends heavily on the co-operation and goodwill of local people, has often 
jeopardised the success of tourism initiatives. 
Murphy (1994) contends that in order for tourism to become sustainable it needs to be managed 
as a resource industry based on local capacity and community decision-making. He insists that 
collaboration, from the nascent planning phases to day-to-day management of the tourism 
operation, is needed to provide communities with a fairer opportunity to influence proceedings 
and provide greater sustainability to the project (Murphy, 1994; Adams & Hulme, 2001; 
Ashley & Wolmer, 2003). 
Pimbert and Pretty (1994, adapted by Roe et al., 2000) point out that there is a broad 
continuum (Table 2.1) in the degree of participation and stake in ownership, that communities 
have in tourism enterprises, classified under the auspices of CBNRM. 
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Table 2.1: How people particpate in development programmes and projects. Adapted from 
Pimbert and Pretty (1994), IIED. 






3. Participation by 
Consultation 









Characteristics of Each Type 
Participation is simply a pretence, with the people's representation on official boards 
being un-elected officials who have no power. 
People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. It 
involves unilateral announcements by a project's management without listening to 
people's responses. The information being shared belongs to external professionals. 
People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External agents 
define problems and information gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a 
consultative process does not concede any share in decision-making, and 
professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's views. 
People participate by contributing resources, for example labour, in return for food, 
cash or other material incentives. Farmers may provide the fields and labour, but are 
not involved in either experimentation or the process of learning. It is very common 
to see this called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging technologies or 
practices when the incentives end. 
Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially 
reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined 
objectives related to the project Such involvement may be interactive and involve 
shared decision-making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already 
been made by external agents. At worst, local people may still only be co-opted to 
serve external goals. 
People participate in joint analysis, development of actions plans and form local 
institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means to achieve project 
goals. The process involves interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple 
perspectives and make use of systemic and structured learning processes. As groups 
take control of local decisions and determine how available resources are used, so 
they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices. 
People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to 
change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources or 
technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-
mobilisation can spread if governments and NGOs provide an enabling framework of 
support Such self-initiated mobilisation may or may not challenge existing 
distributions of wealth and power. 
(Source: Responsible Tourism Manual - PondoCROP, 2001a) 
27 
The notion of 'community participation' is a broad concept (Table 2.1), which ranges from the 
minimalist approaches of information receiving, to empowering approaches that involve the 
creation of self-sufficient, community instigated (and operated) institutions (Barrow & 
Murphree, 2001). According to Barrow and Murphree (2001) the categories of 'manipulative', 
'passive', 'material gain', and 'information giving', cannot be conceded as falling within the 
rubric of community based natural resource management, as they do not involve local collective 
action. In their opinion, it is only the last three categories (Functional- and Interactive 
Participation, and Self-Mobilisation), where collective activity and agreement is required, that 
the concept of 'community' has any significance. 
Many community-based tourism and conservation programs tend to be 'relational' rather than 
participatory. This infers that they seek to improve relationships between the community and 
state, or private partner, through compromise and trade-offs, rather than a genuine devolution 
of ownership or management of the protected area or tourism project to the local community 
(Koch, 1997; Barrow and Murphree, 2001; and Jones, 2001). 
The rationale for a community-based approach to resource management is founded upon the 
following premises: 
• That communities, who have for centuries depended on such natural resources for their 
survival, would have a better knowledge of local ecological conditions and processes 
than outside organisations; 
• That they are better positioned to respond and/or adapt to locally specific social or 
ecological changes and to represent local preferences and cultural traditions; and 
• That they will be more accountable for their natural resource management (NRM) 
decisions and actions, given the relative importance of these decisions to local 
livelihoods 
(Adams & Hulme, 2001; Boyd, 2001; PondoCROP, 2001a). 
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However, the term 'community4, is a rather nebulous concept (Barrow & Murphree, 2001). 
'Communities', are in fact seldom, homogenous entities, and collective interest is often 
fragmented by the wider economic and political structures in which they operate. Community 
power structures are not always representative or accountable, and they often find themselves at 
the mercy of external political forces and bureaucratic regulations (IIED, 1994; Renard, 1997; 
Roe et al., 2000). 
Where communities have had success in establishing authentic community owned and managed 
tourism initiatives, they often share a tradition of strong collective roots based on: 
• Collective ownership and management of land; 
• Abiding support for local structures of communal organization; and 
• A shared history of 'struggle' - such as defending their land against prospective 
colonisers. 
2.3.4.1 South Africa's Experience in Natural Resource Management 
Historically, South Africa's strategy towards natural resource management was characterised 
by a militant 'fines and fences' approach which tended to be highly restrictive, interventionist 
and exclusionary. Forced removals of many thousands of people from newly declared 
'protected areas' and the withdrawal of traverse and harvesting rights to many natural resources 
required for daily survival, set many marginalised communities in direct conflict with protected 
area managers (Katerere, 2000; Fabricius et. al., 2001; Shackleton & Fabricius, 2001). 
4 The term 'community' is one of the most frequently cited in but ambivalent terms in development 
circles. It has a long history of usage but remains a rather broad and elusive term, with numerous 
interpretations. It is thought, assuming the interests and grievances of marginalised 'communities' to be 
homogenous, to be one of the chief failings in 'community-based' tourism initiatives (Renard, 1997; Roe 
et. al, 2000). But there is a need to define what constitutes a 'community' for academic and referral 
purposes. South Africa's government delivery programmes, have defined 'the community' as that group 
of persons meeting the criterion of three key characteristics. These are: location, common ties, and social 
interaction. In simpler terms, a community can be viewed in relation to space (geographic boundaries); as 
economic units; and as a web of kinship, social relations and cultural entities (Dikini et. al., 1996 cited in 
Kepe.2001) 
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As in many societies structured around iniquitous power differentials, the 'weapons of die 
weak' have rarely included open discussion, or above-board conflict resolution (Fabncius, 
2000; Adams & Hulme, 2001; PondoCROP, 2001a). On die contrary, historically 
disadvantaged communities, if they did not resort to outward hostility and violent acts of 
protest, tended to protect their livelihood strategies by means of subterfuge, passive resistance, 
feigned misunderstanding or calculated raids - as was demonstrated by die defiant mass 
harvesting of marine resources in Dwesa-Cwebe nature reserve (1994) and die hunting of 
wildlife inside Mkambati Nature Reserve, justified under die notion of 'ukujola5' (refer to 
Chapter 4 in Kepe, 1997 and Chapter 5 in Palmer et al., 2000). 
Once protected areas (PA's) were proclaimed, little attention was paid to die increased pressure 
on natural resources beyond their boundaries. The importance of wild resources in sustaining 
rural livelihoods was not recognised, whilst paltry attempts at rural development (especially 
within die ex-homelands) was focused almost exclusively around die agricultural sector -
primarily betterment zoning policies and government sponsored farming schemes - which were 
politically resented, and by and large, unsuccessful (Shackleton & Fabricius, 2001). 
A general neglect towards resource management in communal lands, compounded by high 
population densities and dire land shortages, resulted in decades of abuse and degradation. The 
situation today, is that many communal areas have limited wildlife potential. (Koch & de Beer, 
2000; Palmer et al., 2000; Shackleton & Fabricius, 2001). 
However, since democratisation, Soutii Africa has been at die forefront of pioneering policies 
and legislation towards redressing past inequities and improving access to ownership, use, and 
management of natural resources for historically disadvantaged communities (Koch & de Beer, 
2000; Shackleton & Fabricius, 2001; Spenceley, 20036). According to Wynberg and Kepe 
(1999, cited in Shackleton & Fabricius, 2001: 49): "South Africa has entered a new era of 
conservation and environmental management where concerns for human rights, equity and 
sustainable development have become as important as biodiversity conservation". 
5 Ukujola is the isiXhosa term for the non-confrontational agreement that villagers living around 
Mkambati Nature Reserve have. In terms of this notion, hunting in Mkambati does not constitute a crime 
because there is a common understanding amongst the villagers that the reserve is still a part of their 
natural environment. This is because their traditional hunting grounds were fenced off, with little 
consultation, when the area became a nature reserve (Kepe, 1997:41). 
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2.3.4.2 CBNRM Policy in South Africa 
The need to generate tangible benefits from CBNRM through community tourism initiatives, 
was first highlighted in 1995 Southern African Developing Countries (SADQ discussions 
(Steiner & Rihoy 1995 cited in Ashley & Wolmer, 2003). Since then, a number of community 
tourism and community-private partnership support programs have been established, including 
a Regional Community Tourism Association in 2002 (Ashley & Wolmer, 2003). 
However, Barrow and Murphree (2001), and Jones and Murphree (2001), point out that 
CBNRM approaches vary considerably in extent and degree of local participation, underlying 
social, economic, and conservation orientation. In South Africa, there is a particular emphasis 
on black economic empowerment (BEE) and community-private partnerships in natural 
resource use, which do not always comply with the management principles of CBNRM (Ashley 
& Wolmer, 2003). 
South Africa's Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), defines Community 
Based Natural Resource Management as "a multi-dimensional approach to natural resource 
management, encapsulating economic, social, institutional and ecological issues" (DEAT, 
2002a). 
A guideline document for the implementation of CBNRM programmes in South Africa has 
recently been drawn up in response to the lack of clarity and haphazard development of 
CBNRM initiatives to date. It maintains that whilst South African's tourism policies are clear 
and specific, there has been a shortage of 'how to do' guidelines which could: 
• Help facilitate adaptive learning and managing processes instead of compliance 
to blueprints; 
• Equip communities and ecosystems to respond (and recover) from external 
shocks and surprises; 
• Help incorporate local knowledge and institutions more fully into CBNRM 
planning; 
• Specify how to involve local illiterates in decision-making; and 
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• Create new awareness through successive steps in learning and discovery, so that 
plans and actions can be tailored to a local context 
(DEAT, 2002a). 
Seven key principles, developed by Shackleton (2000), were adopted as guidelines for the 
implementation of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), in South Africa 
(DEAT, 2002a: 2). They are as follows: 
i. A diverse and flexible range of livelihood options must be maintained; 
ii. The productive potential of the resource base should be maintained or improved; 
iii. Institutions for local governance, land and resource management should be in place, 
and effective; 
iv. Economic and other benefits should provide adequate incentive for the wise use of 
natural resources; 
v. There must be effective laws and policies in place and implemented, whilst authority 
should be devolved down to the lowest level at which there is still capacity; 
vi. There should be sensitive and responsible facilitation from outside; and 
vii. Local level power relations should be fully understood and be in favour of CBNRM 
Grossman and Koch (1996) identified South African CBNRM initiatives as falling into three 
main categories: 
• Those facilitated by government conservation departments; 
• Those initiated as partnerships between host communities and a private-sector 
investor / entrepreneur; and 
• Those (less commonplace) initiated by the communities themselves, with or without 
involvement from NGOs. 
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There are, however, permutations on this classification, where in many cases 'tripartite 
partnerships' between conservation agency, community and private sector are formed 
(Grossman & Koch, 1996). This tripartite arrangement, often referred to as die 'three-legged 
pot model', is fueled by investment capital and a sophisticated institutional support system 
(Ferrar et al., 1997). Following on from this, Spenceley (2003ft) classified the growing 
interaction of state, private sector and community involvement in South African tourism, into 
six main models based on land and enterprise ownership (Table 2.2). 
Table 2 .2: Operational approaches to state, private sector and community engagement in South 
African tourism 
Scenario Spatial Illustration Description 





Communal land can be used 
through variable partnerships 
between rural people and the 
Private Sector (PS) to develop 
tourism initiatives. Local 
people benefit from training, 
employment and associated 
business opportunities. 
2. Government Land with 
Private Sector involvement 
and community linkages 
PS State Land 
Rural Livelihood 
Impacts 
Land is owned by the State 
and the PS operates tourism 
on it through a lease or 
enterprise agreement. 
Community linkages may be 
formed through equity in the 
tourism enterprise, 
employment in the PS, or 
associated business 
opportunities. 
3. Private Land and Private 
Operators with Community 
Linkages 
Private Land 
and PS Operator 
" 
Rural Livelihood Impacts 




programmes may have 
beneficial implications for 
rural livelihoods, in addition 
to employment and business 
opportunities. 
33 
4. Community Land Claims 
and Land Transfers 
5. Amalgams of Land 
Ownership Types 









Not necessarily land-tenure 
dependent 
Through land claims or land 
invasions. Transfer of land 
ownership from State or PS to 
communities. Communities 
then have the opportunity to 
utilise the land for tourism via 
community-based tourism, or 
joint-venture partnerships. 
Destinations and planning 
initiatives that focus over a 
wide geographical area may 
include areas of communal, 
State and private sector land. 
Tourism has a strategic focus 
and may have employment, 
business and natural resource 
use implications for rural 
livelihoods. 
Individuals or groups from 
rural communities develop 
business enterprises related to 
tourism, and fulfill the role of 
the private sector. 
(Source: Adapted from Spenceley, 2003ft: 22) 
This classification is particularly relevant to the delineation of the different tourism models case 
studied in this research. Tourism development along the Pondoland Wild Coast is characterised 
by a broad spectrum of institutional - land holding - and equity / ownership models. 
The issue of land tenure and proprietorship, as discussed in Chapter three, is a key issue 
affecting the success of CBNRM initiatives. Ashley and Wolmer (2003) highlighted some of the 
potential strengths and weaknesses of different tenure and ownership models, from an appraisal 
of new forms of engagement between communities and the private sector, in southern Africa's 
tourism and forestry sectors (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Summary of the potential strengths and weaknesses of different proprietary and 





land or assets 
Private land 
Restituted land (reclaimed, 
resettled) 
Strengths 
Relatively easy to implement 
De facto community power: 
investor needs local support 
(buy-in) 
The considerable power of the 
state as lessor/seller, and the 
commercial value of the assets 
can be used to leverage in 
socio-economic commitments 
from operators (if used as a 
major criteria in judging bids) 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR): an improvement over 
past practice 
Establishing contact can lead to 
further dialogue/action 
Community as 'land-owner' has 
commercial rights and 
negotiating power. Benefits 
based on ownership, not good 
will of others 
Gains ownership of potentially 
valuable sites inside reserves 
Land-ownership has multiplier 
effect, such as access to 
training.and funds. Negotiation 
can enhance non-financial 
benefits too, i.e. management 
issues 
Limitations 
In absence of strengthening of 
communal tenure, legal and 
negotiating rights remain 
limited 
Lack of capacity to hold private 
sector to account 
Driving force rarely community 
- unlikely to veto 




political will, and administrative 
capacity 
To date, focus on Black 
Economic Empowerment 
(BEE), not necessarily 'pro-
poor' measures 
On private sectors' terms, with 
community as 'recipient', so 
structurally weak 
Remains philanthropic 
donations rather than adapting 
core business philosophy 
Trade-off (in South Africa): 
cannot use reclaimed land for 
residence or agriculture 
Benefits from commercial 
tourism may be slow, variable 
and inequitable 
Commercial development may 
be blocked, particularly in 
conservation areas 
Requires capacity and support 
to exploit opportunities 
Spatial amalgam Can raise commercial value of 
communal area - increasing 
negotiating power of investors 
Top-down: little scope for 
participation from grassroots 
communities 
Conservation / political / 
commercial agendas dominate 
(Source: Ashley & Wolmer, 2003: 49) 
It is evident from this table, that differing levels of proprietorship are accompanied by their 
own distinctive set of advantages and disadvantages. At one end of the scale, investment on 
communal land is <relatively, easy to implement, but without explicitly defined tenure rights, 
communities simply do not have collateral with which to negotiate, nor can potential private-
sector investor be granted contractual security. At the other end of the continuum: investment 
on private land, a joint-venture project is often initiated out of 'philanthropy', or as an attempt 
to improve 'neighbour relations'. Through this ownership model, communities tend to be more 
disposed to becoming passive beneficiaries of the development, with token negotiating power 
and limited social investment return. 
2.3.4.3 Community-Based Tourism Models 
From research on community-based tourism in the Northern Province, South Africa, Ferrar et 
al.(1997) defined four common 'models' for community-based tourism development. These 
models, though somewhat dated, are still widely applicable to the types of community-based 
initiatives, developing on a national scale. They represent different levels of community 
involvement and ownership, but have the following traits in common: 
• Payment, in various forms, to a common property trust or institution i.e. a 
Development Trust Committee, which defines rights to use by area. These rights 
may be limited to a single (tourism) operator, or shared amongst a number of 
enterprises. Some rights may also be shared amongst community members, but 
rights to scarce natural resources are usually limited and monitored (by either 
provincial or national conservation authorities, and sometimes local watch-dog 
organisations) to ensure resource sustainability. 
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• Tourism enterprises must operate in terms of a contract or contractual agreement, 
negotiated through institutions such as the Development Trust Committee. The terms 
and conditions are usually tailored to a local context. Important elements of the 
contract should be made public, especially amongst affected communities. 
• The aim should be to maximise local benefits. This includes access to (non-
threatened) natural resources and financial benefits such as service fees, bed night 
levies and fair wages. Non-financial benefits include education, training, business 
experience and development of alliances, networking and improved private-state-
community relationships. 
i. Consultation and management structures should be established to inform and interact 
with local stakeholders. Management structures range from 'consultation' with local 
organisational structures to a joint Board of Directors for decision-making. Other 
more public forums should also be established to ensure wider dissemination, 
communication and meet public relation needs. 
(Ferrar, 1997; Fabricius etal., 2001, 2003; Spenceley, 2003Z>) 
These three community tourism models (identified by Ferrar et al., 1997), as outlined below, 
exemplify the type of tourism operations, selected for case study on the Pondoland Wild Coast: 
I) Financial Incentive Model: Private Lodge revenue sharing with Community 
The defining characteristics of this model are: 
• assets are partially merged, but private sector entrepreneur remains the dominant 
partner; 
• shared management responsibilities requires consultation' (a weak interpretation 
of participation according to Pimbert & Pretty, cited in 11 ED, 1994) with the 
local community before final decisions are taken; and 
• benefits include profit sharing rental of land, plus a percentage of turnover or 
negotiated levy proportional to business volume i.e. bed-night levy charged on 
every guest which goes directly to the community (refer to Figure 2.1). 
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According to Ferrar et al. (1997) this revenue sharing can take many forms: percentage profit, 
annual rental fee, bed-night levy, or payments to community for services. The actual scale of 
revenue depends upon what is acceptable by the community, and what is affordable to the 
entrepreneur. 
II) The Management Sharing Model: Private / Community Joint Venture 
The defining characteristics of this model are: 
• a complete merge of assets; 
• weight of decision making in proportion to share of ownership in business; 
• corporate style business structure involving share allocations proportional to 
value of assets brought into the enterprise; 
• increased community involvement gives rise to more diverse and preferred 
benefits including non-financial benefits such as training, tourism and 
business experience; and 
• direct financial benefits linked to the success of the operation (and 
transparent distribution of dividends), engenders better understanding of the 
link between protecting natural resources, tourism and improved livelihoods. 
A full joint venture implies that the community contributes their share to the tourism initiative 
in the form of land, cultural or wildlife resources; whilst the private-sector investor provides an 
injection of capital, marketing, business knowledge and formal links to a cash economy. The 
profit-sharing arrangement is often negotiated around the value of the assets (both natural and 
human) that the community brings to the enterprise, in relation to the business skills and capital 
investment that the private sector partner contributes. A 50% profit-sharing agreement would 
indicate that the assets or skills that the two parties contribute, are perceived as being of more 
or less equivalent value (Ashley & Jones, 2001; Spenceley, 20036). However, this begs the 
question: how does one measure (or place a value on) the status of the environment, or 
protection of natural resources, against the business skills or financial contributions of a 
potential investor? 
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The 'contribution* that the community makes to the joint-venture can take a number of forms, 
which may include: increased revenue by attracting a niche (high-paying) tourism market or 
reduced operating costs by contributing cheap labour and access to natural resources, that 
would otherwise have been costly to purchase (Barnes et al., cited in Ferrar et al., 1997). High 
start-up costs, shared profits, time constraints, insecure land tenure and training, participation 
and negotiating costs, often deters potential investors from the outset (Ferrar et al. (1997), 
Ashley and Jones (2001), and Ashley and Roe (20026). Community participation is often 
assisted through a professional NGO or state agency (Swanepoel & de Beer, 1998). However, 
practitioners and those with expertise in the field of CBT advise that it is as much the 
responsibility of the community to make the 'participation' process easier for potential 
entrepreneurs, appointing accountable community representatives that will put the interests of 
the wider community before personal agendas, as the temptation to make personal gain is a 
high risk factor in this model (Ferrar, 1997; Ashley, 1998; Pienaar, 2000; and Fabricius et al., 
2001). 
Ill) Community Business Model: Community-Based Enterprise 
The defining characteristics of this model are: 
• all assets and decisions are community owned and managed; 
• ventures usually exist as small labour intensive satellite or service 
businesses with small capital and managerial requirements i.e. arts and 
craft businesses - often in association with larger corporate operations; 
• business decisions are made entirely by community leaders; 
• a larger corporate, NGO or Community-Based Organisation (CBO) may 
act in an 'advisory' role, providing guidance or access to a market for the 
products and services of the business (PondoCROP, 2001a); and 
• encourages small, micro and medium business enterprise (SMME) 
development 
(Ferrar, 1997; Lewis, Mander and Wynne, 1999; DEAT, 2002a). 
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Figure 2.1: Income / Revenue Sharing Model (after Lewis etal., 1999: 20) 
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Smaller scale enterprises or products, for example: community-run campsites, arts and craft 
centres, cultural performances, and nature or adventure-based ventures are often more 
amenable to high levels of community ownership and management, since they require less in 
terms of initial capital outlay, sophisticated marketing, and specific tourism expertise (Lubbe, 
2003; Spenceley et al., 2002; Spenceley, 2003ft). However, given that the level of investment 
on sole community-ventures tends to be much lower, revenues and resultant employment are 
usually smaller compared to privately or jointly owned enterprise. According to Roe et al. 
(2001): if 'ownership' is of greater value to the community than direct financial benefits, then 
the sole community venture would be the preferred tourism model. However, participating 
communities should realise from the outset that the associated 'cost' of tins option is often less 
income. 
According to Western (cited in Honey, 1999: 392): "low quality service and facilities, and lack 
of international marketing efforts", are two of the main reasons for community based tourism 
enterprises (CBTE), often failing to compete with other private sector operations. Although 
alliances with NGO's and experts can provide funds, skills, and even political clout, it is often 
difficult for community-run tourism projects to take hold and expand without full support from 
the state (Koch, 1997; Halstead, 2002). 
Another important issue to take cognisance of in this model, is that whilst the community need 
not share its profit (after costs), it accepts full responsibility for potential losses. In other word, 
it is a high-risk model for the community. If the enterprise were to fail, this may adversely 
impact on the prospects of future business opportunities, since potential investors or tourism 
partners may feign shy of a community which has failed to run an enterprise on their own 
(Koch, 1997; Barrow & Murphree, 2001; Fabricius et al., 2001). 
2.3.4.4 Community Based Tourism in South Africa 
South Africa's provincial and national government departments have, by in large, begun to 
build the concept of CBNRM into their policies and development strategies (Fabricius et al., 
2003). South Africa's Tourism White Paper (RSA, 1996) and most recent CBNRM and 
Responsible Tourism Guidelines (DEAT, 2002a;b) explicitly recognises 'community-based 
tourism' as a form of sustainable development, appropriate to the socio-economic and 
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environmental context of the country. Nonetheless, some tourism practitioners, such as 
McKenzie (2003), argue that whilst community-based tourism (CBT) has gained prominence in 
national and provincial legislature, it appears that it has not been conceptualised in a systematic 
manner by local municipalities, who have tended to equate all forms of ad hoc support for 
historically disadvantaged groups as 'community-based tourism'. 
Whilst South Africa lays claim to some of the most pioneering and supportive policy regarding 
CBT, putting policy into practice is where the real challenge lies (Boyd, 2001; Mokgope, 2001; 
Fabricius et al., 2003). According to Fabricius et al. (2001) there is mounting evidence to 
suggest that many CBNRM projects - including some previously touted as 'success' stories -
are experiencing problems. The reasons provided for their high incidence of degeneration 
include: 
• a lack of delivery of benefits large or tangible enough to make a significant impact on 
people's livelihoods; 
• ill-defined property rights or protracted tenure reform; 
• weak inter-agency and (government) departmental collaboration; 
• undeveloped expertise around business management tasks and the operations of legal 
community institutions; 
• inadequate emphasis on maintaining the adaptive qualities of communities and natural 
ecosystems (i.e. encouraging a diversity of livelihood strategies); 
• a lack of strong community cohesion - i.e. micro politics, jealousies and factionalism 
often preclude community tourism initiatives from getting off the ground; and 
• scant clarification on the responsibilities, functions and jurisdiction of traditional 
authorities versus local, provincial and even national government in terms of land and 
resource management 
(Koch, 1997; Fabricius et al., 2001; Ntshona & Lahiff, 200Id; Ashley and 
Ntshona, 2002 and Ashley and Wolmer, 2003). 
These 'impediments' will be referred back to in the case studies and final research discussion. 
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2.3.4.5 Conclusion 
After more than a decade of experimentation in community-based tourism, many researchers 
and policy makers have developed a better understanding of the factors supporting and 
encumbering community-based tourism initiatives. Whilst 'active' participation by beneficiary 
communities is being widely entrenched and accepted as important to the long-term success of 
the CBNRM initiatives, it is nonetheless recognised, that it is not always desirable to vest all 
management authority with the community (as advocated by the sole community-venture 
model), especially when capacity is lacking (Roe et. al., 2000; Fabricius et al., 2001). 
The paucity of appropriate tourism skills and business knowledge, at both an individual and 
collective level, is frequently documented as being the single largest barrier to meaningful 
participation of communities in tourism development (Ferrar et al., 1997; Ashley & Jones, 
2001; Ntshona & Lahiff, 20036). The removal of this barrier would require well-resourced, 
appropriate skills and capacity building programmes in a broad range of skills from specific 
hospitality expertise to more general organisational, administrational and business management 
capacities. It is generally agreed that local NGO's and international donor agencies are well 
positioned (or have the access to grants) for such training and community 'capacity building' 
(Koch, 1997; Katerere, 2000 Ashley et al., 2001; Jones, 2001). 
Furthermore, the implicit assumptions of CBNRM are increasingly being called into question 
by practioners, researchers and academics. Principally, these are that benefit-sharing, 
devolution of power, and the establishment of community development forums or natural 
resource management institutions, will automatically lead to more sustainable utilisation or 
protection of the natural environment (Katere, 2000; Mohamed, 2000; Fabricius et al., 2001). 
In recent years, a new approach to tourism, focused on 'harnessing of the industry to the direct 
benefit of the poor' (Roe & Urqubart, 2001), is being developed. This new approach is aptly 
referred to as 'Pro-Poor Tourism'. 
* 
2.3.5 Pro-Poor Tourism 
Pro-poor tourism (PPT) is defined as "tourism diat generates net benefits for the poor" (Ashley 
ei al., 2001:1). It is neither a product nor a niche sector but an approach to tourism 
development and management which aims to enhance the linkages between tourism businesses 
and poor people (PPT website, 2004). Strategies for making tourism 'pro-poor', focus on the 
'unlocking of opportunities' that would benefit the poor rather than expanding the overall size 
of the sector per se. Benefits to the poor may be economic, but they may also be social, 
cultural or environmental (Roe & Urquhart, 2001; Spenceley & Seif, 2003). This approach 
contrasts with national development strategies, in which tourism is so often touted as the 'most 
sustainable development path' towards 'growing the (national) economy' - and where the 
overarching goal is increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and foreign exchange earnings 
(Mowfoth & Munt, 1998; Magi & Nzama, 2002). 
According to Spenceley and Seif (2003: 7): Tourism's potential as a 'pro-poor' strategy lies in 
four main arenas: 
• "Tourism is a diverse industry, which increases the scope for a wide number of 
stakeholders and participants, including the informal sector; 
• Because the customer comes to the product, this provides many opportunities for 
linkages and a multiplier effect in terms of economic (and other) benefits; 
• Tourism is highly dependent on natural capital, which are assets the poor usually 
have access to, even in me absence of poor social or financial capital; and 
• Tourism is a labour intensive industry with a high proportion of earnings accruing 
to women". 
Whilst the PPT approach has adopted many of the principles aligned to sustainable tourism, it 
denounces the sustainable tourism industry for not placing poverty at the heart of its agenda 
(Ashley et al., 2000). Recognising the critical links between poverty - environment - and 
development, supporters of PPT maintain that in a world of mounting inequality, poverty 
reduction should become the driving cog for the sustainable development agenda (Roe & 
Urquhart, 2001). 
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Pro-Poor Tourism does overlap with other 'alternative' sustainable tourism niches such as 
ecotourism and community-based tourism (CBT), but it is not synonymous with either. 
According to Ashley et al. (2000; 2001), PPT considers environmental protection as being 
important to the sustainability of the tourism operation (endorsed by ecotourism), but this 
remains secondary to poverty alleviation goals. Community-based tourism initiatives, on the 
other hand, aim to increase local people's participation in tourism. Whilst this is a key 
component of pro-poor tourism, advocates of PPT maintain that their approach intends to 
unlock opportunities for the poor at all levels and scales of operation, not just at the community 
level. This would include such things as: expanding informal sector linkages, and creating a 
supportive planning and tourism policy framework that would directly address the needs of the 
poor. 
2.3.5.1 PPT Principles 
The key principles underlying pro-poor tourism, as identified by Deloitte & Touche (1999), and 
Ashley et al (2000), are: 
• Participation: poor people have to participate in tourism decisions from the outset, if 
their livelihood strategies and priorities are to be accounted for; 
• A holistic livelihoods approach: a wide range of socio-economic and environmental 
concerns need to be recognised. Focusing merely on jobs and wages is inadequate. A 
pro-poor strategy also needs to be complemented by the development of wider tourism 
infrastructure; 
• A balanced approach to the tourism industry as a whole is necessary. If competitive 
products, transport systems or marketing do not exist, the industry will decline and so 
will any pro-poor strategy; 
• Distribution: promoting PPT requires some analysis of the distribution of both costs 
and benefits, and how to influence these. PPT aims to concentrate more on expanding 
benefits, not just minimising costs to the poor; 
• Commercial realism: involve businesses in development initiatives and seek ways to 
enhance positive impacts for the poor within the constraints of commercial viability; 
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• Flexibility: pro-poor principles can be applied to any tourism segment from 
conventional mass tourism through to special-interest products, but a blue-print 
approach is unlikely to maximise benefits for the poor. As the contexts are widely 
divergent, so strategies need to be adapted to maximise positive impacts. These also 
take some time to develop; and 
• Learning: as there is no single blueprint, learning from trial-and-error, and 
documenting this experience, is essential. Key lessons can also be drawn from other 
sectors such as small enterprise development, good governance, poverty analysis and 
environmental management, and adopted to a tourism context. 
The pro-poor tourism approach pays particular attention to the impact that tourism has on 
livelihoods of the poor. Drawing from the Department for International Development (DFID's) 
experience in promoting 'Sustainable Livelihoods', PPT practitioners have made use of the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Figure 2.3) in case based assessments. For a detailed 
explanation of this framework refer to DFID's Website: http://www.livelihoods.org. Tourism 
affects livelihoods by changing access to different assets. However, assessing potential 
livelihood impacts is not simply a matter of counting jobs or estimating wage income 
(Cattarinich, 2001; Ashley & Roe, 2002ft; Spenceley, 20O3a;b). Pro-poor research has 
revealed a complex interplay of factors affecting livelihood security and the impacts of tourism 
(both positive and negative) on the poor (Ashley et al., 2000; Meyer, 2003). 
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Ashley et al., (2000) have succinctly tabulated some of the potential impacts that tourism has 
on poor (and rural) livelihoods in Table 2.4 





Possible positive impacts 
Tourism con support livelihood goals such as 
economic security, cultural life, health, 
increasing cash income of 
workers/entrepreneurs, contributing to cultural 









Expand economic options, for example by 
creating employment and small business 
options for die unskilled and semi-skilled, or 
by complementing other activities, i.e. 
earnings in the agricultural lean season; or 
development of transferable skills. 
Build up assets (natural, physical, financial, 
human, and social), for example, enhanced 
physical assets, if earnings are invested in 
productive capital; enhanced natural capital, if 
sustainability of natural resource management 
is improved. 
Improve die context or residents' ability to 
influence it, for example, by expanding local 
markets, focusing policy-makers' attention on 
marginal areas. Participation in tourism 
planning and enterprise can give residents 
new status, information and skills to deal wim 
outsiders. 
Fit with people's underlying long-term 
Possible negative effects 
Tourism can undermine economic 
security, self-determination and 
health, i.e. by creating dependency 
on a volatile industry among 
workers, creating local inflation, 
disempowering residents from 
decision-making, or exacerbating 
spread of disease. 
Conflict with other activities, for 
example, impeding Ashing, 
gathering, or agriculture, if land and 
natural resources are taken away. 
Clash with busy agricultural seasons; 
increase wildlife damage to crops 
and livestock. 
Erode assets, i.e. lost access to 
natural assets if local people are 
excluded from tourism areas; erode 
social capital if conflict over tourism 
undermines social and reciprocal 
relations; over-burdening of physical 
infrastructure (sewage or water 
supply). 
Exacerbate policy constraints, i.e by. 
diverting policy-makers' attention, 
resources and infrastructure 
investment to prioritise tourism over 
other local activities. Improved 
transport access and markets can 
undermine local production. 




priorities, for example, to diversify against 
risk, build buffers against drought, or by 
developing an additional source of income 
which continues in drought years. 
term security, i.e. physical threats 
from more aggressive wild animals 
due to disturbance by tourists; 
economic vulnerability can be 
exacerbated due to dependence on 
volatile tourism. 
(Source: Adapted from Ashley et al., 2000; Ashley & Roe 2002b). 
2.3.5.2 Findings from PPT Research 
Although the concept is still relatively new, case-based research is currently being carried out 
to review livelihood impacts and lessons learnt from adopting PPT strategies (Cattarinich, 
2001; Meyer, 2003; and PPT, 2004 - for working papers and publications). Although time will 
be the ultimate test for many of these PPT initiatives, it would appear that PPT intervention has 
proved effective in improving the livelihoods of the poor. Whilst some have been lifted out of 
the income defining bracket of 'poverty', even more have benefited from the non-financial 
livelihood opportunities created - such as improved access to infrastructure and information, 
capacity building, pride and cultural reinforcement (PPT, 2004). 
However, more critical evaluation and critique of PPT initiatives remains to be made. A 
potentially contestable issue that may arise from this new tourism approach is whether poverty 
alleviation goals should, or would be, prioritised over notions of 'sustai natality'. Should job 
creation be prioritised over the natural environment? Is tourism viewed as the 'most 
sustainable* development option by PPT advocates, or is it being peddled first and foremost, 
for its considerable employment potential and economic spin-offs that would benefit the poor 
and reduce poverty? 
Although PPT appraisal has been mostly 'in-house' to date, researchers and practitioners have 
identified a number of issues, with potentially negative impacts for PPT. Ashley et al., (2001) 
have summarised these in Table 2.5. 
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Strength of existing 
economic elites 
Location of poor people 











Breaking in is not easy. Government 
intervention, marketing links, intensive 
communication, profit motives and realism are 
needed. 
Poor people - and hence PPT products - are 
often in remote areas with poor infrastructure. 
Investment in infrastructure (particularly roads 
and communications) may be needed to ensure 
viability. 
Unattractive products do not sell and will 
threaten the commercial viability of an 
enterprise. Involving the private sector (PS) in 
product development should help to ensure that 
initiatives are commercially realistic. 
Marketing is critical if PPT is to compete in an 
already satiated tourist product market. 
Government or PS support may be needed to 
develop effective links and marketing 
strategies. 
PPT can be expensive, especially when 
transaction costs are included. Costs may 
exceed the capacity of a company, community 
or government tourism department, making 
external (donor) funding necessary. 
Secure land tenure is important for attracting 
PPT investment. Land rights need to be 
clarified before tourism development goes 
ahead. 
Government attitudes can be the driving force 
or stumbling block for PPT. Commitment is 
critical but not enough on its own. 
Capacity building is likely to be an essential 
part of any PPT initiative. Some form of 
external facilitation may be required. 
PPT is most effective when different 
stakeholders work together. Investment in 
communication is required. 
Mismatched expectations and benefits can 
thwart initiatives. It is important to deliver 
short-term benefits while long-term schemes 
are developing. 
(Source: Ashley et al, 2001: 36). 
2.3 5.3 Conclusion 
Under the umbrella of 'pro-poor' tourism, many practical lessons have been learnt and 
recommendations made towards expanding opportunities and directing a larger portion of the 
benefits from tourism, towards the poor. Although PPT shares many of the same principles as 
other 'sustainable' tourism sectors, it is the first to place poverty alleviation as its principal 
objective (Deloitte & Touche, 1999; Ashley et. al., 2000). 
This approach therefore has particular relevance for countries such as South Africa, where after 
ten years of democracy, economic and political analysts estimate that approximately 40% of 
South Africans are still living below the poverty line - defined by the Marketing Research 
Bureau of South Africa in March 2004, as those members of society surviving on less than 
R 1 871 / per household of 4.7 people (Landman et al., 2003). 
2.4 Tourism and Sustainable Development in South Africa: 
The Policy Framework 
In 1994, the Economist Intelligence Unit estimated the value of South African tourism to be 
less than two percent of total GDP. Latest available statistics show South Africa to be the best 
performing and fastest growing tourism industry in the world with tourism contributing R 72.5 
billion to South Africa's GDP in 2002 (7.1% of total GDP) and accounting for one in eight 
jobs, including those jobs created in the informal sector6 (Moosa, 2003a, Makwakwa, 2003). 
Despite adverse global trends, the first quarter of 2003, showed an 11.2% increase in overseas 
arrivals, from 2002. This, according to the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
(2003a: 1), bestows our prominence as a "world favourite travel destination'', and reiterates the 
value of the sector as a "leading contributor towards GDP, transformation and the creation of 
sustainable jobs" (Makwakwa, 2003; Moosa, 2003a). 
The growing popularity of South Africa as a tourism destination can be to a large degree 
attributed to the remarkably smooth transition that South Africa has undergone from minority 
6 Koch (1997) maintains that the more integrated and diversified the local economy. The more indirect 
employment is created. 
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rule to a united democracy. 'Madiba' magic and the rainbow nation acted as powerful magnets 
in stirring the interest of international tourists to visit the country. The new Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT)7, recognising the significant and largely untapped 
potential of tourism's contribution to economic growth and social reconstruction, began drafting 
a participatory, non-discriminatory White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Tourism 
in South Africa (RSA, 1996), in order to provide a policy framework for this rapidly 
mushrooming industry (Koch & Massyn, 2001; Magi & Nzama 2002: 68). 
The 1996 Tourism White Paper recognised that, due to a racially discriminatory history and 
deliberate •protectionism', tourism development in South Africa had largely been a "missed 
opportunity" (RSA, 1996: 5). During the apartheid era, the industry had been catering to a 
homogenous, predictable, and minority clientele, of the privileged (read: white) domestic 
tourist. As such, the potential of the tourism industry to boost national income, strengthen 
employment and rural economies, generate foreign exchange, spawn entrepreneurship and new 
services to stimulate other sectors of the economy, had not been fully realised (RSA, 1996). 
It is fortunate that South Africa's transition to democracy and subsequent drafting of a new 
constitution and legislation coincided with a global movement towards a more socially and 
environmentally responsible development philosophy (Oelofse & Scott, 2002). In line with 
global trends towards sustainable development, the 1996 Tourism White Paper proposed 
'Responsible Tourism' as its principal sector (RSA, 1996; DEAT, 2002ft; Spenceley, 2003A). 
'Responsible Tourism' is, like pro-poor tourism, ecotourism and CBNRM, essentially another 
brand of 'sustainable tourism' (Refer to Section 2.3.1, pp. 21). 
Roe and Urquhart (2001: 5) define Responsible Tourism as: 
"Tourism that promotes responsibility to the environment through its sustainable use; 
responsibility to involve local communities in the tourism industry; responsibility for the 
safety and security of visitors and responsible government, employees, employers, 
unions and local communities ". 
7 The amalgamation of the Department of Tourism (previously located within the Department of 
Economic Affairs) with the Department of Environmental Affairs - i.e. the creation of DEAT - reflected 
the link between environmental protection, sustainable development and sustainble tourism. 
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Responsible Tourism advocates that all stakeholders involved in the tourism industry, from 
national government to one-man tourism operators, should take a proactive approach in 
developing, marketing and managing tourism initiatives, such that they comply with the three 
pillars of sustainable development: i.e. that they strive towards greater social responsibility, 
environmental sensitivity, and economic sustainability (RSA, 1996; Spenceley et al., 2002). 
The Tourism White Paper (RSA, 1996) recognised that whilst tourism had traditionally been 
promoted by government as a means to increase national income and foreign exchange 
earnings, there was a dire need to harness tourism for poverty relief, sustainable job creation, 
fostering of entrepreneurial opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons, and local 
economic development. According to the White Paper (RSA, 1996: 16): "responsible tourism 
is not a luxury for South Africa. It is an absolute necessity if South Africa is to emerge as a 
successful international competitor". Responsible Tourism offers South Africa a unique 
opportunity to be a world leader in 'new tourism' and to set benchmarks for global best 
practice (DEAT, 2003). 
In 1997, a follow-on report, Tourism in Gear, outlined a consolidated framework for 
implementation of the White Paper, emphasising the need for tourism to be "government led, 
private sector driven, community based and labour conscious" (Spenceley & Seif, 2003: 33). 
This publication was aligned with a more general shift in the African National Congress' 
(ANC's) policy framework towards a neo-liberal macro-economic policy (Hallowes, 2002; 
Spenceley & Seif, 2003). 
The gazetting of the 1998 National Environmental Management Act (no. 107 of 1998), 
however, has been the most powerful piece of legislation passed, with the potential to convert a 
cornerstone of our constitution: 'that development must be socially, environmentally and 
economically sustainable...' into a more concrete reality (RSA, 1998; Oelofse & Scott, 2002). 
This Act explicitly identifies the need to promote greater co-operative governance and public 
interest in the environment, and focuses on three core domains: resource conservation and 
exploitation; pollution control and waste management; and land use planning and development 
(RSA, 1998; Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). 
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In May 2002, the DEAT published a set of National Responsible Tourism Guidelines, to 
provide guidance, quantifiable indicators and targets for South African tourism enterprises to 
adhere and strive towards (Kotze, 2002). These guidelines were formulated after a twelve-
month participation and research process supported by the Department for International 
Development (DFID), with a sizeable complement of 'pro-poor', 'sustainable livelihood' and 
'Fair Trade in Tourism8' practitioners and researchers', making valuable contributions 
(Spenceley et al., 2002; Spenceley & Seif, 2003). 
Since the publication of the Tourism White Paper (RSA, 1996), the enactment of NEMA (RS A, 
1998) and DEAT's National Responsible Tourism Guidelines (DEAT, 20026), the 
transformation of South African's tourism industry is being spearheaded via two main tactics: 
black economic empowerment programmes aimed at emerging entrepreneurs; and policies to 
promote greater involvement in and benefit from tourism by poor rural communities (Roe & 
Urquhart, 2001). A number of government and parastatal-driven programmes, such as DEAT's 
Poverty Relief Programme and the Tourism Enterprise Programme (TEP), have also been 
created to promote greater involvement of previously disadvantaged individuals in die tourism 
industry (Spenceley, 2003*; Spenceley & Seif, 2003). 
2 .4 .1 Conclusion 
South Africa's remarkable democratic transition, its diverse landscape(s), wildlife, and rich 
cultural heritage, makes it one of the fastest growing tourism destinations in the world. The 
industry's potential to contribute towards job creation, income and development in regions 
previously neglected (i.e. through the colonial and apartheid years), is widely recognised. 
However, tourism should not be considered a quick fix solution to rural development and 
poverty alleviation. In order to contribute towards the redistribution of wealth and growth of 
the South African economy - whilst ensuring previously disadvantaged citizens are able to play 
a more meaningful role in the industry - tourism developments need to be carefully planned 
and implemented. 
8 Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa (FTTSA) - the brand and trademark - was launched in January, 
2001. The brand, into which 'responsible' tourism operators are encouraged to buy into (though they must 
comply with a minimum set of FIT principles and criterion), recognises and awards the private sector for 
support for community-based, emerging and micro-enterprise development, as well as trade with 
previously disadvantaged individuals and the informal sector (Seif, 2002). 
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In his address at the launch of southern Africa's 'people-first' tourism campaign, Koch (1997: 
6) alluded to the paradox of where: despite the opportunity for international tourists (visiting 
South Africa) to see "off the beaten track destinations'' and community-based tourism 
enterprises, mere was little evidence to suggest that the traditional distribution of tourists to 
"Cape Town, the Garden Route, followed by a visit to Kruger National Park", had really 
changed. He stressed the responsibility that tour operators, the media, environmental and 
community-based pressure groups had, to ensure that travelers were made more aware of the 
significant socio-economic contribution they would make (i.e. to rural communities) by visiting 
areas that were off these well-worn travel routes (Koch, 1997) - such as the Pondoland Wild 
Coast and tourism enterprises documented in this research. 
Whilst South Africa's new 'Responsible Tourism' philosophy, is designed to 'level the playing 
field' in this previously minority-lead industry, converting policy into practice is where the 
challenge lies. Since tourism is essentially a labour intensive industry, with limited scope for 
technological substitution, there is significant potential for job creation (both formal and 
informal) for individuals with a wide range of skills and education. 
Future tourism development, focused around South Africa's natural and cultural assets, should 
be informed by the lessons learnt, experiences, and recommendations made by academics and 
practitioners with experience in the 'sustainable tourism' niches such as 'ecotourism', 
'community-based' and 'pro-poor' tourism. Whilst a principal element of 'responsible tourism' 
is its commitment to environmental and cultural sustainabiliry (as both ecotourism and 
community-based tourism stress), it is not enough to ensure the long-term sustainability of a 
'responsible tourism' operation by simply safeguarding the attractions upon which it is based. 
For an environmentally and culturally sustainable tourism enterprise to become a more 
'responsible' tourism operation, it needs to contribute tangible and lasting socio-economic 
benefits to its purported beneficiaries (Murphy, 1994; Koch, 1997; Fabricius, 2000; Shackleton 
& Fabricius, 2001). With an estimated 40% of South African's living below the poverty line 
(Landman et al., 2003), the exigency to challenge poverty with environmentally responsible 
(and sustainable) development is paramount (Oelofse & Scott, 2002). Tourism development, 
which is people-centred but at the same time, sensitive to the ecological systems which form the 
basis of human survival, has potential to address poverty alleviation and environmental 
protection simultaneously. 
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY SITE IN CONTEXT 
The Eastern Cape's Pondoland Wild Coast: A Socio-Economic and 
Environmental Perspective 
3.1 Study Area 
'Pondoland', as defined by Nicholson (1997), is the northernmost section of die Wild Coast, 
stretching from the southern boundary of the Umtamvuna river (31 31 'S 30 11 'E) to the 
northern banks of the Umzimvubu river - boundary of Port St John's municipality (31 37'S 29 
32'E) - in the south. The straight-line distance between these two boundaries is approximately 
90 kilometres and falls within the administrative boundaries of the Eastern Cape Province 
(Nicholson, 1997; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). 
According to the most recent municipal delineations, this area is now classified as 'Eastern 
Pondoland', extending inland to include the old districts of Lusikisiki, Bizana, Flagstaff and 
Tabankulu but not Mt Frere or Mt Ayliff (Feely, cited in White et al., 2002 - refer to Figure 
3.1). The boundaries of Western Pondoland stretch from the Umzimvubu River in the North to 
the Umtata River in the South and includes the districts of Port St John's, Libode and Nqeleni 
(White et al., 2002). The scope of this study, lies within the demarcations of Eastern 
Pondoland, but for convenience, will hereafter be referred to as 'Pondoland'. 
It should be noted, that the terms 'Pondoland', 'Transkei Wild Coast', and 'Wild Coast', are 
used interchangeably throughout the research. To clarify the boundaries of these terms, the 
'Wild Coast' refers to that stretch of coastline in the Eastern Cape Province spanning 
approximately 300kms from the Great Kei River in the south (north of Morgan's Bay, Eastern 
Cape Province) up to the Umtamvuna river in the north (the boundary between Eastern Cape 
and Kwazulu-Natal province - Figure 3.1), and was formerly part of the 'independent' 
homeland, referred to as 'Transkei' (Kepe, 2001). 'Pondoland' (the focus area of this research) 
is thus the northernmost section (third) of the Wild Coast. When the term 'Wild Coast' is used 
in me research, the northern Pondoland region is automatically included by this reference. 
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Figure 3.1: Location of the five case studies within the Pondoland Wild Coast, Eastern Cape. 
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The Wild Coast 
Pondoland Wild Coast 
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(Source: Cartographic Unit, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Pietennaritzburg, 2004). 
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3.2 History and Administration 
Pondoland has a long and colourful history. Archaeological evidence dates the presence of 
hunter-gatherers in die region from 150 000 - 500, 000 years ago (Cawe et al., 1983, cited in 
Nicholson, 1997), whilst agro-pastoralist settlement in the fertile coastal valleys, dates back to 
the late 7th century AD. The language, customs and traditions of the Pondo people have 
developed over a thousand years of co-existence, with persons of Khoi-Khoi, Nguni and San 
origin (Feely, 1987). 
The Pondo people have, over the centuries, passionately defended meir land and culture against 
occupation from other groups. These have included the Mfengu and Bhaca, who fled from 
Shaka's reign of terror during the early 18* century (Nicholson, 1997), and in more recent 
times: the violent uprisings (known as the 'Pondoland Revolts') against apartheid betterment 
planning imposed by the former nationalist government (Mbeki, 1984; Pinnock, 2002). 
Today, the smallest administrative unit within rural 'Pondoland', falls under the authority of the 
local headman (whom are usually government-appointed). People often refer to this person as 
the 'chief, but this is technically incorrect. The chief is actually the paramount chief or king, 
who in this case, is King Sigcau. The regional tribal authority of Western Pondoland is home to 
die Nyanda people, whilst the Qaukeni people are affiliated to Eastern Pondoland. Bom die 
Nyanda and Qaukeni descend from the Mpondo tribal group (White et. al., 2002). 
After 1994, die heads of die various tribal authorities, together with government councillors 
from me district municipality, formed me new District Authority. Approximately 30 or 40 of 
these headman administered areas make-up a magisterial district, which is under the control of 
a local government magistrate. There is however some overlap between die local municipal 
boundaries and the regional tribal authorities. Bizana and Lusikisiki constitute the regional 
tribal authorities within die study area, whilst Mbizana, Ingquza and part of Port St John's 
municipality are the magisterial districts. These all fall within die municipal demarcations of the 
O.R. Tambo District Council, which is a district municipality of Eastern Cape Province (SA 
Explorer Data, 2001 and 1: 500 000 Surveyor General Data, University of Kwazulu-Natal 
Cartographic Unit, Pietermaritzburg - Figure 3.2). 
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Amalgamating traditional leadership structures with new democratic forms of local 
government, within the ex-homelands, has not been an easy task. As was confirmed through a 
broad spectrum of field interviews: incapacity, jealousies, and power struggles frequently 
jeopardise many (potential) development projects, where consensus and compromise simply 
cannot be found. This is'in addition to the contested division of responsibilities between 
national and provincial government departments (Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). 
Figure 3.2: District Councils and overlapping Regional Tribal Authorities and Magisterial 
Districts on the Pondoland Wild Coast. 
v vfflti REGIONAL TRIBAL AUTHORITIES 
1 
Magisterial Districts 
• The Wild Coast 
Pondoland Wild Coast 
(Source: Cartographic Unit, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2004). 
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3.3 Socio-Economic Background 
The Eastern Cape Province has one of the lowest socio-economic development indices within 
the National Space Economy, and a human development index (HDI) which is one of the 
lowest in the country, second only to Northern Province. Nowhere is this more evident than in 
the rural coastal communities of the former Transkei homeland (RSA, 2002; Statisics South 
Africa (STATS SA), 2003). 
Census 2001 statistics reveal that 38% of households within the O.R. Tambo Municipal District 
have no formal source of income. In other words, they are subsistence farmers, living off 
government grants and sporadic informal earnings. Twelve percent of households survive on 
less than R 4 800 per annum, and 25% on less than R9 600 per annum. Only 1 % of households 
in this district earn more than R 153 600 per annum (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2004). 
To afford a more in-depth insight into the socio-economic status of rural Pondoland coastal 
communities, some of key demographics from the latest census survey9 (2001), for the Mbizana 
and Ingquza magisterial districts (referred to as 'Qaukeni' by the 2004 Municipal 
Demarcation's Board) are provided as follows: 
The total number of people living within the Mbizana and Ingquza magisterial districts, was 
calculated at 480 191. These people were divided amongst 86 023 households at an average of 
5.6 persons/household. 
Fifty-nine percent of the population is under the age of 20 years, whilst 35% of the population 
falls within the economically active age category of 20 - 64 years. However, 71 % of this age 
group are unemployed. These rural coastal communities have a slightly higher percentage of 
aged people relative to the national average: 5.2%, in contrast to the national average of 4.9% 
(STATS SA, 2003). This is possibly as old people are well taken care of, often being the 
principal, or most regular source of income (in the form of monthly state pension), for many of 
9 These statistics come from the most recent - 2001 Census Survey - as reported by the South African 
Municipal Demarcation Board (2003). Available online: www.demarcation.org.za. Since only a small 
portion of Port St John's (PS J) municipality is included within the boundaries of the study area, PSJ 
statistics are excluded from these calculations. 
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these rural households. Eighty-three percent of households survive on less tiian R 12 000 total 
annual income, with 33% of these households having no formal source of income. 
3.3.1 Basic Service Provision 
As summarised in Figures 3.3 - 3.5, the number of households within the Mbizana and 
Ingquza magisterial districts, with a tap on-site, is less than two-percent (some white cottage 
owners, and tourism operations). Six percent of households have access to a public tap or 
government stand pump, and the remainder (89%) still depend on streams, springs and other 
natural water bodies for this basic, indispensable resource (Figure 3.3). 
Forty-percent of households surveyed have no sanitation, whilst 58% make use of a pit latrine. 
Less than one-percent use a bucket latrine, and less than two-percent have a flush toilet within 
their place of residence (Figure 3.4). Eighty-one percent of households have no access to 
telephone services (either public or private). Sixteen percent of households have access to a 
public phone booth, but not necessarily within their village locale. 
Less than five-percent of dwellings are on the local electricity grid, whilst 81 % of households 
rely principally on candles for their lighting requirements. Thirteen percent make use of 
paraffin, and less than one-percent use gas (Figure 3.5). 
Figure 3.3: Water Provision in Mbizana and Ingquza magisterial districts. 
Figure 3.4: Sanitation in Mbizana and Ingquza magisterial districts. 
None Pit Latrine Bucket Flush Toilet 
Latrine 
Figure 3.5: Lighting Sources in Mbizana and Ingquza magisterial districts 
It is evident from these statistics that national government's 'Basic Service Delivery' 
programme is still to stretch as far as these historically marginalised coastal communities. 
Poverty and lack of access to even the most basic services, means that rural coastal 
communities are usually heavily reliant upon the 'free' goods and services provided by their 
natural environment. Sustained access to, and provision of, these resources remains key to their 
well-being and quality of life. If 'sustainable development' is about using naural resources to 
improve human welfare today, without compromising the needs of future generations, then it 
should follow that the development initiatives planned for the Pondoland Wild Coast, recognise 
this fact. Is this the case? 
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3.4 Wild Coast Development Strategies: From a macro-scale Spatial 
Development Strategy to a 'Community-Based' Tourism Initiative. 
The Wild Coast, as Kepe (2001: 20) describes it " is an area of deep contrasts''. As is clear 
from the previous section, it is characterised by high levels of unemployment, poor health care 
and rudimentary infrastructure with poverty levels some of the highest in the country (Anderson 
& Gait, 1998 cited in Kepe, 2001; CIETAfrica, 2001); and yet its pristine natural beauty and 
rich biodiversity makes it, potentially, one of the most economically valuable regions in the 
province. Poverty and the environment are thus two core issues at the heart of the Wild Coast 
development debate (Kepe 2000; 2001). 
Development projects which seek to harness the natural environment for socio-economic 
upliftment, have become a prevailing discourse for the Wild Coast. After the 1994 elections, 
with the homeland of Transkei once more included on the South African map, government 
devised a macro-economic strategy to redress the situation of poverty and undevelopment, 
entrenched by an "apartheid space economy" (ECDC, 1998: 1). This was in the form of a Wild 
Coast Spatial Development Initiative. 
3.4.1 The Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative (WC SDI) 
The Wild Coast SDI, conceived of in 1995-1996, was one of ten nationally-implemented 
development strategies, intended to 'unlock' the inherent economic potential of the region 
through targeted government investment in key areas: specifically, infrastructure and service 
provision, which it was envisioned, would help attract private-sector investment to the region. 
The Wild Coast was naturally identified as a 'high-priority' development area because of its 
extremely high poverty levels and legacy of deliberate 'underdevelopment'. Tourism, 
commercial forestry, and agriculture were earmarked as the lead economic sectors for the WC 
SDI, in line with government's Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy 
(ECDC, 1998; DTI, 1999; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). 
The 'agri-tourism' SDI initially fell under the Department of Transport, as its anchor project 
was to be a coastal road connecting the province of Kwazulu-Natal to the city of East London, 
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Eastern Cape, cutting through the Pondoland section of the Wild Coast. However, when the toll 
road failed to materialise (as government never managed to secure private sector financiers), 
responsibility for the SDI shifted to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for a brief 
period before it found a home in the national Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism (Gerardy, 2001; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). 
The SDI's approach to tourism development, was that it should be private sector driven, but 
that government would act as an intermediary agent - removing key blockages (such as through 
the upgrading of infrastructure) and facilitating a more 'investor-friendly' environment. It did 
however recognise, that due to the Wild Coast's pristine environment and unique geography, a 
planned nodal approach (as opposed to haphazard ribbon development) to tourism development 
would be prudent (Nicholson, 1997; Sturgeon, cited in Ashley & Ntshona, 2002, Cooper, pers 
comm., 2003). 
Although underpinned by laudable social-development goals, the Wild Coast SDI has on the 
whole, failed to translate into practice (Kepe, 2000, 2001; CIETafrica, 2001; Ashley & 
Ntshona, 2002). Some of the key reasons given for its failure, as identified by Kepe (2000; 
2001), was that: it sought fast-track, large-scale development and investment which was not 
entirely appropriate to an undeveloped, low-skilled and ecologically sensitive environment); it 
tried to skirt around the contentious, albeit critical, issue of land-holding and tenure reform; it 
made massive assumptions regarding 'beneficiary communities' without taking the time to 
understand local realities or competing agendas; there was a lack of sustained leadership 
driving the initiative in addition to weak inter-governmental cooperation; and it pursued a top-
down technocratic approach without first taking the time to secure 'buy-in* from community, 
local, or provincial government authorities. Finally, Ashley and Ntshona (2002) maintain that 
the underlying assumptions of the WC SDI, were themselves, inherently flawed. The belief that 
a small amount of public sector spending would leverage in huge sums of private sector 
investment, and that the private sector would be willing to finance this infrastructure! 
development, was a highly unrealistic expectation, in their opinion. 
In essence, the Wild Coast SDI never made a meaningful contribution to improving the lives of 
the rural poor it was designed to benefit as it took a neoliberal, macro-econonomic approach to 
developing the Wild Coast, which failed to take sufficient cognisance of the complex 
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environment and local communities into which it was being prescribed. Although it was 
conceived with a 'sustainable development agenda', for the reasons provided above, this did not 
translate into practice. In fact, Kepe, (2000; 2001: 78) believes that, it has in fact been more of 
a "disruption" to the lives of the people it was intended to benefit, by "raising expectations and 
failing to deliver". This is especially true for those individuals who clung onto land or other 
assets in the expectation of becoming party to new developments, which never materialised 
(CIETafrica, 2001; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). 
For a while things went ominously quiet on the SDI front, until in March 2000, the European 
Union (EU), "in support of the Wild Coast SDI", provided a €12.8 million grant (between R 
80 - R 85 million, depending on the rate of exchange) to promote "community-based tourism 
development on the Wild Coast" (DEAT & EU, 2001: 1). 
3.4.2 The EU Wild Coast Community Tourism Initiative 
The Wild Coast Community Tourism Initiative (WCCTI) is a bilateral partnership between the 
National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) (as central implementing 
agents) and the European Union (as principal funders), and was designed to foster 'community-
driven', 'responsible' tourism development along the Wild Coast (DEAT and EU, 2001; 
ECODES, 2003). Tourism was identified as a logical means to fulfilling the national SDI 
directive aimed at unlocking the inherent and under-utilised development potential of a 
previously marginalised homeland; generating long-term international competitiveness; forging 
stronger public / private sector partnerships; and economic growth - all advocated by national 
government's GEAR strategy (DEAT & EU, 2001; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). 
The national DEAT appointed three non-governmental organisations (NGO's) as the principal 
implementing agents of this programme (considered to be an 'unconventional approach' for a 
Programme of this size). They were: PondoCROP (a local NGO, responsible for enterprise 
development and community facilitation); the South African arm of the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (to ensure tourism developments proceed in compliance with environmental best 
practice); and Triple Trust (responsible for the community training and skills development 
component of the programme). It would appear however, that these NGO's were appointed 
without first having to go through a competitive tender process, or providing evidence that they 
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would be capable of delivering on a Programme of this magnitude and funding (DEAT & EU, 
2001; ECODES, 2003). 
The original financing agreement proposed that in collaboration with the established private 
sector, a total of 300 viable community projects would be developed within five anchor areas 
(covering the entire Wild Coast) over the four-year lifespan of the Programme. The five 
selected development nodes, were much akin to those identified by the original Wild Coast SDI 
(Bailey & Haynes, pers comm., 2003; ECODES, 2003). It was soon discovered however, that 
the remote, politically-sensitive, and complex institutional environment of the Wild Coast, 
made this a highly unrealistic target (Bailey, Haynes, Trebble, Wiggishof, pers comm., 
2003/2004). Many of the issues blamed for 'poor delivery' of the EU WCCTI Programme, 
were akin to those identified in the critique' of the Wild Coast SDI failings. Principally, these 
entailed: a non-acceptance of the Programme at provincial and local government level as it was 
perceived as having been 'parachuted' in from a national directorate; the inability to fast-track 
land reform - so that rural communities can gain access to land to use as collateral in joint-
venture tourism partnerships, and that private sector investors may be offered some form of 
contractual security; confusion around overlapping institutional mandates with respect to 
development and access to natural resources; and too large a development area, with resources 
and development nodes being too widespread. 
The EU Programme was initially designed to be a 'pilot project', to test different tourism 
models, with a view to replicating these nationally. The two principal business models proposed 
for trial, were: a) the community-driven tourism model and b) private sector-community 
partnerships. However, it would appear, that only the 'community-based' tourism model has 
gained any advance or 'reality-test' (ECODES, 2003; Research Findings, 2004). 
The relevance of the EU WCCTI Programme to this study is that the Amadiba Horse and 
Hiking Trail - the 'sole' community-based tourism enterprise and first case study of this 
research - became the 'lead product' for this external donor programme. The benefits and 
ramifications of this patronage will be discussed within the Amadiba Adventures case study (CS 
1 - refer to Figure 3.1). 
3.5 The Natural Environment 
Pondoland has a mild sub-tropical climate with a small seasonal temperature variation. This 
makes it favourable for tourism all year round, but temperate enough to avoid tropical diseases 
such as malaria. However, the region does experience a relatively high average annual rainfall10 
(1 200mm/ pa), with the rainiest months experienced during summer from October to March, 
and a minimum of at least 50mm expected on a monthly basis. Tourism operators should plan 
for inclement weather conditions any time of year (Nicholson, 1997; White et al., 2002). 
A typical Pondoland landscape is characterised by step-like grassland plateaus descending down 
towards the coast, dissected by steep gorges and a forest patch mosaic (Low & Rebelo, 1996; 
Nicholson, 1997; van Wyk & Smith, 2001). Arenite Quartzitic sandstone forms the substrate 
for this landscape, stretching in an approximately 15km wide band from the Umtamvuna River 
(Port Edward), to a clear-cut termination at the Egosso Fault, 3kms north of Mbotyi (Johnson, 
1991 cited in Nicholson, 1997; White et. al., 2002). It is this substrate which underlies the 
Tongoland-Pondoland centre" of plant endemism, which is one of three major regions of plant 
biodiversity in South Africa (van Wyk & Smith, 2001; Cooper, 2003). Natal Sandstone soils, 
which predominate along this coastline, are largely unsuited to intensive agriculture because of 
their shallow, highly leached, and acidic nature (Shone, 1985; Van Wyk, 1992, cited in White 
et. al., 2002). 
Although the hard quartzitic rocks have created gentle 'tableland' like formations running 
parallel to the coast, the deep ravines created by the numerous youthful rivers, which cut 
through them, have thus far provided a serious barrier to the construction of a coastal road. As 
a result, there are numerous arterial (predominately dirt and 4x4) roads, which feed off the 
10 Estmated at around 1 200 mm/year as taken from average annual measurements of Mkambati Nature 
Reserve (Nicholson, 1997). 
11 The Pondoland Centre (PC), albeit small, is recognised as one of the most important centres of plant 
diversity and endemism in Africa (Davies et al., cited in van Wyk & Smith, 2001). The centre is 
demarcated edaphically as encompassing the relatively large outcrop of the Msikaba Sandstone 
Formation, which extends along the Indian Ocean from the Umzimkulu River in southern Kwazulu-Natal 
to the Egossa Fault (just north of Mbotyi in the Ntsubune region) in Pondoland. Also included are the 
smaller outcrops of sandstone around Port St Johns (Mt Sullivan and Mt Thesiger), Uvongo, and the small 
interval of predominantly Karoo sediments between the Egossa Fault and Port St Johns. There are in 
excess of 1 800 different vascular plants within this centre, with more than 120 of them (6.7%) being 
endemic to the area (van Wyk & Smith, 2001). 
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main R61 and run between these river gorges, to the coast (Nicholson, 1997). In me southern 
parts of Pondoland, these tablelands end precipitously as steep cliffs, giving rise to scenically 
dramatic coastal features such as Cathedral Rock and Waterfall Bluff (Nicholson, 1997; White 
et al, 2002) Refer to Plates 1-2. 
In the northernmost portion of the study area, mere are ancient sand dunes which contain 
fossils dating back to the Middle and Upper Pleistocene (Johnson, 1991 cited in Nicholson, 
1997). Within the Amadiba region, coastal dunes near Xholobeni, have recently come under 
threat from mining, after a prospecting lease found them to contain high traces of the heavy 
metals rutile, titanium and ilmenite (Pinnock, 2002; Sapa, 2002; TEM, 2002; Bishop, 
20030,-fc). 
Plate 1: 'The Castle': A freestanding rock Plate 2: Waterfall Bluff. One of the highest 
feature similar to (and 2km south of) Cathedral waterfalls with fresh water plunging directly 
Rock (Source: Colvin, 2003). into the ocean (Source: Colvin, 2003). 
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3.5.1 The Marine Environment 
The Wild Coast is both revered and feared for its high-energy waves, jutting headlands and 
rocky reefs (Costello, 2001). A storm zone inimical to human structures and freak wave 
phenomena, makes this coastline hazardous to shipping. The many ancient and modern 
shipwrecks strewn along the coastline bear testimony to this (Nicholson, 1997). 
Whilst the Pondoland coastline supports a high degree of biotic diversity, largely due to the 
southward sweeping Agulhas current which transports tropical fish species from northern 
equatorial waters, the low nutrient content of these waters makes them unsuitable for 
supporting large fish populations or capable of sustaining a commercial fishing industry 
(Nicholson, 1997). It is however, a popular holiday destination amongst recreational fishermen. 
Coinciding with the first gales of winter, huge shoals of sardines migrate up the coastline, 
accompanied by an entourage of predatory gamefish, dolphins, sharks and seabirds. This 
annual phenomenon is a potentially massive, but remains a largely untapped, tourist attraction. 
(Costello, 2001; Heydorn, 1989, cited in White et. ai, 2002). 
In terms of biological importance, the Pondoland coast scores high in marine invertebrate 
(including interudal) and fish diversity (Fielding et. ai, 1994 cited in White et. ai, 2002). It is 
an important spawning area for many linefish species, such as red steenbras {Petrus rupestris) 
and poenskop (Cymatoceps nasutus) (Buxton & Clark, 1989, cited in White et. al., 2002), and 
is home to some of the most productive and pristine estuaries in the country (INR, 2003). 
In February 2004 (Sapa, 2004), Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) officially declared 
the Pondoland Wild Coast a Marine Protected Area (MPA) in compliance with the Marine 
Living Resources Act (Act 18 of 1998, refer to Appendix 4). Stretching from the Umtamvuna 
River (Port Edward) down to the Umzimvubu River (Port St Johns) and 15kms out to sea, mis 
MPA is approximately 1 300 km2 in extent, and brings the proportion of South Africa's 
coastline under 'formal protection' to 19% (just short of the 20% recommended internationally) 
(Enslin, 2004; Sapa, 2004). 
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3.5.2 Terrestrial Ecology 
In the northern Pondoland tablelands, a dense and sour grassland comprising primarily 
Themeda triandra and Tristachya leucothrix species, predominates (Acocks, 1988; Nicholson, 
1997). Grasslands constitute a valuable natural resource as thatching material, traditional 
medicine, and cattle grazing. Containing over 80 species endemic to the Pondoland Centre, 
grasslands are the most threatened vegetation type in the area. Whilst grasslands closest to the 
coastline are considered to be in relatively good condition, those further inland have come 
under increasing threat from overgrazing, subsistence agriculture, afforestation and commercial 
maize and sugar cultivation (White et al., 2002). 
According to Nicholson (1997) and Cooper and Swart (1992), the main forest types occurring 
within the study region are Pondoland coast forest, dune, swamp forest and mangroves. All of 
these are of a high ecological and conservation value. 
3.5.3 Status of Nature Conservation and Environmental Legislation 
pertaining to the Pondoland Wild Coast. 
There is a plethora of legislation and policy relating to natural resource utilisation, 
management, and environmental protection on the Pondoland Wild Coast. The situation is 
further complicated by the fact that although the former self-governing territories, as it was 
'Transkei', no longer exist as legal entities, many of the former statutes and proclamations still 
apply. These stand until they are officially repealed in a court of law, and succeeded by the 
environmental laws pertaining to the rest of South Africa. This has resulted in 'legal plurism' 
(Wiggishof, pen comm., 2003), where according to the specialists: there is no single policy or 
legislative framework which exists to formally legislate or guide development in the region, 
other than 'guideline' documents such as the Tourism Development Guidelines for the Wild 
Coast (1997) (Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). 
Appendix 4 summarises the key legislation pertaining to conservation, management and 
utilisation of natural resources on the Wild Coast. However, of particular relevance to tourism 
development on the Wild Coast is the Transkei Environmental Conservation Decree (no. 9 of 
1992), commonly referred to as 'the Decree'. Originally a military decree, proclaimed under 
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the old Transkein authority of General Bantu Holomisa, this decree effectively serves to 
establish a Coastal Conservation area 1 000 metres landward of the high water mark, 
measured: 
(a) in relation to the sea, as distinct from tidal lagoons; 
(b) in relation to a tidal river or lagoon, from the highest water level reached during an 
ordinary storm, excluding exceptional or abnormal floods. 
The decree explicitly prohibits a number of listed activities, including: clearing of land, 
erection of buildings, establishment of waste disposal sites, building of dams and roads, and / 
or any other activity which has potential to disturb the natural state of vegetation, land or 
waters, without the authority of an appropriate permit. Although it is not overtly stated, the 
issue of such permits is unlikely to be granted without a full environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) (Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). 
The 'decree', in theory, provides a powerful environmental blanket over communal land in the 
coastal zone. It is in fact the contravention of this decree, which forms the basis for the alleged 
illegality of holiday cottages established along the coastline after 1994 (Nicholson, 1997; 
Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). 
Recognising the unique environment of the Pondoland coastline and its incompatibility to 
regular forms of development, it was proposed by the Wildlife and Environment Society of 
South Africa (WESSA) that a protected area be established here. The Pondopark proposal, in 
Ashley and Ntshona's (2002: 28) opinion is, potentially... 
"the biggest thing to happen on the Wild Coast, potentially another big plan that goes 
nowhere, and potentially a plan that sparks popular resistance that goes well beyond the apathy 
and jibes sparked by the SDI" 
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3.5.3.1 The Pondopark Initiative 
In line with a general shift in conservation ethos from a preservationist 'fines and fences' 
approach, towards more sustainable utilisation and participatory resource management, the 
development of a contractual 'biosphere12' park, stretching from Port St Johns to the 
Umtamvuna River (Port Edward), was first proposed by the South African Wildlife and 
Environment Society (WESSA) some twenty-seven years ago (Cooper, 1977 cited in 
Nicholson, 1997; Cooper, 2002; 2003). Figure 3.6 details the proposed boundaries and 
zonations of this contractual park. 
The Transkei Coastal Development Planning documents of Els and Taylor (1979, cited in 
Nicholson, 1997) and Nicholson (1993) endorsed the vision, on the grounds that Pondoland was 
incompatible to regular forms of development such as commercial agriculture or industry, but 
that its pristine beauty, and high biological diversity, was ideally suited to sensitively planned 
tourism development within a formally protected area (Nicholson, 1997). 
The overall vision was to create a protected area which would combine high level protection 
(i.e. Schedule 1 areas) for sites of high ecological value - such as the State forest reserves, 
estuaries, biodiversity hotspots, and nature reserves - with other settled and lower conservation 
priority areas, into a biosphere type park (Cooper, 2002). A 'nodal' approach to development 
would then promote environmentally compatible land use (such as forestry and eco-tourism) in 
the 'buffer' and 'transition' zones. 
12 Biosphere reserves are effectively multiple land use areas, organised into three interrelated zones of 
'•core conservation' area(s), buffer zone and transition area(s). Ideally, the intensity of human activities 
decreases concentrically from the periphery transition zone out towards the 'core' conservation area(s), 
but there may be multiple core areas within a single reserve (UNESCO, 2004). 
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Figure 3.6: Proposed boundaries and zonation for a Pondoland Conservation Area 
(Source: Conceptual Report to DEAT, Castley, 2001, edited by Cartographic Unit, University of 
Kwazulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2004). 
The Nicholson Report (1997) (commissioned by WESSA), put forward a well-documented and 
convincing proposal for the establishment of a National Park. It was never intended to be 
prescriptive regarding how, or who should spearhead the initiative, but recommended that a 
National Park Task Team be formed, which could collaborate with some form of broader 
stakeholder authority (much like the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park Authority) and would 
include representatives from Eastern Cape Government (Mkambati Nature Reserve is currently 
under control of the Eastern Cape Department of Nature Conservation), the National 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (responsible for indigenous State forest reserves), 
National Parks Board, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (responsible for 
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the marine and intertidal zone), Wild Coast business and community groups, as well as the 
local municipal and tribal authorities (Nicholson, 1997; de Beer et al., 2002; Cooper, 2003ft). 
However, it would seem that in early 2000, the initiative got 'hijacked' into the realm of the 
Wild Coast SDI (then being headed-up by the Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism), with South African National Parks suddenly taking a spirited interest in the park 
proposal, to the perceived 'exclusion' of province13. In February 2001, President Mbeki, in his 
State of the Nation Address, confidently announced (to the surprise of many) that the 
Pondopark plan was to go ahead (Bailey & Cooper, pers. comm, 2003). However, it appears 
that province has voiced staunch dissent against the Pondopoark proposal (as they feel they will 
be losing their prime nature reserves over to SANParks) and managed to defer further action. 
Since President Mbeki's speech there has been no word or clarification as to whether the 
Pondopark will proceed or not. 
The latest development, according to Keith Cooper (pers comm., 10 April, 2004), is that 
province, under the mentorship of the Wilderness Foundation and backed by Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) funding, are re-examining the entire Pondoland coastline for future 
protected area status. Those in the know surmise that this protected area will be closely aligned 
to the original boundaries of the Pondopark, as much of the original literature and 
environmental surveys are being redeployed. 
With the impending threat of mining and the extension of the N2 highway, an almost fait 
accompli, there has never been a more critical need for a decision to be made. Whether 
Pondoland is declared a National Park, or not, has momentous bearing for future tourism 
development, conservation, natural resource management and 'sustainable Pondo livelihoods'. 
13 If the area were declared a 'National Park' according to the National Parks Act (57 of 1976), South 
African National Parks (SANParks) would become the principal administrative authority for the park. 
Eastern Cape Province were understandably opposed to this plan as this would mean conceding ownership 
and control over protected areas such as Mkambati (considered a 'gem' in their portfolio) to SANParks. 
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3.5.4 'Sustainable Development' or Environmental Threat? 
3.5.4.1 Where to, the N2? 
Perhaps the single biggest development, with implications for the sustainability and 
development of tourism on the Pondoland Wild Coast, is the proposed extension to the N2 
highway, which is planned to cut through the Amadiba coastal region. Over and above its 
impact on the natural environment, this toll road could have a significantly adverse impact on 
the community-based horse and hiking trail currently operating in the area. 
A 'superior primary road' was first identified in 1997 by the Wild Coast Spatial Development 
Initiative (WC SDI), as an essential catalyst to "facilitating access to previously untapped areas 
of the Wild Coast... and creating local development opportunities in the short and long-term" 
(Alii, cited in Rogers, 2004a [online]). It was one project of the WC SDI, which had backing 
from all sectors of government, but which ironically, ended up being shelved due to insufficient 
private sector buy-in at the time (Ashley & Ntshona, 2002; Bailey pers comm., 2003). 
However, in November 2000, after an unsolicited in bid from a consortium of private and 
parastatal construction companies (SANRAL, 2001), the Wild Coast Toll Road was back on 
government's 'priority' agenda. Bohlweki Environmental were appointed to carry out a 
mandatory EIA, which after two years and four volumes later, was explicitly detailed, but 
critics maintain, "inherently flawed" (Kay, pers comm., 2004 cited in WESSA, 2003, 2004; 
Davies, 2003:1; Guy & Herrington, 2003) as it failed to consider alternative routings or other 
development options, including the 'no go' option. 
The South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) (a private company 
representing government), fervently denies this assertion. According to them: eleven alternative 
routings were investigated for the greenfields section between Port Edward and Lusikisiki, as 
laid out in the EIA. These routes included some that were more closely aligned to the coast, 
and others that were further inland (Figure 3.7 maps three of these 'proposed' routes -
information for mapping provided by de Beer et al, 2002 and Bohlweki Environmental, 2003) 
According to SANRAL (2004 a;b): what transpired from the EIA recommendations was that a 
route closer to the coastline would endanger more ecologically sensitive areas (including rare 
vulture colonies), whilst routes aligned further inland would need to traverse more river basins 
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and large tracts of indigenous forest. They maintain that the route they have selected 
(Delineated as 'Proposed Inland Route' (green) in Figure 3.7), on the basis of the EIA 
recommendations, strikes the most favourable balance between protection of the environment 
and social welfare requirements. It is, in their opinion, "the most sustainable development 
option" (SANRAL, 2004 b:\). 
Whilst approximately 80% of the 550 kilometres of proposed highway will follow the existing 
road alignment of the R61 and N2, the new road sections, proposed to cut through 'greenfield' 
(pristine or undeveloped) sites in Northern Pondoland, is what has spurned a heated, and high-
profile, debate. These new road sections will extend between Ndwalane and the Ntafufu River 
(north of Port St Johns) and link Lusikisiki to Port Edward, with costly suspension bridges 
straddling the Mtentu and Msikaba river gorges (Figure 3.7). The preferred inland route will 
skirt around the boundary of Mkamabti Nature Reserve, but this is in fact an obligatory 
requirement as Mkambati is a recognised protected area (Bohlweki Environmental, 2003; 
Olver, 2003). According to SANRAL (2004ft: 1), the total 'pristine' area to be affected by the 
road reserve in the Pondoland greenfields section will only be 0.16%, whilst the actual road 
surface will comprise 0.12% of the total area. However, it is the associated developments 
which accompany such a highway which is of as much concern to the environmentalists and 
anti-road lobbyists. 
In December 2003, the DEAT sanctioned the proposed alignment of this highway, finding the 
potential impacts, as identified in the EIA, to be "reasonably acceptable" (Olver: 3 December, 
2003). A 30-day extension was granted to elicit public comment and repeals against DEAT's 
record of decision. At the time of writing, there have been no further (or final) decisions 
announced by either SANRAL or the DEAT, as to whether the project will go ahead. In the 
interim, criticisms, allegations, and counter-allegations, continue to be voiced through the 
media, with warranted concern that the debate is becoming increasing "personalised and 
polarised" (Olver cited in Yeld, 2004 [online]). 
South Africa's Wildlife and Environment Society (WESSA) have been one of the most 
outspoken dissidents in the campaign against the toll road (with strong links to the media), over 
and above the many thousand of individual appeals lodged. Much of the criticism has been 
directed at the way in which the whole process (including the EIA) has been handled, an 
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inadequate public participation process, and question the rationality of such a high-speed toll 
route. The key arguments of those opposing the highway, and the rebuttals of those in favour of 
its development, have been summarised in Appendix 5. 
Some critical questions requiring consideration with respect to the highway's impact on 
sustainable tourism development on the Pondoland Wild Coast, are: 
• Firstly, will a toll road which bypasses the present economic centres and provides no 
arterial roads or access to the coastal area, provide the kind of 'social development' the 
highway proponents maintain it will? Can this toll road really help to boost tourism in 
the area... at least the kind of tourism which will be sustainable in the long-term i.e. 
low-impact, socially and ecologically responsible tourism? Is not an upgrade of the 
existing R61, with better-maintained coastal roads (already in existence), a less costly 
and more appropriate response to facilitating tourism growth on the Pondoland Wild 
Coast? 
• What kind of development will accompany the existence of such a road? Surely not the 
kind that local communities (whom are largely illiterate and are characterised by a low 
skills base) will benefit most from? 
• What impact will this highway, and the development accompanying it, have on the 
ecologically sensitive area (a biodiversity hot spot- refer to footnote 10) through which 
the road traverses? Will the highway not impair upon the 'sense of place' and 
marketable natural assets (i.e. its 'pristinity', underdevelopment and significant 
biodiversity) upon which the Wild Coast tourism industry currently hinges? 
• And finally, one has to question the 'incidental' link between the highway and the 
proposed mining deal (refer to Appendix 5). 
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Figure 3.7: Proposed alignments of the N2 Toll Road (Source: Cartographic Unit, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2004). 
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3.5.4.2 Proposed Dune Mining 
In August 2001, an Australian mining company, Mineral Resource Commodities (MRQ, was 
awarded a concession to prospect for heavy minerals between the Mzamba and Mtentu estuaries 
in the Amadiba region of Pondoland (Sapa, 2002; Bishop, 2003a;b). According to MRC, tins 
22 km long strip, extending 1,5 kms inland (also me area over which the Amadiba Horse and 
Hiking Trail traverses), is one of die "ten biggest mineral sand deposits in the world", with a 
potential resource of sixteen million tons of heavy minerals and eight million tons of ilmenite 
(Sapa, 2002: 10; Sapa & Ashe, 2004; Enslin, 2004). 
When the Pondoland Marine Protected Area (MPA) was proclaimed by parliament in February, 
2004, many erroneously considered this to be an automatic annul to die controversial mining 
plans (Naidoo, 2004; Bishop, 2003/?). However, this has nor proved to be the case. Marine 
protected areas typically only stretch up to die high-water mark and die proposed 326 ha 
mining site at Xolobeni (marked as a 'point of interest' in Figure 3.7), is outside of this zone. 
However, die stricter international regulations accompanying this new MPA, will make it 
harder for mining to obtain approval (Enslin, 2004; Rogers, 2004b). 
Responding to criticisms that mining would negatively impact on ecotourism operations in the 
area, Mineral Resource Commodities CEO (Luscombe [Online Press Release], 2004: 1), insists 
that both mining and ecotourism could co-exist in harmony, and that "other industries besides 
eco-tourism would be required to provide significant economic stimulus and deliver long-term 
growth for the Eastern Cape Province." In many respects, this is a valid comment, considering 
the dire socio-economic conditions of die region and the employment opportunities (albeit 
limited and 'short-term') that the mining would afford. 
Whilst me mining company has voluntarily nominated all beaches, coastal dunes (which support 
coastal bushland and diicket), riverine areas, and a five metre zone around mature thicket and 
trees, as "No Go" areas for prospecting (TEM, 2002: 14), environmentalists point out that 
during the actual mining phase, enormous quantities of freshwater (as saltwater is unsuitable) 
will be required to sustain the type of open-pond mining that is likely to occur (Uken, cited in 
Sapa & Ashe, 2004). With no water pipelines anywhere near die proposed mine site, it is a 
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warranted concern that this freshwater would need to be extracted from adjacent estuaries (Kay, 
cited in Bishop, 2003*). 
According to a DEAT spokesperson: the former minister was strongly opposed to mining in the 
area - believing that eco-tourism would constitute a much more 'sustainable development' 
option for the area. However, the new DEAT minister, is yet to take a stand on this contentious 
issue. Although the DEAT ministry has a platform from which to oppose the mining, 
unfortunately the final decision (as to whether mining goes ahead or not) rests with the Minister 
of Minerals and Energy, whom together with Eastern Cape government, would appear, are in 
favour of mining (Enslin, 2004; Sapa & Ashe, 2004). Their argument is that the mining will 
help to generate massive economic and employment spin-offs for one of the poorest regions in 
the country14. R 1,5 billion worth of investment, R 500m annual revenue (for 25 years), more 
than 300 permanent jobs, and the possibility of a $ 202 million smelter in East London, should 
the project go ahead, is what the mining company is promising. To sweeten the deal, MRC has 
also reportedly negotiated a 15% equity deal, with a local black empowerment company 
(Bishop, 20036; Enslin, 2004). 
Fears that the mining company are 'buying into' the local community are warranted, despite a 
number of community gatherings - attended by local households and headman of the Amadiba 
region, and even the Pondo Queen (acting chief of the local traditional authority) - to voice 
their concerns and as a show of solidarity against mining in the area (Herrington, 2004). 
At the time of writing, the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) is still to take a final 
decision on the Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project. In the interim, the threat of mining has 
provoked a national outcry from a wide number of environmental groups, politicians, 
community leaders and the public sector. Joining forces with opponents of the N2 extension, it 
would appear that preparations are well underway for what could become South Africa's 
biggest and most concerted green battle since the 'Save Lake St Lucia' campaign of the early 
1990s. 
14 These are similar arguments to the ones used to justify the clearly unviable deep water port development 
at Coega (refer to Chapter 2 in Bond, P. (2002): Unsustainable South Africa'). The mining ore would be 
shipped out from Coega, which many surmise, is no coincidence. 
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3.6 Natural Resource Utilisation and Sustainable Livelihoods 
Most Wild Coast communities depend heavily on marine, forest, grassland and other natural 
resources for subsistence, building material, health and cultural practices (Kepe, 1997, 2000; 
White, 2001). Since wild resources are mostly harvested from land held in 'common', they are 
inclined to display "subtractability characteristics" typical of shared resources (Shackleton & 
Fabricius, 2001: 48) 
Subsistence utilisation has been an intrinsic livelihood strategy of the Pondo people for many 
centuries. In the past, many of these traditional societies formed relatively closed systems in 
which natural resources were managed through an intricate interplay of reciprocities and 
solidarities. Although population densities have increased, placing greater pressure on existing 
resources, it is the 'commodification' of these resources, which is of greatest concern to 
environmentalists, and often, the communities themselves, whose well-being is so often 
dependant upon the sustained maintenance of these ecosystem goods and services (Kepe, 1997; 
Ntshona & Lahiff, 2001; PondoCROP, 2001a). 
According to local communities, much of this commercial utilisation is undertaken by 
'outsiders'. However, the task of defining who constitutes an outsider, is becoming an 
increasingly contentious issue (White et al., 2002; de Villiers pers comm., 2003). As the 
distinction between those persons with 'rights' over particular resources, and those who would 
be classified as 'outsiders' is so vague, this poses great difficulties in establishing regulations, 
monitoring, and law enforcement (White et al., 2002). According to Nicholson (1997: 35), 
"unscrupulous operators" have capitalised on this institutional and management mayhem, 
especially since the integration of the former Transkei back into South Africa, with plant 
materials (collected for traditional medicine markets) and marine resources, coming 
increasingly under threat. 
Since democratisation, South Africa has developed a host of new policies and legislation, 
relating to the ownership, use, and management of natural resources, with a view to fortify the 
rights (and access) of the poorest rural sectors of society (Shackleton & Fabricius, 2001). South 
Africa's progressive Constitution, clearly institutes the rights and obligations of national, 
80 
provincial and local spheres of government to safe-guard the environment for present and future 
civil society. 
Section 24 of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996, cited in Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001: 14) states 
that: 
Everyone has the right (and responsibility) to: 
(a) an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; 
(b) have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that-
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation, and 
(Hi) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
Furthermore, South Africa's Constitution makes unequivocal provision for the use of natural 
resources, under the umbrella of 'ecologically sustainable development'. Whilst the legislation 
and policy pertaining to natural resource utilisation and management is diverse in its 
application, it is in line with international thinking - promoting a sustainable livelihoods15 and 
participatory approach towards natural resource management (Mokgope, 2001; Ntshona & 
Lahiff, 2003a). 
In recent years, the Wild Coast has become a core study area for research undertaken by the 
Sustainable Livelihoods in southern Africa Programme (Mokgope, 2001; Lahiff, 2003; Ntshona 
& Lahiff, 2001, 20O3a;b). Much of this research has focused around institutional, governance 
13 DFID (2004:1) defines "sustainable livelihoods" as: 
" the capabilities, assets (both material and social resources), and activities required for a means 
of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks 
and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not 
undermining the natural resource base". 
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and policy processes associated with rights and access to land, water and wild resources. These 
findings have in turn, provided guidance and practical directives to the development of co-
operation agreements around natural resource management in the region. 
Whilst appropriate land conservation and resource protection measures should be the 
cornerstone of any co-operation agreement, their long-term success may only be assured, with 
the full backing from local resource users themselves (Mohamed, 2000; Shackleton & 
Fabricius, 2001, Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). Until resource users have more defined rights to 
use, transact, or access land upon which these resources exist, sustainable resource utilisation 
may be an unrealistic expectation. Hence the importance and exigency of land tenure reform. 
3.7 Land Tenure Reform 
Post-1994, South Africa has embarked upon an ambitious programme of land reform designed 
to redress the racially unbalanced status of land holding, and grant more secure tenure rights to 
millions of historically disadvantaged South Africans (RSA, 1997; Lahiff, 2003). 
Land Reform has been pursued under three broad headings: 
• Restitution: provides relief or restoration of land back to certain categories of 
victims, dispossessed by racially discriminatory legislation after 1913. The cut-off 
date for claims was 31" December, 1999. 
• Redistribution: a system of settlement/land acquisition grants which makes it 
possible for previously disadvantaged persons to purchase land from other private 
owners or the state. The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
programme has become the flagship for land redistribution and is aimed at 
facilitating entry of black emerging farmers into the agricultural economy. Since its 
inception in August 2001, the programme has delivered more than 400 000 ha of 
land to almost 20 000 emergent black farmers (Mayende, 2003). 
• Tenure Reform: the most complex arena of land reform. It seeks to bring all people 
occupying land under a unitary, legally valid system of landholding. It is the process 
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of devising more secure forms of land tenure1, resolving tenure disputes, and aims 
to provide alternatives for people who have been displaced by the process 
(RSA, 1997: vi; Lahiff, 2003). 
Attempts to dismantle the apartheid map, are further complicated by the complex, unstructured 
nature of legislation and property rights pertaining to communal areas (CA's) - the prevailing 
land administration system of the former homelands. Much of this legislation is currently under 
repeal, but until such time as it is amended, land continues to be registered in either the name 
of the state, or local traditional leaders - many of them former employees of the previous 
apartheid state. (Adams et al., 1999). 
Overt and secure land rights are recognised as a fundamental premise in advancing sustainable 
rural livelihoods. This is through the strengthening of people's rights to utilise and manage 
natural resources with vested interest for today and future generations; whilst tenure security 
creates a more enabling environment for government and private sector investment. This 
investment may include government service delivery, infrastructural development, or new 
economic opportunities such as mining, manufacturing or tourism development, with economic 
spin-offs for previously disadvantaged communities (Katerere, 2000; Kepe, 2000; Makopi, 
2000). 
'Land Rights' is a widely encompassing term, but usually includes the right to: 
• Occupy a homestead, make permanent improvements, burial rights, access or rights 
over harvesting of natural resources; 
• To transact, give, mortgage, lease, rent and bequeath areas of exclusive use; and 
• Right to exclude others from the above-listed rights at a community and/or individual 
level 
(Adams et al., 1999). 
Secure property rights for all citizens, is recognised by South Africa's Constitution as a 
fundamental premise to a functioning democracy. Section 25(6) of the Bill of Rights, requires 
government to enact legislation that will secure the land tenure rights of those whose rights 
were made insecure in the past, or to provide them with comparable redress. 
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The Bill of Rights also recognises the need for tenure reform legislation to address deeply 
entrenched gender inequalities of land rights in communal areas. The majority of women 
residing in communal areas, do not have land tenure through their own standing, but through 
the men they are related or married to. On divorce or widowhood, women often lose the right 
to homes and fields. This situation, one of substantial insecurity and abuse, is in urgent need of 
redress. 
3.7.1 The Transkei Wild Coast: A History of Dispossession 
Current land reform and rural development on the Transkei Wild Coast, can be understood as a 
by-product of racially-skewed homeland policies, dispossession, and apartheid betterment 
planning. Early twentieth century colonialists were the first to divide the Transkei coastal 
region into 'tribal' and 'resort' areas: the former set aside for African occupation and 
administered indirectly by the traditional authorities (based on chiefs and headmen), whilst 
'seaside resort* areas were reserved for White Transkeins (Republic of Transkei, 1969; Kepe, 
2001; Cousins, 2002). 
A culmination of massive overcrowding (both within the homelands, and so-called 'black spot' 
areas of freehold ownership), forced removals, the migration of African labour into a white-
controlled mining and urban economy, a dearth of economic development and investment, and 
chronic poverty has exacerbated unsustainable livelihoods and enormous pressure on natural 
resources in the region (Cooper, 1988; Lahiff, 2003). 
During the 1950's, a policy of 'betterment' or villagisation was introduced by the Nationalist 
government, supposedly as a means of controlling rangeland degradation in communal areas. 
(Cooper, 1988; Yawitch, 1988, de Wet, 1995 cited in Lahiff, 2003). This evoked particularly 
strong opposition from Pondo communities, which in addition to the imposition of unpopular 
chiefs and headmen (whose powers were derived from the Native Administration Act of 1927 
and the infamous, Bantu Authorities Act of 1951), and an inferior Bantu education, were 
among the main factors leading to the so-called 'Pondoland Revolts'. Violent protestations 
began to erupt in the towns of Bizana, Flagstaff and Lusikisiki from 1958. A major clash in 
June of 1960, resulted in 11 people killed by security police, and the Nationalist government 
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was forced to declare a 'State of Emergency' throughout the Transkei (Mbeki, 1984; Kepe, 
2001). 
Although the Transkei was a nominally self-governing homeland from 1963, it obtained official 
'independence' in 1976, under the governance of the Transkei National Independence Party. In 
1987, General Bantubonke Holomisa, then an ANC supporter, took over as Head of the 
Transkei and this led to considerably freer political activity than in other homelands under tribal 
rule. After the 1994 elections, Holomisa became Deputy Minister for the Department of 
Environment and Tourism, but in 1997 co-founded his own party with Roelf Meyer - the 
United Democratic Movement (UDM). Whilst the ANC holds the overwhelming majority of 
the Eastern Cape vote, at both provincial and district level16, Ashley & Ntshona (2002) 
surmised that the need to maintain it's electorate (in the face of growing UDM support), has 
placed considerable pressure on the ANC to be 'seen to be delivering' on their promises of 
basic service(s) and infrastructural development. However, the 2000 Municipal and 2004 
National Elections reaffirmed the ANC's omnipotent presence as the leading political party at 
both regional and provincial level (IEC, 2000, 2004). 
Today, the predominant system of tenure in the former Transkei (as with other ex-homelands) 
is that of 'communal' ownership. Due to previous discriminatory laws, such as the 1913 and 
1936 Land Acts which created a system of 'second class rights', black people were never 
allowed to own the land they occupied, and were only granted weak and legally insecure forms 
of tenure in the form of quitrent titles or permission to occupy (PTO) certificates (Kepe, 1997; 
Cousins, 2003). 
Even in those instances where people had pooled money together to purchase land, they were 
often not allowed to register it in their own names. Moreover, they needed to be aligned to a 
particular tribal leader in order to have the purchase of this land registered. As a result, much 
of the land in the former homelands is registered as land 'held in trust' by different tribal 
16 In the 2000 Municipal Elections, the African National Congress (ANC) took 20 of the 21 ward seats 
available for the Mbizana District and one seat went to the United Democratic Party (UDM). It also won 
all 13 of the ward seats available for the Port St Johns Municipality (IEC, 2000). In the 2004 National and 
Provincial elections, the ANC got 79.3% of the Eastern Cape electorate, with the next strongest opposition 
being the UDM, which won 9.2% of the vote (IEC, 2004). In the 1994 National elections, ANC won 
84.4% of the electorate, whilst the strongest opposition came from the old National Party (NP), which 
took 9.8% of the vote (IEC, 2004). 
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groups. The state has assumed nominal jurisdiction over these tribal lands, until such time as 
there is greater clarity on overlapping and conflicting land rights (Nicholson, 1997; Makopi, 
2000; Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). 
3.7.2 Tenure Reform on the Transkei Wild Coast 
The inherited land administration system of this ex-homeland in terms of land allocation, 
demarcation, and resolution measures for land disputes, is in a state of near-total collapse. 
Magistrates no longer fulfil the functions they formerly had, agricultural extension officers 
rarely survey the sites, which continue to be allocated ad hoc (exacerbating the 'illegal' cottage 
problem), and few records are kept (Cousins, 2003). Lack of clarity on basic land rights has 
lead to massive conflict between traditional leaders, communities, and the local government 
bodies, whose ordinance it is, to oversee development projects (Kepe, 2000; 2001; Bailey & 
Sperring, pers comm., 2003; Cousins, 2003). 
This anachronistic system of land administration, makes it everyone's domain. According to 
Cousins (2003): local government officials view communal land as State land (as it is registered 
in the Deeds Registry), planning development without seeing the need to ask permission from 
current occupiers of the land. Traditional leaders, on the other hand, view communal land as 
land that they control, with potential development projects being a means of securing greater 
support from their subjects. Finally, the communities themselves believe the land they occupy 
to be theirs - and always has been - with or without the PTOs, title deeds, or any of the other 
western contrived pieces of paper, that would legitimise this ownership. They certainly want to 
be involved in the strategic decision-making that will govern the use and development of this 
land. 
In a study on land reform and sustainable rural livelihoods in the Eastern Cape, Lahiff (2003) 
concluded that tenure reform was still not considered a top land issue priority. This is because 
land rights, in remote rural areas such as the Wild Coast, are generally not perceived as being 
'particularly vulnerable'. He points out that unwritten rights and community-level decision-
makers continue to assume responsibility for land allocation to newly formed households 
(whether their residents were born in the area or not), and evictions are almost unheard of. 
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Nonetheless, he does stress that delayed tenure reform, has major implications for the manner 
in which decisions around land are made within communities and for potential development 
initiatives - whether they are implemented by external agents (such as the state or private 
sector) or by local people themselves. He maintains that the true cost of stalled tenure reform 
along the Wild Coast, will not be reckoned upon feelings of insecurity, but in terms of "the 
investment that never materialised, the development that never happened, (and) die community 
project that never got off the ground" (Lahiff, 2003: 39). 
3.7.3 The new Communal Land Rights Bill and Interim Measures for Tenure 
Reform 
Outside of formally conserved Provincial Nature Reserves, State protected Forest Reserves, 
and a few acres of freehold tenure, the Wild Coast is comprised of 'tribal* or 'communal' land. 
This land is legally owned by the state, but administered by the tribal authorities as agents of 
the state. State ownership is referred to as 'nominal', since it is 'in name only'. It is 
government's intention, as affirmed in our constitution and policies, that me users and 
occupiers of such land should be recognised as the true owners, and that the land should be 
transferred to them in full legal ownership i.e. through the enactment of appropriate legislation, 
such as the new Communal Land Rights Bill (Wiggishof, 2003a). 
The Communal Land Rights Bill (CLRB) is the last pivotal piece of land reform legislation, yet 
to be ratified. Government's caution in introducing this Bill has been well advised. Land 
Tenure Reform is a complex and sensitive process, which across the world, has often had 
unintended and undesirable consequences. If a key piece of legislation fails to address causal 
problems, is inappropriate in its content, or impracticable in its implementation - it is doomed 
to failure (Adams et ai, 2000; Cousins, 2002, 2003). 
The CLRB came out at me end of 2003, with the expectation that it would be enacted by April 
2004, but has received extensive criticism from civil rights organisations, academic institutes, 
legal practitioners, gender campaigners and even the South African Human Rights 
Commission, for: 'failing to endorse broad human rights objectives'; 'lack of clarity around the 
content of the rights being created'; 'inadequate endorsement of community involvement in 
land use decision-making'; and not enough "strong measures" to promote gender equality 
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(Cousins, 2003: 5; Kollapen, cited in Sapa, 2003 [online]; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 
2004 [online]). 
However, until the CLRB is accepted and ratified by parliament, the legal standing is that 
persons residing in communal areas, still have extremely weak tenure. Until such time as their 
rights are elucidated, government has used interim safeguards, such as the Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act (Act 62 of 1997), the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (Act 3 of 
1996) and the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act t IPILRA), Act 31 of 1996, all of 
which act in accordance with the constitutional mandate which states that all South Africans 
have a right to "legally secure tenure" (Shackleton & Fabricius, 2001; South African 
Constitution, cited in Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2003:19) 
The IPILRA remains a key piece of legislature, governing the formation of natural resource co-
operation agreements. It stipulates that permission should be sought (and granted) by affected 
communities, should any of their de facto rights be altered or removed (Makopi, 2000; 
Coleman, pers comm., 2003; Khanyile, 2003). 
Since so much of communal land remains unsurveyed and the boundaries between different 
communities are often not clear, implementing tenure reform in the former homelands is a 
highly complex and drawn-out process. Moreover, many communities wish to maintain 
'communal' ownership of the land. Since it is government's vision to provide all South 
Africans with secure and transferable land ownership under a variety of tenure models 
(including communal tenure), it has now become the rather litigious challenge of ensuring 
communal landholding institutions become legally recognised entities, and be operated 
transparently in accordance to democratic and constitutional principles (Makopi, 2000; 
Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). This has been facilitated through the passing of the Communal 
Property Associations Act (28 of 1996). 
Communal Property Associations (CPAs) are legal land-holding entities which enable 
communities to acquire, hold or manage property. They have also provided the institutional 
mechanism necessary for entering into partnerships with the private sector, as once instituted, 
they provide tenure security by recognising the rights holders as the potential beneficiaries of 
any (future) development on the land. Like corporate companies, they should be operated 
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through clearly specified rules and publicly accessible constitutions (Shackleton & Fabricius, 
2001; Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). 
According to Cousins (2002): over 500 group titles have been issued to communal property 
associations and community trusts in South Africa since 1996, but sadly, many of these are now 
dysfunctional. This high incidence of failure has not been put down to the fact that CPAs are a 
form of shared land holding - for many people desire a system of group tenure and they have 
proved resilient and persistent in other parts of Africa and elsewhere - but poorly drafted 
Constitutions, poorly defined tenure and access rights for the individual, infighting, a 
fundamental mismatch between the titling model and realities of African land tenure, and 
inadequate government support provided to these groups, both in infancy and the subsequent 
stages of establishment. On the whole, the registering of CPAs has also been a protracted, and 
fairly onerous procedure (Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001; Cousins, 2002). 
It has been found that members often retain strong ties to their original communities, rather 
than seeing themselves as part of the new social entity. In some cases traditional leaders have 
contested the authority of elected trustees, and in others, an elite minority have siphoned off the 
benefits from ownership. There have been some notable exceptions, but according to Cousins 
(2002: 1) "overall the experience has been disillusioning for many in the land reform sector". 
In the absence of defined property rights and the rigorous requirements inherent of CPAs, 
Community Trusts have been favoured as a easier-access, but still legally constituted, vehicle 
through which communities can enter into legitimate third-party development partnerships, be it 
with government, private sector investors, other legal entities, or other individuals 
(PondoCROP, 2002a; Wiggishoff, 2003). The European Union Wild Coast Community 
Tourism Program adopted this legal framework to facilitate their joint-venture tourism 
partnerships (WCCTI, 2003; Wiggishoff, 2003). 
These 'Trusts' are a formalised channel for individual community members to voice concerns, 
opinions and/or support for particular development projects, as well as the community's 
representation in co-management agreements. The Trustees should be democratically elected 
and comprise a suit of different interest groups, including both traditional and local government 
leaders. Unlike CPAs, it is not a land-holding entity per se, and so it is necessary that the land 
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first be transferred to the community trust, in name, before it can be leased to third-parties 
(Wiggishof, 2003). The Trustees and its members are governed by the Trust Deed (like a 
Constitution), which should clearly lay down the objectives, managerial and land use 
principles, conflict resolution procedures, and general rules and regulations governing trustees 
and its members (PondoCROP, 2002a; WCCTI, 2003; Wiggishof, 2003). 
3.7.4 Facilitating Tourism Investment through Tenure Reform 
Along the Wild Coast, most tenure reform beneficiaries live in areas with enormous eco-
tourism potential. Nonetheless, as Ashley and Ntshona (2002: 15) point out: "lack of formal 
land rights precludes resident communities from using land as collateral in such initiatives". At 
the same time, potential investors remain hesitant to commit to land-based developments, until 
they can be guaranteed contractual security (Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). 
The Minister of Land Affairs has recognised that deferred development, "as a result of a 
legally solid but administratively slow land reform process", would only be of further detriment 
to such economically depressed and poverty-stricken areas. The DLA has thus developed a 
'back-to-back' model into which tribal communities can enter into business-partnerships with 
investors, on the agreement of all three parties (i.e. the Minister of Land Affairs, the investor 
and the local community) (Wiggishoff & Pienaar, 2001: 30; Coleman, pers comm., 2003). The 
minister has categorically stated that DLA will not go as far as to grant freehold title in these 
agreements (as she does not want to isolate trust lands) but would be prepared to authorise 
medium to long-term (25 - 30 year) leases, provided certain preconditions are met (Coleman, 
pers comm., 2003; Land Reform Office, 2003). 
According to EC DLA, these leases can take up to six months or more to be processed, as they 
require authorisation from the National Department of Land Affairs (based in Pretoria). The 
concern then, is that potential investors (for whom time is money) will begin to look elsewhere. 
From my experience, 'six months' is a highly optimistic waiting period. By way of example, 
one potential investor interviewed during this research, is six years after his initial tender, still 
waiting for a final lease agreement on the land (issued by National DLA), to commence 
building a luxury eco-tourism (Goss, pers comm. 2003). 
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The irony is that this investor was granted a personal restitution claim, on condition that he 
enter into partnership with the local community in a joint-venture tourism enterprise (Cooper & 
Haynes, pers comm., 2003). A formal land application on behalf of the community was 
submitted in July of 2003, but as yet (20 April, 2004), remains to be approved. According to 
the investor (pers comm., 20 April, 2004) the 'hold-ups' have reportedly been less to do with 
National DLA (as was originally thought), than with the local Tribal Authority. This is an issue 
of some concern for future tourism development along the Wild Coast. The terms which this 
investor is proposing (Table 3.1), makes this a prototypical development for community-private 
partnership on communal land, and yet, bureaucratic red-tape, self-important tribal authorities, 
indecision, and inter-departmental conflict and confusion, is making even the most committed 
and genuinely "Pondo-Passionate" (Goss, pers comm., 2003) of investors want to resign out of 
sheer frustration. 
Table 3.1: The Mkhweni River Lodge proposal. 
Mkhweni River Lodge 
The EU/DEAT Programme through its Community Project Fund (CPF) has offered to assist with the 
funding and facilitation of a 50:50 Joint Tourism Venture, between the Kwa Rhole community and the 
Umngazi River Bungalow Group. It is anticipated that the Kwa Rhole community will be awarded a 99 -
year lease (longest possible lease - closest to title) on the land, of which National DLA will be the other 
signatory. Umngazi River Bungalows (the company) will then sub-lease this land on a 25 -year renewable 
contract to the joint tourism project (Goss, pers comm., 2004). 
A 60-80 bed eco-tourism lodge, situated on the south bank of the pristine Mkhweni River (between the 
Msikaba River and Luphatana on the Pondoland Wild Coast), is what is being proposed. The development 
is estimated to cost R 15 million, with the EU/DEAT program willing to fund the community equity 
portion of the project, of between R 5- R 10 million. This would allow for direct community ownership of 
the facility and a secure a flow of funds (profit-sharing) back to the community. 
Mkhweni River Lodge is anticipated to create at least 55 direct and permanent jobs (90% of these locally 
drawn), notwithstanding the spin-off benefits from local outsourcing and community SMME facilitation. 
The new lodge is expected to draw on the overflow of A, B and C domestic income sectors (primarily 
families, but also couples and honeymooners) from the highly successful Umngazi River Bungalows 
(which averages 93% bed night occupancy throughout the year) and is rated one of the best value-for-
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money establishments in the country (Getaway, 1998 cited in Goss pers comm., 2003). Mkhweni will 
benefit from Umngazi's considerable popularity and exposure, as well as from shared marketing costs. 
There is thus an awaiting market for this development, with 70% occupancy levels, conservatively 
predicted for the first year of operation. This is considerably higher than the average tourism enterprise on 
the Wild Coast 
Detailed planning and design has commenced, undertaken by an integrated team of specialists, such that 
the new development will adhere to environmental best practice; and be underpinned by progressive social 
and economic principles, as established by South Africa's new 'Fair Trade' and 'Responsible Tourism' 
Guidelines. However, until the long-term land ease 
The anticipated date for opening was set as mid 2004, but until the land lease is awarded to the Kwa Rhole 
community, there is little contractual security to warranty this joint-venture. 
(Source: Schutte, 2002; WCCTI, 2003; Goss & Haynes, pers comm., 2003) 
3.7.5 The 'Cottage' Controversy 
The Wild Coast 'legal' / 'illegal' cottage debacle has been another focus of media attention in 
recent years. The tenure system legitimising and/or prohibiting these cottage developments is 
discussed below. 
3.7.5.1 The 'legal' Cottages 
The original concept, as laid out by Proclamation No. 174 of 1921 and No. 26 of 1936, was to 
provide White Transkein residents with seaside / fishing cottage sites, who, because it was 
demarcated 'tribal' land, would not otherwise have access thereto. The Transkei Seaside Resort 
Board allocated a number of sites along the Transkei Wild Coast, legitimised through the 
issuing of three-year, renewable, Permission to Occupy (PTO) certificates. According to 
Nicholson's (1997) survey: the approximate number of registered 'legal' sites within the study 
area are as follows: 
Msikaba: 10; Lambasi Bay: 8; Luphatana: 7; Drews Camp: 3; Ntafufu: 6; Mbotyi: 20 
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These 'resort' sites were originally granted to white traders, and farmers in the interior, with 
former Umzimkulu and East Griqualand farmers holding the majority of the PTO's to Northern 
Pondoland sites. Whilst PTO's were cheap and relatively easy to obtain, they were 
accompanied by fairly restrictive terms. Some of the regulations, according to (the now 
defunct), Seaside Resorts Board (Republic of Transkei, 1969), included: 
i. Sites shall not exceed one half-acre in extent, nor should the value of the buildings exceed 
R 1000. This was the amount cottage-owners could expect to be paid out, should the state 
decide to expropriate their site. Obviously it would not have been in the financial interest 
of PTO holders to develop their cottages into anything of greater value; 
ii. All PTOs issued would be valid for a period of three years only, and there was no surety 
that it would be renewed. The 'token' rental was set at RIO/annum (only recently gone up 
to R20/annum) and was paid for a triennial period; 
iii. The local magistrate or province could end the PTO at any time; 
iv. No extensions or alterations to these cottages could be made without the Boards 
permission; and 
v. Sites were allocated only to persons bona fide domiciled in the Transkei, and could not be 
occupied by the same party or parties for more than four months in any one year. 
PTOs used to be granted by the local magistrate and registered with provincial Local 
Government and Housing. When Transkei was reincorporated back into South Africa, the 
responsibility for issuing residential PTO's fell to the Provincial (Eastern Cape) Department of 
Land Affairs (PDLA) (Nicholson, 1997). 
With unimpeded and haphazard development of illegal cottages, posing an augmenting threat to 
their own existence, legal cottage owners banded together and formed a 'legal' cottage owners 
association - the Wild Coast Cottage Owners Association (WCCOA) - which serves to 
represent the views and interests of its 300 strong legal- site members. Divided into 25 regions 
(representing the entire Wild Coast), with elected area representatives, the association meets 
regularly to discuss the latest developments around tenure reform, the 'illegal' cottages, 
conservation and other development initiatives pertaining to the Wild Coast. 
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For the past decade, the Association has been negotiating through official government channels, 
to try and acquire a more secure and longer-term tenure agreement for its members. They have 
motivated for freehold title, but it would appear, are content to settle for the next best option: a 
long-term (i.e. 35 year, renewable) lease on their land and property (Webb, pers comm., 
2003). However, one does have to be careful of assuming that the association speaks for a// the 
legal cottage owners. In discussions with numerous cottage owners from Mbotyi, Msikaba and 
Port Grosvenor - it was evident that a number of 'legal' cottage owners are becoming 
increasingly frustrated about having to 'pander' to the demands and whims of government and 
local community, without having any form of tenure-security to show for it. Some of these 
cottage-owners felt that it was nigh time government took more decisive action, and provide 
them with at least an option to purchase title-deeds to the land (many cited in mat they were 
prepared to pay market-related prices for the acquisition of this land), or grant long-term leases 
with explicit 'community commitments' attached, for example: financing a local clinic or 
school, or paying a monthly levy into a Community Trust Fund which could go towards, 
specific community development projects (Discussion with ten 'legal' cottage owners, 
2003/2004). 
3.7.5.2 The 'Illegal' Cottages 
When General Bantu Holomisa took over power in 1990, a military moratorium was placed on 
the granting of all land to 'outsiders'. The effect of this was that in the absence of formal 
channels, informal land allocations took place, with local chiefs and headmen continuing to 
assign land to outsiders - often to wealthy White individuals - without formal (and legally 
binding) permission from government. The allegations are: that for a couple hundred Rands, or 
a few sheep and bottles of brandy, the local chiefs have been willing (and continue) to allocate 
some of the countries finest coastal real-estate to wealthy outsiders (Nicholson, 1997; Kepe, 
2001; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002; Bailey, Cooper, Wiggishof, de Villiers, Malan, pers comm., 
2003). 
These illegal cottages pose a serious challenge to the new government. The land they occupy is 
both ecologically and commercially important, whilst as non-commercial operations, they 
contribute "relatively little to the local economy" (Ashley & Ntshona, 2002: 39). Many 
(Nicholson, 1997; DEAET, 2000; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002; PondoCROP, pers comm., 2003) 
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argue that the small benefits provided by these cottages: seasonal employment as domestic 
assistants, gillies and care-takers, as well as token sponsorships towards local soccer teams, 
schools or clinics, for example, is insignificant in comparison to the potential economic spin-
offs (for both government and local communities) that appropriate commercialisation of this 
prime real estate, would have. 
These illegal cottages, first came under scrutiny from the Heath Special Investigating Unit 
(HSIU) during the late 1990's. The Heath Commission tried to bring the owners of illegal 
cottages to book, on the grounds that their buildings were in contravention of Decree No. 9 of 
1992, originally a military decree, but adopted by the new government as a conservation 
measure which establishes a no-development 'coastal conservation area' 1 000m inland from 
the high water mark (Cooper and de Villiers, pers comm., 2003). 
According to the decree, almost all coastal cottages (legal and illegal) along the Wild Coast 
would be in contravention of the law; but it has been easier for government to clamp down on 
those cottages without the official occupation certificates granted by the previous government. 
The HSIU initially made good progress, but then got entangled in some legal technicalities and 
progress ground to a halt (de Villiers and Wiggishof, pers comm.,2003). 
Most of the owners of these 'illegal' cottages are affluent, and well connected business men, 
who have organised themselves astute lawyers to defend their battles (they argue 'rights') in the 
high court, on the grounds of racial discrimination. They argue that legal action has not been 
taken against Black people (not necessarily from the area) whom have built homes within the 
1 000m decree, so why should they have court interdicts against themselves, when they have 
obtained the same 'permission' from the local chief (de Villiers; Bailey; Sperring, and 
Wiggishof, pers comm., 2003; Field Discussion with legal and illegal cottage-owners, 
2003/2004). 
In June 2000, a joint Task Group was instigated by National DEAT and the MEC DEAET 
(province) to rejuvenate the process. A three-phase course of action was undertaken by the new 
Task Group. 
Phase 1: to immediately halt any further illegal development; 
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Phase 2: to target numerous developments to establish a legal precedent and reinforce Phase 1 
activities; and 
Phase 3: to demolish illegal developments and rehabilitate degraded areas (MCM, 2000). 
The latest reports on the 'progress' made by this Task Force, is that more than ten completed 
or partially completed buildings have been 'voluntarily' demolished and respective areas 
rehabilitated after collaborative government operations led to threatened arrests of illegal 
cottage owners. More than 30 criminal cases have been opened whilst civil action is already 
underway against 25 individuals (20 for illegal buildings and five for driving on the beach 
and/or cutting down protected trees). 
On the 7 November 2003, the first illegal cottage at Ntafufu, was bulldozed by senior national 
and provincial authorities. This according to Eastern Cape MEC, Enoch Godongwana, "is 
intended to send a strong message to other illegal cottage owners that government will deal with 
them accordingly'' (DEAT & EC DEAET, 2003 [online]). 
According to Ashley and Ntshona (2002) the illegal cottage debacle presents another interesting 
dynamic to the process of revitalising tourism and re-shaping private, community and 
government roles along the Wild Coast. Given the general failure of other 'developments' to 
actually translate into practice, the economic benefits, small as they may be, which these 
cottages (both legal and illegal) bring to local economies, cannot be wholly dismissed. In most 
instances, the communities have shown overwhelmingly support for the cottage owners on the 
basis that they at least provide "some employment, help build schools, and give (them) 
medicine" (Ashley & Ntshona, 2002; Discussion with Pondoland Coastal Communities, during 
eight day hike from Port Edward to Port St Johns, March 2003). 
Along this remote rural coastline, where government delivery on even the most basic of 
services has been virtually non-existent, the cottage owners are respected 'for at least delivering 
something arguably better than a heap of empty (government) promises' (Ashley & 
Ntshona, 2002; Bailey, Cooper, & Haynes, pers comm., 2003; Fieldwork, 2003). 
Interestingly, from my experience, the chiefs themselves also choose not to differentiate 
between 'legal' and 'illegal' cottages. This is obviously to buttress their own judiciary clout 
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around land allocation. In their opinion: provided the cottage owner has received permission 
from themselves, to build upon a particular piece of land, he has as much right to be there as 
his black, or white, neighbour. Since this is the very same plea which 'illegal' cottages are 
using in their legal defence, it is clear that greater clarity is needed regarding the (future) role, 
and degree of authority, that traditional authorities should share in our new democracy. This 
was supposed to have transpired through the drafting of the Communal Land Rights Bill, but 
evidently remains unclear. 
3.7.6 Land Restitution Claims 
A delayed process of tenure reform however, is not the only land-related concern, encumbering 
potential investment and development in the region. A commissioned study revealed that there 
were no less than 65 land claims lodged in the area between Port Edward and Port St Johns 
(Kepe et al. 2000 cited in Ashley & Ntshona, 2002). Authorised by the Land Rights Act (27 
of 1994), some of the more significant claims within the Pondoland study region, include: those 
by the Khanyayo community on Mkambati Nature Reserve and Tracor land; land used by a 
Northern Pondoland sugar company around Mzamba; a restitution claim on a state forest near 
Flagstaff; the Lambasi claim for Magwa Tea Estate; and many other smaller •betterment' 
claims (Kepe, 2001; Ntshona & Lahiff, 2001; Lahiff, 2003). 
As in other provinces, the Eastern Cape Regional Land Claims Commission (RLCC) is 
responsible for settling restitution claims. According to Lahiff (2003: 12), the Eastern Cape 
RLCC has proved itself quite "dynamic and innovative'', particularly in dealing with betterment 
claims. In partnership with a local NGO, it has established the first Settlement Support and 
Development Planning unit in the country, aimed at providing co-ordinated and long-term 
support for restitution beneficiaries. 
After six years of successive intervention and negotiations, the Dwesa-Cwebe land resolution 
set a high precedent for community conservation and land reform, not only in the Eastern 
Cape, but for South Africa as a whole. The resolution saw the claimant community awarded 
full title to the protected area and the establishment of a Communal Land Trust to take control 
of the management thereof (Palmer et al., 2000; Bailey, 2003). 
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The Mkambati claim has also recently been settled, boosted by a R 60-million partnership deal 
between the new Community Land Trust, Eastern Cape government and the Wilderness Safari / 
Mantis Consortium. The tender is to develop low-volume (no more than 108 beds), high-
revenue tourism lodges within the reserve, which is to remain a 'Protected Area* under the 
authority of Eastern Cape Nature Conservation. The deal looks set to provide a S 000 ha 
extension to the reserve (provided by the Mkambati Land Trust), a 9% gross profit payment to 
be shared in a ratio of 6:3 by the communities comprising the Mkambati Land Trust and the 
Eastern Cape Department of Economic Affairs and Tourism (ECTB), with ISO direct jobs 
created (Lunsche, 2003; Macleod, 2003; Wilderness Safaris, 2003). 
Where land claims do exist, there tend to be more clear-cut boundaries as to whom constitutes 
'the community' with claim to demarcated pieces of land; although overlapping restitution 
claims certainly do exist. Outside of these areas, land along the Wild Coast is contested by a 
large number of different groups and government institutions with overlying mandates (Table 
3.4). Where there is dispute over whom the potential land-rights holders are, and under whose 
jurisdiction a given area lies, the formation of co-operation agreements are even harder to 
negotiate (Ashley & Ntshona 2002; Sihlope & Russel, 2002). 
3.7.7 Overlapping Institutional Mandates 
Table 3.2: Indication of the many different, and overlapping, responsibilities of government 
departments for land along the Wild Coast. 
• Department of Land Affairs (National DLA): overall custodian of the land and responsible 
for issuing long-term leases on the land. 
• Provincial Department for Land Affairs (PDLA): responsible for all forms of land reform 
other than restitution claims. Has authority to issue PTOs (albeit a temporary and insecure form 
of tenure that it is) almost immediately, without national DLA ratification. 
• Regional Land Claims Commision (RLCC): responsible for adjudicating land claims. 
• National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT): is the department 
responsible for environmental management in general, but particularly for co-ordinating 
management of South Africa's coastline and marine living resources (including marine living 
98 
resources in estuaries). It has spearheaded the Pondopark proposal to become a National 
Protected Area and was responsible for the tourism component of the Wild Coast Spatial 
Development Initiative (WC SDI). It is also the main government directive, partnered to the EU, 
to facilitate the Wild Coast Community Tourism Initiative (WCCTI) as a pilot program of 
support to the WC SDI. 
Marine and Coastal Management (MCM): is a directorate within the national DEAT and is 
principally responsible not only for the management of marine resources but for the entire 
coastline 1km inland of the high-water mark (as is stipulated by the Conservation Decree No 9 
of 1992). 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF): This national dept is responsible for the 
regulation of South Africa's (fresh) water resources, administered under the National Water Act 
(No 36 of 1998). Despite not being freshwater resources, estuaries are included under this 
jurisdiction. DWAF, together with Eastern Cape Nature Conservation are also responsible for 
the management of National Forest Reserves. 
Department of Provincial Treasury, Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism 
(DEAET): is responsible for a number of aspects of coastal management in the Eastern Cape 
Province including policy formulation, reviewing development plans, administering provincial 
nature reserves, and reviewing Environmental Impact Assessment applications in the Province 
(in terms of regulations under the Environment Conservation Act No.73 of 1982). It is also 
directly responsible for the government's tourism programme in the province. It forms part of 
the provincial planning network that supports the Cabinet Committee and Provincial Legislature 
regarding the strategic direction for economic development in the province. DEAET has also 
been closely involved in negotiations around the future management of nature reserves being 
returned to claimant communities under the restitution programme. 
Eastern Cape Nature Conservation: Provincial nature reserves (i.e. Mkambati and Silaka 
within the study area) fall under this authority. They are understaffed, under-financed, and 
defend a rather poor rack-record for conservation in the province. 
Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC): A key parastatal organisation, charged 
with the task of driving tourism development and investment in the province, as well as giving 
impetus to the socio-economic imperative of growing tourism as key economic sector in the 
province. This organisation also owns many of the coastal hotels along the Wild Coast 
National Department of Public Works (DPW): In possession of large tracts of land and 
involved in the land reform process to some degree. 
• Provincial Department of Agriculture (DOA): Currently making much state land available for 
redistribution to emerging black farmers and provides agricultural support services to land 
reform beneficiaries. 
• District Municipal Councils: The OR Tambo District Council is the local government 
authority responsible for overall development planning and service delivery within its area of 
jurisdiction. Within its Integrated Development Plan (IDP), provision should be made for local 
land reform projects and infrastructure development - such as water and roads, housing, clinics 
and schools. 
• Tribal Authorities: Qaukeni, Mbizana and a small section of Port St John's, are the Regional 
Traditional Authorities for Eastern (Coastal) Pondoland. These authorities, are in effect, a form 
of local government for their area of jurisdiction. They are responsible for the control of land 
tenure, through the Permission to Occupy (PTO) system. To procure a PTO an individual or 
organisation must first approach the local traditional authority for permission before PDLA 
makes a final decision and processes the PTO. 
(Source: Nicholson, 1997; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002; Sihlope & Russel, 2002; ECODES, 2003; Lahiff, 
2003; Cooper, EU PMU staff, PondoCROP staff, Wiggishoff, pers comm., 2003) 
3.7.8 Conclusion 
Despite some pioneering work on behalf of national and provincial land reform institutions, 
tenure reform on the Wild Coast is still on a slow-track of delivery, overwhelmed by many 
different obstacles. According to Lahiff (2003: 13), the main 'challenges' include: lack of 
policy direction in key areas, cumbersome internal procedures, inadequate co-operation and/or 
rifts between different spheres of government (especially between national, provincial and local 
authorities), limited budgets and constraints imposed by the National Land Reform programme 
itself. 
I assent with Lahiff (2003) on these issues, but would include one more significant 'obstacle' to 
this list: until the role and authority of the traditional land allotters (i.e. the chiefs) is clearly 
delineated by law, we shall continue to battle with illegal cottage development insecure tenure 
rights, investor reticence, and many of the other problems alluded to in this chapter. 
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3.8 Tourism Planning on the Pondoland Wild Coast: 
In September 1996, the Land and Agricultural Policy Centre (LAPC), commissioned by the 
Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative, undertook an investigation into the potential tourism 
opportunities and constraints in the region. The report (LAPC, 1996 cited in Nicholson, 1997) 
concluded that the area had massive, 'untapped' tourism potential, but that product 
development had lagged due to a number of critical factors. Their reasons included: lack of 
institutional and human capacity; large amounts of state forest reserves (also a potential 
opportunity); perceptions of crime and violence; the legal / illegal cottage issue; and a 
potentially investor-unfriendly or 'risky' economic environment. The report listed a number of 
issues requiring urgent redress in order to facilitate a sustainable tourism industry within the 
region. These were: ensuring local communities are fully involved in tourism planning; land 
tenure issues are satisfactorily resolved with effective administration and control systems in 
place; institutional and human capacity is strengthened; measures are in place to afford 
effective natural resource protection and sustainable utilisation; and that a tourist and investor-
friendly environment is promoted. Furthermore, the report recommended that a clear spatial 
planning and policy framework be formulated for the Wild Coast, to provide direction and 
terms of reference for future tourism development (Nicholson, 1997). 
In 2003, the Wild Coast was the Eastern Cape's most popular holiday destination, with over 
470 000 visitors. The domestic tourist market constituted more than 80% of this figure 
(primarily the 2-3 star hotel market), but there has been a marked increase in the number of 
foreign visitors (Haynes, 2003). Based on a latent demand scenario, market research indicates 
that the Wild Coast could achieve a 20% higher demand over a ten-year period, with a growth 
in the local tourism industry of 6% per annum. Destinations in South Africa, on the whole, are 
growing at an average rate of 2,5% per annum (Haynes, 2003). 
In response to the recommendations by the 1996 LAPC Report, me Wild Coast Tourism 
Development Policy was drafted by the provincial Department of Economic Affairs, 
Environment and Tourism (DEAET), and made public in June, 2000. This document has 
become the leading text for tourism operators (potential and existing) on the Wild Coast. It 
identified tourism as the "lead economic sector of the Wild Coast Spatial Development 
Initiative" (DEAET, 2000:1) and explicitly outlined the key issues (both opportunities and 
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constraints) pertaining to tourism development within the region; tourism and environmental 
policy guidelines; institutional policy arrangements; and provided procedural guidelines for 
tourism project applications (DEAET, 2000). 
A summary of the key issues identified, as constraining sustainable tourism development in the 
region, were outlined in this policy paper (Appendix 6) The policy made no attempt to conceal 
or make excuses for the blatant failings of provincial and other government institutions to 
orchestrate successful tourism development in the region. It frankly rebukes 'institutional 
mayhem', created by competing and often conflicting government departments, as resulting in 
lengthy procedures, poor response time to development applications, and indecisive policy and 
decision-making. It points to the fact that land tenure issues, which remain to be effectively 
resolved, continue to defer private sector investment in the region, although "the Department of 
Land Affairs has apparently made some progress with specific development procedures for the 
area" (DEAET, 2000: 2). Of particular significance to potential tourism development, it 
highlighted the exigency for an officially sanctioned 'Spatial Development Plan' for the Wild 
Coast, to thwart further ad hoc development (i.e. the illegal cottages), and investor insecurity. 
The document recognised that capacitated local community institutions, through which private 
sector could negotiate and co-operate, were by and large, not in existence. The policy 
suggested legally constituted community tourism trusts as a possible way forward. These legal 
entities could enter into joint venture and equity partnerships with developers on behalf of the 
community, and be able to approach financial institutions for funding for community-based 
developments. They would also act as a channel through which benefits derived from tourism 
enterprises (for example rent) could be distributed to local communities (DEAET, 2000). The 
Wild Coast Development Corporation was proposed as a facilitatory agent for accessing 
community funding at a preferential rate and reduced collateral requirements. Leasehold was 
considered the preferred tenure arrangement for new tourism development, and in those cases 
where land has not yet been transferred to community ownership, it was advised that the 
Minister of Land Affairs serve as the principal lessor (DEAET, 2000; Wiggishof, 2003a). 
The Wild Coast Tourism Development Policy (DEAET, 2000: 4) outlined the core underlying 
principles, to which future tourism development along the Wild Coast should strive to comply, 
as: 
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• The current use of land and resources by land occupiers along the Wild Coast should be 
recognised and future tourism developments should not weaken community access to, or 
sustainable utilisation, of such resources; 
• Tourism development along the Wild Coast should be based on the principles of 
Efficiency - must be the best use of land, Equity - the fairest use of and benefit from 
tourism resources, and Sustainability - tourism development must be ecologically and 
economically sustainable; 
• Tourism development along the Wild Coast should principally be private sector driven, 
but it is government's responsibility to create an enabling environment and policy 
framework for this development; 
• Tourism development should be dependent upon the establishment of close partnerships 
and co-operation amongst all the key stakeholders; 
• All tourism development should respect the principle of nodality; and 
• Future tourism development should cater to all types of tourists and budgets - from 
international to domestic, as well as local day-trippers. 
The Policy document (DEAET, 2000) also provided explicit spatial planning guidelines and 
demarcated development nodes. This spatial planning control, aims to ensure that appropriate 
forms of tourism development are encouraged at appropriate locations. Tourism development, 
with the exception of ecotourism / low impact tourism development, where appropriate, should 
be concentrated in identified first and second order nodes only. 
The most urban and extensively developed areas along the Wild Coast were assigned first order 
status. Port St Johns and Mzamba are the only first order nodes within the Pondoland study area. 
Within these areas, there is greater focus on recreation provided by the development itself (such 
as golf courses or hotel activities), and not as much on the environment in which it is located -
although these developments will usually be located in a clean and attractive setting. Larger hotel 
or cluster developments, and some cottage development were envisioned for these zones 
(DEAET, 2000; Wiggishof, 2003a). 
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Second order nodes are less developed and more urban in nature, with a greater focus towards 
'family holiday' tourism and recreation facilities provided by both the development and the 
environment. Within these nodes, cottages, cluster complexes and family hotels may be 
developed. Mbotyi and Msikaba (both with a large number of legal and illegal cottages) are the 
only two second order nodes in the study area (DEAET, 2000; Wiggishof, 2003a). 
Much of the Pondoland coastline has been demarcated as an Ecotourism/ low impact tourism 
zone, with only low intensity, natural-resource-based, environmentally and culturally sensitive 
tourism, permissible. Ecotourism developments are typically in a secluded venue and usually in 
the form of a camp, small cluster or specialised lodge facilities. Some of these tourism 
developments, although rustic and secluded, could still offer a high standard of accommodation 
and service (DEAET, 2001; Haynes, 2003; Wiggishof, 2003a). 
Areas of outstanding natural beauty, such as the stretch of coast between Lupatana and Mbotyi, 
which includes the landscape features of Waterfall Bluff, Cathedral Rock and Sikatcha, have 
been assigned a 'No Development' status. This means absolutely no tourism development will 
be permitted in this special control environment and access to the natural resources within these 
zones, will be controlled (DEAET, 2000). 
Perhaps the most unyielding piece of legislation remains the Transkei (Environmental 
Conservation) Decree 9 of 1992 which prohibits all development within a 1 000 metre coastal 
zone (measured from the high-water mark), without a conditional permit. Should special 
permission be given for tourism development within these 'Special Control Environments', it 
would certainly be subject to a full Environmental Impact Assessments and adherence to strict 
Integrated Environmental Management Procedures (Wiggishof, 2003a; Bailey, Haynes, and 
Trebble, pers comm., 2003). 
Although the Wild Coast Tourism Policy (2000) is probably the key text to which potential 
tourism investors should confer, it is still only a policy document per se (even though it has been 
gazetted). There is yet to be a sufficiently detailed Spatial Development Plan, established for the 
Wild Coast. The 'O.R. Tambo District Tourism Spatial Development Plan', as found in the 
Eastern Cape Tourism Master Plan (ECTB, 2003 - 2007), probably comes closest to achieving 
this end, though it is far from providing a definitive, or sufficiently detailed, plan for the area. 
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The local Qaukeni Integrated Development Plan (Vuleka Communications, 2002:15) also 
identified tourism as the area lead economic sector, recognising its potential to impact positively 
on "job creation, poverty alleviation and local business growth", but fails to elaborate as to 
how local government plans to establish or promote this tourism, or provide a spatial planning 
framework. 
3.9 Conclusion 
With 110 kilometres of pristine coastline, striking landscape features, and a rich cultural 
heritage, there is little doubt that the Pondoland Wild Coast has enormous tourism potential. 
However, given its exclusionist history, the complex institutional environment governing its 
natural resources (and use), and an enduring state of tenure insecurity; it is not particularly 
surprising that the Pondoland Wild Coast remains a virtual 'blank slate* when it comes to 
tourism development. It is very clear that a broader and more considered spatial planning and 
development framework is required for the area, with mechanisms in place to help 'fast-track' 
appropriate and responsible tourism development. Tourism initiatives proposed for this area, 
would certainly need to be underpinned by sustainable development principles - i.e. that they 
seek to be 'socially, ecologically and environmentally sustainable'. 
The question proposed by this study then, is: do the four tourism operations selected here as 
case studies, adhere to such principles? Are they exemplars for 'responsible' and 'sustainable' 
tourism in the region? The individual tourism operations will be documented in their own 
context (Chapters 4-7), whilst these criucal questions will be considered and evaluated in the 
concluding chapter (Chapter 8). 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES 
THE AMADIBA HORSE AND HIKING TRAIL 
4.1 Introduction 
The Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail (H&HT) is a community-based tourism enterprise 
operating in the northernmost reaches of the Pondoland Wild Coast. It was first initiated in 
1997, through the assistance of a local NGO, and has since become the flagship project for the 
EU Wild Coast Community Tourism Initiative. In 2000, it won the President's Award for the 
best community tourism project in South Africa (WCCTI, 2002a; 2003). This operation was 
selected for study as it exemplifies Ferrar et a! (1997) third tourism model: the 'Community 
Business Model' (refer to Section 2.3.4.3), and is one of the more established sole-community 
tourism ventures in South Africa. It has however received extensive grant funding, institutional 
and marketing support from the donor EU programme and a local NGO - the merits and 
failings of which, will be considered. 
4.2 Study Site 
The Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail (H&HT) operates in the northernmost section of the 
Wild Coast and falls under the local government jurisdiction of the O.R. Tarn bo District 
Council and the Mbizana Municipal Council (Russell & Kuiper, 2001). As is the case through 
much of the Eastern Cape, these municipal delineations overlie traditional authority 
boundaries, with the Amadiba Regional Authority divided into Location 24 (the coastal 
authority) over which Chief Balini presides, and Location 21 (inland), which falls under the 
control of his relative, Headman Sigidi (Ntshona & Lahiff, 2003d). 
The Amadiba area extends 22 kilometres down the coast from the Mzamba River in the north 
(just south of Port Edward) to the Mtenm River in the south (northern boundary of Mkambati 
Nature Reserve) and stretches approximately one kilometre inland (SA Explorer Data, 1999). 
Figure 4.1 provides a location map of the area with an inset of the Amadiba area and Case 
Study (CS) 1 (Amadiba Adventures) in relation to the other documented enterprises along the 
Pondoland Wild Coast. 
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Figure 4.1: Location map of the Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail and Amadiba Tribal Area 
Pondoland Wild Coast, Eastern Cape Province. 
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4.3 The Tourism Operation: A multi-day Horse and Hiking Trail 
Amadiba Adventures is a community-based adventure tourism operation which offers multi-
day horse and hiking trail packages (between 1; 4 and 6 day trails). Trailists are 
accommodated in two tented camps: the first situated on the Kwanyana River overlooking the 
historic Red Sands (approximately 14.4 km south of Mzamba) and the second, a larger and 
more permanent camp, nestled in a stand of milkwood trees on the northern banks of the 
Mtentu River (refer to Figure 5.1). All accommodation, hire of horses, tour guiding, 
equipment lease and catering along the trail is provided through a series of linked business 
enterprises, each owned and operated by a local person or group, with support from the 
Amadiba Project (Russell & Kuiper, 2000; Bend, 2003a; b). 
Trails are flexible and can be tailored to suite the interests and riding / hiking competencies of 
different groups. The horse trail has proved the most popular, but a mixture of hiking and 
riding, or a pure hiking trail, can also be arranged. Trails depart weekly and groups of up to 
twelve people can be accommodated at any one time. The trail is a circular route with two 
nights usually spent at Mtentu camp (and an option for an extended stay here), and two nights 
at Kwanyana camp on the outbound and return journeys. At Mtentu, guests engage in a number 
of different activities including canoe trips up the estuary, visits to waterfalls and indigenous 
forests, guided walks in the adjacent Mkambati Nature Reserve, day outrides, and organised 
cultural visits to a local sangoma, traditional ceremonies or local taverns (Pinnock, 2002; 
WCCTI, 2002a; Bailey & Ngwelle, pers comm., 2003). 
Plate 3 (above left): The central dining boma at Mtentu camp on the Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail. 
Plate 4 (above right): Amadiba Adventure Trailists (Source: Pondocrop, 2003). 
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4.4 Background 
The Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail (H&HT) was initiated in response to the augmenting 
need for social development and poverty alleviation in the region, and in retort to the 
ineffective delivery of the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative (WC SDI). Members of 
the Amadiba Community approached a local NGO, the Pondoland Community Resources 
Optimisation Programme (PondoCROP), to ask for assistance in helping them establish a 
tourism concern that would reduce poverty and address critical resource management issues 
(Russell & Kuiper, 2000). In 1997, PondoCROP, in association with local government and 
community structures, and financial assistance from Ntsiki Enterprise Promotions Agency, 
helped to initiate what would become a pioneer development in the sphere of 'community-
based', 'ecologically-responsible', and 'pro-poor' tourism (WCCTI, 2002a;b; Bailey, pers 
comm., 2003). The earliest product was a horse-trail, using locally owned horses, which 
followed the old coastal route of the original Transkei Hiking Trail17. The idea was for the 
Amadiba people to use assets freely available to them, such as their horses and spectacular 
natural surroundings, to generate sustainable income whilst affording tourists a culturally 
enriching, wilderness experience (WCCTI, 2002a; Bailey & Sperring, pers comm., 2003). 
17 The Wild Coast Hiking Trail was first opened by the Transkei Department of Nature Conservation, 
during the early 1980's in an attempt to formalise the increasingly popular act of traversing the Wild Coast 
on foot. The trail saw the introduction of a more formalised system in which permits, trail huts and trail 
rules were introduced. The Wild Coast was divided into four main sections, each with it own exit and 
entry point, with the northernmost section, or 'Pondoland Trail', being the longest - traversing 110 km of 
coastline with 10 overnight hiking huts. Detailed maps were provided which offered information on 
overnight stops, local flora, fauna, geology, history and marine ecology. The Wild Coast trail was widely 
regarded as one of the most spectacular and challenging trails in South Africa. 
However, the greatest problem Nature Conservation experienced with managing the trail, was the poor 
communication network along the coast. There was no reliable way of informing staff of new hiking 
groups and this often led to a situation where hikers would arrive at a overnight hut, only to find it locked 
(out of fear of theft) and nobody around. Hikers would then end up breaking in, or be forced to spend the 
night outside. 
Political instability in the region during the late eighties and a number of violent incidents on tourists 
along the Wild Coast, had an extremely negative affect on the trail's popularity. During the early 1990's, 
the number of hikers doing the trail became so few, that the viability of maintaining the trail was seriously 
called into question. Directorate budget-cuts meant that there was no funding available for routine 
maintenance or staff payments, and the huts gradually fell into a state of disrepair. In 1998, Eastern Cape 
Nature Conservation officially closed the trail in an effort to put pressure on provincial government to 
release a maintenance budget (Huggins, 2002). 
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According to research conducted by Ntshona and Lahiff (20036): the idea of the Horse and 
Hiking Trail was met with some apprehension from local community members, who feared the 
community might end up losing their land to the project, as was happening with many of the 
illegal cottages developing at Sikhombe and Mnyameni. The venture initially proposed to 
include the use of people's houses for accommodating tourists, but this was abandoned due to a 
general unwillingness from the local community18 (Bailey, pen comm., 2003; Ntshona & 
Lahiff, 2003). 
PondoCROP facilitated a number of meetings with local Amadiba communities and members 
from the Local Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) committee to clarify the 
concepts and thinking behind the community-based project and reassure communities that their 
participation would not entail a loss of land (Ntshona & Lahiff, 20036). The Amadiba Steering 
Committee (based on the old RDP committees already in place) became the formalised 
institution for devolving management and authority of the trail to the community. In 2000, the 
Amadiba Steering Committee was reconstituted to become the Amadiba Coastal Communities 
Development Association (ACCODA), with the name change reflecting the community's desire 
to have a management authority representing them not only on issues pertaining to natural 
resource management and the H&HT, but wider development issues such as infrastructure, 
health and education. (Russell & Kuiper, 2001; Bailey & Wiggishof, pen comm., 2003; 
Ntshona & Lahiff, 20036). 
ACCODA currently has 12 elected trust members - two from each of the five villages in the 
Amadiba area, one tribal authority chief, and one representative from the local municipality. 
There are no longer any representatives from PondoCROP on this trust committee (Fong, et 
al„ 2004). In December 2000, a Trust Fund was established whereby all monies generated 
from development initiatives (such as the Horse and Hiking Trail), wholly owned by, and 
maintained for the use of the broader community, would be administered and managed by 
ACCODA's trustees (PondoCROP, 20016). In addition to representing the broad interests of 
the Amadiba community, it is ACCODA's duty to facilitate arbitration disputes concerning 
community rights, development priorities and potentially conflicting government, community 
'* It should be noted however, that a 'Village Based' Horse and Hiking Trail was later initiated through the 
EU WCCTI Programme. 
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and private sector agendas (Russell & Kuiper, 2001). Amadiba Adventures remains however, 
the single largest responsibility of ACCODA. 
ACCODA outlined its vision for the Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail as "developing a world 
class tourist destination" based upon die following principals: 
• Honour and protection of local traditional lifestyles and the wilderness environment of 
the Transkei Coast, in the short and long term; 
• Generating financial benefit to the local community; and 
• Building the capacity of community members (PondoCROP, 20012): 11). 
4.5 Procedural Establishment and Institutional Stakeholders 
Many perceive me Amadiba Adventures project to be a blueprint model for 'community-based' 
and 'responsible' tourism development. Although Amadiba Adventures has developed into a 
relatively successful operation, this 'success' should be qualified against the substantial 
financial grants and institutional support received from the EU Wild Coast Community Tourism 
Initiative (WCCCTI) Programme and PondoCROP - as the programme's main implementing 
and enterprise support agent (WCCTI, 2002a, b; 2003). 
Amadiba Adventures has undergone considerable managerial and organisational restructuring, 
during its brief existence. These changes have largely been driven, not out of concerns 
expressed by tiiose most directly involved with the project (i.e. the Amadiba community or 
project employees), nor from demands of its patrons, but rather through the funding and 
expertise made available by the EU funded 'Support to the Wild Coast Spatial Development 
Initiative Pilot Programme' (Ntshona & Lahiff, 2003Z>; Bailey; Haynes & Cohen, pers comm., 
2003 - refer to Section 3.4.2). 
Although the product itself remains largely unaltered, the approach to the way in which the 
business is run has evolved through a number of stages to become, as Ntshona and Lahiff 
(2003: 41) identified: "increasingly commercial". This progression may provide for a more 
efficiently-run (and inherently more profitable) operation with larger financial benefits accruing 
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to the Amadiba community and project employees, but some persons (Ntshona & Lahiff, 2003: 
41; Bailey & Sperring, pers comm., 2003) have expressed concern that such benefits could be 
set against the increasing centralisation and managerialism that has become the core focus of 
the restructuring process. This, they argue, runs the risk of endangering die 'genuinely 
participatory and uniquely local qualities diat have characterised me trail to date'. 
4.5.1 Organisational Restructuring: An Adaptive Learning Process 
A Business Plan for Amadiba Adventures was drawn up in June 2001, where it was suggested 
that a management committee: the Amadiba Adventures Management Committee (AAMC), be 
constituted from a selection of representatives (i.e. catering, horse and hiking guides, transport 
and logistic personnel, and camp managers) from each of the individual operating areas 
(PondoCROP, 200\b). The new management committee would assume full responsibility for 
me day to day operational and management decisions of me trail 0>ut still report to ACCODA), 
so that ACCODA could shift its focus towards broader and more strategic decision-making 
such as information dissemination, and garnering community support for the H&HT and other 
proposed development initiatives (Russell & Kuiper, 2001; Fong et al., 2004). 
The complex network of accommodation facilities, transfer logistics, trail activities (i.e. river 
crossings, horse changes, canoe trips and guides), multiple service providers, coupled by me 
remote and rural nature of the environment, necessitated the need for a centralised 
administrative support centre. This central agency was proposed to act as a 'nerve centre' for 
the trail network, co-ordinating accommodation bookings, service providers and the various 
trail support resources. This agency would have to be linked directly to the individual 
community business operations along the trail (PondoCROP, 2002&; Bailey, pers comm., 
2003). Communication between the various service providers and the central booking /co-
ordinating agency has been made possible through cell-phone communications supported by 
portable masts and solar-powered battery chargers as there is no electricity and mobile phone 
coverage is weak in the area (Bailey, pers comm., 2003; WCCTI, 2003). 
Figure 4.2, provided by the Business Plan (PondoCROP, 2001fc), illustrates how the trail was 
broken down into more functional, independent Business Management Units (BMU's). The 
'Facilitation and Support Unit' was proposed to be responsible for capacity building within the 
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different units, so that that they could become self-contained, profit-generating centres, of the 
overall Amadiba Business. It was envisaged that each of the units would operate in co-
ordination with, but independently of, all the other business units, and have proportional 
representation on the new Project Management Steering Committee (PMSC). Developing a 
Business Strategy was the joint responsibility of the Steering Committee and the business unit 
concerned. After this restructuring process, ACCODA assumed overall ownership of the trail, 
but daily operational decisions became the responsibility of the business unit concerned 
(PondoCROP, 20016; Bailey, pers comm., 2003; Bend, 2003ft). 











= Profit generating centres (Source: PondoCROP, 2001ft) 
Notes: 
The following 'Business Management Units' were created to oversee more efficient operational 
management: 
• Mtentu campsite: this business unit comprises camp keepers / cleaners, caterer's, security and a 
camp manager, responsible for hosting guests at the Mtentu River. 
• Kwanyana campsite: this business unit comprises a similar staff complement (but fewer in 
number) to that of Mtentu. They are responsible for hosting guests at the Kwanyana River. 
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• Guides and Horse Organisers: this business unit is responsible for transporting tourists safely, 
by foot, horse or canoe, into the trail area, between campsites, up and/or across rivers. 
• When a trail booking is made, this information is forwarded to all the applicable BMU's whom in 
turn contact the relevant persons on the ground that act as the communication hub for their 
respective service provider team. Every self-contained BMU is responsible for maintaining 
information and communication flow between a) transference of bookings made at the Central 
Agency through to the ground, and b) administrative reporting to the Management Steering 
Committee and the owners of the business - i.e. the community, represented by ACCODA (Bend, 
20036). 
• Central administration unit: this business unit is a 'cost centre' (i.e. it does not generate profit 
but is essential to the working of the larger organisation) and is responsible for all the centralised 
administration, finance, reporting, and marketing functions of the business. 
However, after four years of operational experience (1999-2002) it became evident that there 
was still a clear lack of administrative skills in the Amadiba Adventures business. This was 
largely due to me dependence mentality that me project had on PondoCROP (PondoCROP, 
20026; Ntshona & Lahiff, 2003). PondoCROP had continued to oversee the reservation, 
financial and administrative components of the Amadiba Adventures business from their 
Mzamba offices. The development of the Facilitation and Support Unit was proposed to lessen 
this dependency by developing skills and capacity within the individual BMU's such that when 
PondoCROP withdrew from me project all together (after me EU Programme has run its term 
and funding was exhausted) Amadiba Adventures would be an entirely self-sufficient, 
sustainable tourism operation. 
PondoCROP had proposed that the Facilitation and Support Unit / Central Agency be 
established not only as the principal vehicle for ensuring sustainability of the Amadiba 
Adventures project, but all of the community tourism projects established under the auspices of 
the EU Wild Coast Community Tourism Initiative (whose 4-year contract would be coming to 
an end in March 2004) (PondoCROP, 20026). However, by me end of the programme, this 
'Agency' had not materialised to the level of functioning, or competence, that PondoCROP had 
originally envisioned for it. 
In fact, me current Trails Manager has become more or less, the single linchpin of the entire 
Amadiba Adventures Business. Although there is a rudimentary 'Facilitation and Support' unit 
in place, the current Amadiba Trails Manager has assumed almost single-handed responsibility 
for all me reservation, staff co-ordination, and logistical operations of the business. This is 
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because there is no clearly defined, or competent, second line of management. The Trails 
Manager currently undertakes all Amadiba Adventure's networking and co-ordination witii 
external agencies, reports the activities of the business to ACCODA, and represents Amadiba 
Adventures at the various marketing trade shows and conferences. His absence from the 
Reservations Office (when he is away at trade shows or on other business) reportedly leaves a 
"serious void", and it is a warranted concern, expressed by many on the EU programme, that 
should he leave the business, Amadiba Adventures might soon fall apart (Fong et at., 2004; 
Bailey, Haynes, and Wiggishof, pers comm., 2003; Trebble, pers comm., 2004). 
One of the key recommendations which came out of an assessment conducted by the University 
of Berkeley, on Amadiba Adventure's sustainability (Fong et al., 2004: 4), was that the 
business should train-up and reorganise their staff complement so that they appoint specialist 
managers to operate within a clearly delineated "hierarchal structure" (the conventional 
organisational structure of most profit-making businesses around the world). The organisation 
of the business should be such that there are clearly defined responsibilities, control areas, and 
formalised relationships amongst staff, supervisors and the various hierarchal control managers 
of the business. However, those who have been integrally involved with the Amadiba 
Adventures business seriously question where this level of capacity (required in a hierarchal 
managerial system) could be sourced from the local Amadiba area - should it remain a local 
community initiative. 
I believe this to be the single largest failing of Triple Trust (TTO) - the NGO appointed to die 
EU programme to provide community capacity building and skills training around tourism 
development. TTO were not specialists when it came to business management (i.e. training in 
accounting, reservation and marketing skills), the hospitality industry, or trust training. Their 
experience was aligned witii die more conventional community development projects i.e. 
leadierwork, beading, poultry farming, sewing projects and die like. They therefore had to sub-
contract other training organisations to meet die training needs of die programme. There was a 
large degree of misunderstanding between PondoCROP and TTO as to whom was responsible 
for identifying training needs and die sourcing of potential candidates, resulting in belated 
training workshops, which by many informant's account, were 'far too general and 
elementary'. 
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From the situation which Amadiba Adventures now finds itself in (where only the Trail 
Manager has any real knowledge of the business management component of the community 
business), it appears that TTO's training has made little tangible difference to enhancing the 
'capacity'- particularly that relating to tourism development - of the coastal communities 
residing in the study region (Bailey, Cuba, Wiggishof, pers comm., 2003; ECODES, 2003; 
Trebble, pers comm., 2004). 
4.6 Critique of Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts 
4.6.1 Economic Impact 
4.6.1.1 Direct Employment and Training 
According to PondoCROP's Finance and Business Plans (PondoCROP, 2001ft; pers comm., 
2003; PondoCROP, 2003), the EU Mid-term Report (ECODES, 2003), and the 2004 Concept 
Business Model submitted by Haley Sharpe Consultants (Lourens, 2004): 9 business entities 
and 57 employment opportunities had been created out of Amadiba Adventures (AA) by 
December 2002. Of these only 22 are full time jobs, whilst the remaining 35 are part-time 
employees - remunerated only when tourists are on the trail. Employees are divided between 
the following business units and service providers (PondoCROP, 2001ft): 

































(Source: PondoCROP, 2003). 
The total salaries paid by Amadiba Adventures during 2002 amounted to R281, 232.70. The 
average income per job category is provided in the table below (ECODES, 2003; 
Lourens,2004). 
Table 4.2: Average 2002 Income per job 
category for Amadiba Adventures 







































Table 4.3: Average hospitality wages from 
survey of 10 tourism enterprises conducted 
by Haley-Sharpe Consultants 


















R 45 000 
R 15 000 
R 22 500 











As is clear from the above tables, the remuneration levels of Amadiba Adventure (AA) 
employees are significantly lower than average rates paid by the South African hospitality 
industry (ECODES, 2003; Lourens, 2004a). As a comparison: an administrator employed by 
the Amadiba Adventures business earns approximately R9 600/annum, whilst an average salary 
for a receptionist working in the hospitality industry, according to Haley-Sharpe consultants 
(Lorens, 2004a) is R43 000/annum. The Mid-term Review (MTR) Consultants (ECODES, 
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2003) calculated, based on an average wage rate per job category and taking into account the 
number of full and part time employees, the average wage rate for full time AA employees to 
be R429.58 per month (based on 2002 wage rates), and R191.27 for part time employees. 
Although, these figures are below even the minimum rural wage for domestic and agricultural 
workers'9, in a highly impoverished remote rural community, with more than 40% of 
households living below the poverty line (May, 2000 cited in Russell & Kuiper, 2001) and 
unemployment rates in the region of 80%, these earnings still go a long way towards uplifting 
the local economy. 
4.6.1.2 Formal Economic Contribution: 
1) Estimated Revenue from wages into Amadiba Region 
The potential Annual Income into Local Rural Economy: 
Number of full-time employees x Average wage rate: 22 x R 429.58 x 12 = R113 409.12 
Number of part-time employees x Average wage rate: 35 x R R191.27 x 12 = R80 333.4 
Total Annual Contribution: R 193 742.52 
The majority of business analysts brought in through the EU Programme to advise on the 
financial and management component of the Amadiba business have recommended that AA 
cutback on its staff complement and increase remuneration levels to comparable standards of 
the industry. This would mean that there would be less in the way of management costs and 
more funds flowing directly to the service providers (Fong et ai, 2004; Lourens, 2004a; 
Earnst & Young, cited in Trebble, pers comm., 2004). 
19 The Minimum wage for domestic workers, as of November 2003 was R864/month for urban 
domestics (a minimum of R4.87 per/hour for less than 27 ordinary working hours/week) and R702/ month 
for rural workers (minimum of R3.95/hr). Should year-on-year consumer inflation be greater than 10 
percent as of 31 October 2004, the department will adjust the 8% 2003 wage increase upwards 
(SouthAfricaJnfo reporter, 2003). 
The current minimum wage for agricultural workers is R871.58/month where average household income 
> R24 000/annum, and R713.65 where average household income is < R24 000/annum. This is after the 
Department of Labour announced a mandatory 9% and 10% wage increase from March 2004 
(SouthAfrica.info reporter, 2004). 
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However, as Amadiba's Trail Manager (pers comm., 2003; Trebble, pers comm., 2004) points 
out: AA was purposely designed to operate off a flat hierarchal structure - whereby the camp 
manager does not get paid much more than the kitchen assistant, who in turn does not get paid 
much less than the horse guide. AA decided to work off the principle that instead of employing 
one person at R100 /day, they would employ two persons to share the job and pay them R60 
each = R120/day. Even though this means less overall profit for the Amadiba business, there 
is a wider spread of direct benefit-sharing amongst the local Amadiba households. Profit 
maximisation comes second to job creation in Amadiba Adeventure's view. 
2) Turnover and Profit 
Since the EU programme's inception of support for the Amadiba project (2000 - 2004), annual 
turnover has shown a steady growth from R280 000 in 2000 to over a million Rand in 2003 
(PondoCROP, 2003; Bailey & Trebble, pers comm., 2003/2004). The 2002 and 2003 incomes 
combined account for 72% of the total earnings from 2000. These revenue figures are reflected 
in Table 4.4 below. 













> R 2,151 560 
(Source: PondoCROP, 2003). 
This growth in turnover is a result of more trails conducted (i.e. higher occupancy levels) and 
price restructuring (a product price increase). Although the growth in turnover reflects an 
expanding business, its success should be measured only after operational costs are taken into 
account. The net profit equation (i.e. profit after expenses) reveals a considerably less 
successful narrative. 
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The breakdown of the 2002 revenue (provided by the Mid-term Review), is as follows: 
• 51 % (R281,232.70) to salaries and wages; 
• 22% (Rl 19,776.73) to operational costs; and 
• 27% (R150.550.57) to profit. 
However, in 2003, the Income/Expenditure Budget published by an external consultant, Haley-
Sharpe, (for January -September 2003) showed Amadiba Adventures to be operating at a 
R 537 500 loss10. This loss excluded the grant fund of R 400 000 spent on training, mentorship 
and skills development, provided through the EU programme (Lourens, 2004a). From this 
report (Lourens, 2004a) it appears that general administration and operational expenses of the 
business had increased exponentially (as much as 12-fold for some expenses) during the 2003 
period. A case of alleged 'misappropriation of funds', has since become public, but remains to 
be proven. Nonetheless, PondoCROP has been sternly admonished for not having sufficient 
protocols in place to prevent such a situation from transpiring in the first place. As identified by 
the Earnst and Young (2004) report: there was an explicit lack of segregation of duties, cash 
management policies and procedures, debtor, cash or payroll reconciliation's, asset 
verification, or of monitoring actual expenditure and budgets. For example, Amadiba 
Adventure's chequebook and cash card only ever required one signatory (Undisclosed, pers 
comm., 2004). 
Essentially, PondoCROP operated on a system of trust, with too much liberty being assigned to 
the integrity of its individual employees. ACCODA is as much to blame, for not having kept a 
tighter check on where, and how much, of their money was being spent. This is a matter of 
some concern when one considers that it is actually ACCODA's responsibility to monitor the 
financial turns of the 'Community Business' (or at least it definitely would be if PondoCROP 
and the EU programme were not providing support). According to sources there has been "a 
fair amount of confusion around the lines of responsibility when it came to the checks and 
balances of the businesses' financials, with the EU Programme Management Unit (PMU), 
20 It should be noted that Haley Sharpe's Financials are not directly comparable to the Financial Reports 
prepared by PondoCROP and the EU, as they employed a different accounting procedure to determine the 
businesses' profitability taking a more prudent approach to depreciation and tax deduction and tending to 
discount the grants provided through the EU Programme. 
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PondoCROP and ACCODA all expecting the others to have picked up on the transgression" 
(Undisclosed, pers comm., 2004). 
Despite this major transgression, PondoCROP insists that Amadiba Adventures still made a 
profit in 2003. The fact that Amadiba Adventure's turned over a million Rand in sales helps to 
affirm the potential 'success' of the Amadiba Adventure's business, provided sound business, 
financial and management protocols be instituted. 
4.6.2 Occupancy Rates and Market Statistics 
The number of trails conducted, as opposed to the number logistically possible in a single 
month (i.e. Occupancy Levels) is a further consideration with respect to the 'sustainability' of 
the business. PondoCROP works on 28 trails/month constituting 100% occupancy for the 
Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail. This translates into a possible 336 trails available in a year 
(PondoCROP Financial Records & Trail Statistics, 2003). 
Occupancy levels have increased steadily since the inception of the Horse and Hiking Trail. 
The 144 trails conducted from January to December 2002, represents an occupancy level of 
43%. This increased during 2003, due to positive word-of-mouth referrals and a strong 
marketing campaign backed by the EU Programme (WCCTI, 20CK2a;b; 2003). These increasing 
occupancy rates suggest that there is a latent market-demand for the type of tourism product 
Amadiba Adventures is offering. 
In addition, it is important to consider the current profile of trail-participants in order to inform 
a more target driven marketing campaign. As can be seen from Figure 4.3 the majority (54%) 
of Amadiba's clientele comes from domestic tourists. A further seven percent comes from local 
school groups and 32% are International tourists, who predominantly occupy the trail during 
school and non-peak holiday periods. It should also be noted that 25% of the 2002 sales income 
was derived from PondoCROP staff and visiting NGO's. This is a source of income which is 
likely to tail-off substantially, after the EU Programme has concluded. 
In considering Amadiba Adventure's marketing and trail statistics for 2003 (PondoCROP, 
2003): it appears that seventy-one percent of all domestic enquiries during 2003 were sourced 
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from two main sources: namely, Getaway Magazine, and word-of-mouth, resulting in 66% of 
all reservations. From this market information one can infer that the general profile of the 
domestic tourist interested in such a trail, is likely to be middle income friend or family groups 
(such as those who would buy Getaway Magazine) or those persons seeking a unique cultural, 
adventure and outdoor-experience. 
Figure 4.3: Amadiba Sale Categories for 







• Pondocrop Staff 
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Considering that the 2003 price/day for the Amadiba Trail was R400 (R 1 600 for a four-day 
trail), the Amadiba product is not marketed at the 'budget-traveller', especially when one 
compares it to other Wild Coast holiday resorts and family hotels, where for between R 240 -
R 460/pppn (depending on accommodation choice and seasonality) one is guaranteed 
comfortable to luxurious lodgings, three meals a day, and other entertainment facilities 
(Getaway Online, 2004). 
In terms of International Enquiries, the Coast-to-Coast21 has proved to be the most effective 
marketing strategy for 2003, followed by word-of-mouth and recommendations or referrals 
made by Backpacker Lodges (Amadiba Financials and Trail Statistics - PondoCROP, 2003). 
Backpackers may chose the Amadiba trail over similar competitors, for any of the following 
reasons: the historical intrigue of the area being a former homeland and the fact that the Wild 
21 The Coast-to-Coast is a booklet made freely available to backpackers containing information about 
different Backpacker's and budget tours across South Africa. 
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Coast is perceived as being 'off-the-beaten track'; a chance to interact with and experience local 
amaPondo culture; and the pristine natural surroundings for which the area is acclaimed. 
Backpackers are usually well educated and often value a high degree of social interaction and 
adventure activity (PondoCROP, 2003; Fong et al., 2004). The international eco-tourist / 
backpacker is usually prepared to put up with a little discomfort and 'average' food, provided 
the experience they receive is uniquely memorable or perceived of as somewhat 'exclusive'. 
4.6.2.1 Satisfying Market Demand and Competitive Pricing 
In their assessment of Amadiba Adventure's sustainability, and recommendation for future 
marketing initiatives, a team of University of Berkeley consultants (Fong et al., 2004) 
identified four main tourist groups, who they considered 'target markets' for the Amadiba 
Adventures product. These were: the ecotourist; the backpacker; and 'special interest' tourist 
groups from both the international and local tourist markets. Their attributes and reasons for 
'interest' are summarised in Table 4.5. 






Selected Target Market 
Attributes 
• First-time visitors 
• Interest in unique physical sites 
• Independent travelers 
• Taking a holiday in a different 
province of South Africa 
• Interest in natural sites 
• Value quality 
• Responsible travelers 
• Interest in natural sites and local 
culture 
• Budget travelers 
• Adventure seeking 
• Young and active 
Value Proposition 
Amadiba is a world class, once in a lifetime 
natural experience that is set in an area of 
pristine coastal wilderness and rich cultural 
history. 
Amadiba offers a visit to an area of national 
and global historical significance, as well as 
a journey to a land of unmatched 
environmental importance and beauty. 
Adhering to the standards of responsible 
tourism, Amadiba provides a journey 
through pristine coastal wilderness and an 
area steeped in rich cultural history. 
Amadiba is a unique adventure and 
community-based experience located in the 
remotest part of South Africa. 
(Source: Fong et al., 2004) 
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To gain a better perspective on whether Amadiba Adventures would fulfil the expectations of 
these identified markets, the Berkeley consultants undertook Amadiba Adventure's four-day 
horse trail (in the capacity of international tourists). Their views and comments, backed by 
personal field observations and pilot investigations, have been summarised below: 
• In comparison to similar tourism initiatives, Amadiba Adventures falls short in terms of 
quality of service and is slightly higher in price than other Eastern Cape competitors; 
• Whilst the spectacular natural environment of the Wild Coast sells itself, the cultural 
interaction which international guests may be seeking to experience with Amadiba 
Adventures, has possibly not been developed to full potential. Furthermore, those 
components which support Amadiba Adventures as an ecotourism venture, should be 
emphasised during the trail, for example: information regarding local materials used for 
building, or the use of alternative energy in the trail camps. A genuine 'ecotourist' is 
interested not only in the flora and fauna of the region but how his/her stay will impact 
on the surrounding environment. In as remote and pristine location as the Wild Coast, 
this aspect of the trip's facilities should be underscored; 
• Standardisation of basic sanitation, dining and sleeping facilities, seems to be in order 
amongst the different trail camps; 
• The catering on the trail can become rather monotonous when chicken is invariably 
served up at every dinner. The packed lunches were also criticised for not measuring up 
to the quality tourists felt they were paying for (Fong et al., 204). An important part of 
the Amadiba experience should be learning about and interacting with the local 
community. The inclusion of more local foods into the catering menu would be an 
added value to the trip as ecotourists and backpackers are usually curious about tasting 
new food and finding out about its origin; and finally 
• Service levels and the organisational logistics of the trail do not always meet the 
standard expected of the (tourism) industry. A number of trail groups commented on the 
varying condition of the horses, delays in transfers (when new horses had not been 
delivered timeously) and the quality of equipment provided. 
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From the University of Berkeley findings, comments obtained from groups who had undertaken 
the trail, and participant experience, it appears there are still some important logistical and 
managerial issues which require redress before Amadiba Adventures can confidently align itself 
with the backpacker and ecotourist markets (Field Observations, 2003; Discussions with 
Amadiba Trailists, 2003-2004; Fong et al, 2004; Trebble, pers comm., 2004). 
The University of Berkeley consultants (Fong et al., 2004) recommended nonetheless, that the 
price of the trail be increased fractionally. They suggested a daily tariff of between R445-R450 
per day, in recognition of the fact that this pristine coastline can only really be accessed through 
die horse and hiking trail. Customers are thus paying a premium to access this part of the coast. 
I believe the current trail price is fair, when one considers the activities and constituent 
components of the trail. PondoCROP has indicated, in its financial forecasting, that it could 
increase me trail price annually by 5% to 15% (PondoCROP, 2003c; Fong et al, 2004). 
However, I would not advise a price increase until such time as quality and service levels are in 
order. Price should be dictated by demand and at a current occupancy level of under 50%, 
Amadiba Adventures would benefit more (in terms of higher turnover and need for more full 
time employees) from having more trails conducted each month, as opposed to fewer at a 
'premium' price. Offering 'out-of-season' trail packages at a reduced rate (provided all service 
providers are fully remunerated and the business is operating at a profit, albeit smaller) may 
help to boost annual occupancy levels. 
4.6.3 Socio-Environmental Impacts and Institutional Sustainability 
The Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail has been a pioneering initiative in a region with no prior 
tourism experience, and a largely subsistence, low-skilled rural economy. According to a 
natural resource and socio-economic survey conducted by PondoCROP on 30 households in me 
Amadiba Region, the average monthly household income was calculated at R 512, with 33% of 
households stating pensions as their primary source of income, and 10.5% of households 
relying on family members working outside the area as their only source of income. 
Agriculture, natural resource collection and animal husbandry hence continue to play an 
important role in supporting local livelihoods (PondoCROP, 2002c). 
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The Annuliha project has not only helped to create local employment and improve facilities, but 
conferred ownership and management responsibilities for the trail and it's environ to the local 
Amadiba community. This has produced some innovative joint-management partnerships 
between the community and its 'statutory' custodians (i.e. government) (Ashley & Ntshona, 
2002; WCCTI, 2003). The establishment of the Amadiba Coastal Communities Development 
Association (ACCODA) as the communities local representative body for development 
initiatives (originally necessitated through the development of the Horse and Hiking Trail) has 
certainly facilitated a greater sense of 'ownership' and interest by local communities in 
development (principally 'tourism', but other development initiatives as well) of their region 
(Russell & Kuiper, 2001; Bailey, pers comm., 2003). 
According to PondoCROP (Undisclosed spokesperson, pers comm., 2003): when there was 
debate regarding whether a second lodge should be built at Mtentu (so that both Amadiba 
Adventures and Ufudu, or another private sector operator, could operate year round), 
ACCODA made it quite clear that given a choice between Ufudu (their private-sector flyfishing 
partner - refer to Case Study 2) and Amadiba Adventres as principal operators, Amadiba 
Adventures would definitely take precedence. This was attributed to the 'greater sense of 
ownership' that the community shared with the Horse and Hiking Trail. 
4.6.3.1 Overlapping Jurisdictions 
Ashley and Ntshona (2002: S3) identified the largest obstacles to the sustained success of 
Amadiba Adventures, as being "institutional" in nature. The rigours of bureaucratic process, 
compounded by conflicting and unclear institutional jurisdictions, has made the establishment of 
this community-based enterprise a capital-intensive and time-consuming affair. The reality is 
that it has taken four years of dedicated support from the EU Wild Coast Community Tourism 
Initiative (WCCTI), coupled to a number of years prior to the Programme (with PondoCROP's 
support), to get the Amadiba business to its current - and many will maintain, still 'fledgling' -
status. Whilst the popularity of the trail (reflected by increasing occupancy levels) reveals that 
there is indeed a market demand for 'alternative' (i.e. community, culture, and nature-based 
tourism) tourism experiences, the lead time, effort and financial backing required to get the 
project to a point of effective and sustainable delivery has been significant (ECODES, 2003; 
Ntshona & Lahiff, 2003). 
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As was discussed in die contextual overview (Chapter 3), a major impediment to development 
on the Wild Coast is the surfeit of governmental departments with overlapping (and often 
incongruous) jurisdictional mandates. The Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail, for example, 
impinges upon me jurisdictions of, amongst others: the National Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) (specifically the Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management 
(MCM)), the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), the National Department of 
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), as well as the Provincial Departments of Economic 
Affairs, Environment and Tourism (DEAET) and Local Government and Planning (LGP). The 
local authorities of die O.R. Tambo District Council, me Mbizana Municipal Council, as well 
as me Regional Qaukeni Tribal Authority, also have environmental and natural resource 
management responsibilities in me region. The points of interface between ACCODA and the 
various government structures responsible for different areas and natural resources utilised in 
the trail, was originally through me Joint Programme Steering Committee (Figure 4.4) 
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(Source: Russell & Kuiper, 2001: 19) 
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Natural Resource Management, has historically, been an issue of conflict amongst Wild Coast 
communities and the statutory authorities. Amadiba Adventures was conceived of as a novel 
way of providing the Amadiba community with tangible economic benefits, whilst attaching 
'value' to the protection of their natural resources and environment. The foundations however, 
upon which to develop this co-management initiative, were not in place and due to the 
multitude of potential stakeholders involved, developing collaborative co-management 
agreements has been a sensitive, complex, and protracted affair (Russell & Kuiper, 2001; 
Bailey; Haynes; Wiggishof, pers comm., 2003). This has been further complicated by recent 
government restructuring with respect to departmental jurisdictions and key responsibilities 
(Glazewski & Sowman 1998, cited in Russell & Kuiper, 2001). 
For example: the Mtentu Estuary - upon which one of the Amadiba Trail huts is located and is 
also used for canoeing and seasonal flyfishing - falls under the jurisdiction of DEAT: MCM 
(classified as a Marine Protected Area within the Mkambati Nature Reserve) but is also the 
responsibility of the National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, whom are responsible 
for the regulation of all South Africa's fresh water resources (including estuaries) and the 
management of the indigenous forests flanking the estuary. MCM however, have little presence 
on the ground (their National office being located in Cape Town), so have handed over 
responsibility for the estuary to Eastern Cape Nature Conservation, who in turn, are answerable 
to the Eastern Cape Department of Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism (DEAET). 
This is ironic considering the national restructuring process was designed to shift responsibility 
for marine resource management from provincial authorities (i.e. DEAET) to a national 
government responsibility administered by the newly instituted Marine and Coastal 
Management (MCM) directorate within national DEAT (Sihlophe & Russell, 2002; Bailey; 
Cooper; Sperring; Wiggishof, pers comm., 2003). 
Provincial and local government departments have reportedly been the most actively involved 
in the Amadiba project. The Mbizana Municipal Council provided a full-time local councillor 
to work on the project and act as a bridge between local government and the Amadiba 
community. The local municipality has also been broadly supportive of the efforts to establish a 
collaborative natural resource management plan for the region (Russell & Kuiper, 2001). 
Despite the historical animosity that local communities have towards provincial government 
authorities - particularly, Eastern Cape Nature Conservation for their law enforcement on 
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fishing permits, closed-seasons and bag limits - provincial government personnel have provided 
support to the Amadiba community on a number of fronts, for instance: assisting ACCODA 
with its application to MCM for a catch-and-release flyfishing permit on the Mtentu estuary -
refer to Case Study 2 (Russell & Kuiper, 2001; Bailey; Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2003; 
2004). 
4.7 Discussion and Future 
Since the EU mid-term review22, various business strategy and management assessments (for 
example, the Haley Sharpe Concept Business Model and Implementation Plan (2003), the 
Berkeley University Market Analysis and Business Strategy (Fong et al„ 2004), and the Eamst 
and Young (2004) study of AA's financial control environment), have been undertaken to try 
and bring Amadiba Adventures up to speed with 'best principle' business practice. 
Although it has not been possible to undertake detailed calculations to assess the growth of 
Amadiba since its earliest inception, the reality is that it has taken a full four years with 
substantial financial, marketing and operational backing from the EU Programme, coupled by 
a number of years of NGO support prior to this, to get the Amadiba business to its current 
level of delivery. Moreover, the fact that only one community member (the current Trails 
Manager) is considered 'capacitated enough' to sustain the AA business after donor and NGO 
support is withdrawn, calls the long-term sustainability of the Amadiba project into question. 
It would appear, that the general perception held by those who have been integrally involved 
with the EU Programme, is that Amadiba Adventures would be more profitable and 
sustainable in the long-term, should it acquire an experienced private sector partner. The 
Haley-Sharpe Business Assessment recommended that Amadiba Adventures pursue a: 
"Business and Private Sector management contract, with the Amadiba community retaining 
ownership of the business's fixed assets" (i.e. infrastructure and immovable assets) (Lourens, 
2004a: 39). The reasoning behind this submission, is that Amadiba Adventures could benefit 
22 All EU Funded Programmes are required by their financing agreement, to undergo a mid-term review, 
carried out by external consultants, so as to assess the relevance, impact, efficiency and delivery of the 
Programme in meeting its targets and key objectives. The EU WCCTI Mid-Term Review was delayed by 
six months, with the result that nearly 75% of the project time had passed (ECODES, 2003). 
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greatly from the management expertise of a long-term management contract with an 
experienced private partner, whilst ownership of the assets of the business remain firmly 
vested with the community, and thereby retaining a sense of ownership and support for the 
success of the business. They suggested that human resource conditions (i.e. local employment 
quotas and market-related wages) be stipulated as part of die contract, with an option for 
revision every two to three years. They also made a number of suggestions as to who they 
considered 'appropriate' (and reportedly, 'interested') private sector partners. Amongst these 
were Wilderness Safaris, African Heartland Adventures (currently operating overland Wild 
Coast Adventure packages from Buccaneer's Backpackers in Cintsa, East London), and Wild 
Coast Holiday Reservations. Interestingly, they did not include the Ufudu Flyfishing 
Operator's as a 'preferred' private sector partner (Lourens. 2004 a; b). 
Although a number of persons interviewed from the EU Programme, have been quick to write 
off Amadiba Adventures as a 'failed' community-tourism initiative, this I believe, is an unfair 
dismissal. It needs to be acknowledged that AA has received substantial operational and 
financial support, being an anchor project to the EU WCCTI programme, and it is 
disappointing that this backing has not translated into greater long-term sustainability. The 
situation in which Amadiba Adventures now finds itself: looking for a suitable private-sector 
partner, is appreciably incongruous to the original tenets of the Horse and Hiking Trail project. 
However, the Amadiba Adventures project is, I believe, still underpinned by laudable 
'sustainable development' principles. Rather than dismissed as a 'failing' in community-based 
tourism, it should be considered a 'reality-test' for the successful ingredients and limitations of 
community-based tourism. As will be discussed in the final chapter, the perceived failings of 
this community-based model actually have much less to do with the 'inherent failings' of 
community-based tourism, than they do about the dynamic and complex socio-economic and 
institutional environment in which the enterprise has operated; and a donor support programme 
(the EU Programme) whose objectives, development nodes, and time frame, were 'overly 
ambitious' for the same reasons. 
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CHAPTERS: CASE STUDIES 
THE AMADIBA-UFUDU PARTNERSHIP 
5.1 Introduction 
Ufudu is a catch-and-release flyfishing outfit run by a husband and wife team, which operate 
from October to December on the Mtentu River, Northern Pondoland, and a further three 
months (January - March) from a similar community-based camp at Kosi Bay, in Northern 
Kwazulu-Natal. The operators have a non-consumptive, low impact, ecotourism philosophy, 
and market themselves as offering "top quality fly-fishing in a simple setting, with high-quality 
service* (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). 
Ufudu have entered into a profit-sharing agreement with the Amadiba community in return for 
the concession rights to a three-year (+ optional one-year renewal) catch-and-release flyfishing 
permit, which the community was granted through Marine and Coastal Management. This 
'financial incentive model', as identified by Ferrar et al (1997), is in its final year of an 
extended lease, with the future of this private sector-community agreement, currently 
undecided. 
5.2 Study Site 
Ufudu operates from the Mtentu trail camp (used by the Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail the 
remainder of the year), which is located on the northern bank of the Mtentu River, directly 
across from Mkambati Nature Reserve. Refer to Figure 4.1 for the location of this case study, 
delineated as 'CS 2'. 
The aesthetically spectacular Mtentu Estuary, with its unique annual migration of the highly-
prized Giant Kingfish (Caranxa Ignobilis), contributed the major draw card to Ufudu's site 
selection (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004) Table 5.1 provides some background 
information on the Mtentu Estuary. 
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Table 5.1: Background to the Mtentu Estuary 
The Mtentu Estuary 
The Mtentu Estuary marks the northern boundary of Mkambati Nature Reserve and the border of 
Lusikisiki and Bizana Rural District Councils (INR, 2003). 
The estuary is three kilometres long and between 50-150 metres wide, flowing through a steeply incised 
forest gorge with spectacular cliff-faces up to 80 metres in height (Day, 1981, cited in INR, 2003). In 
terms of biological importance, Harrison et al (1998) gave the Mtentu estuary a rating of 7 (out of a 
possible 9), derived from three main health indexes: 
• Biological Health: The Mtentu estuary scored 5.2 (out of 10). The Biological health index is 
calculated by comparing the fish species found in the estuary with the potential species richness 
of the estuary. Although the Mtentu is not particularly 'species rich1 per se, it is the seasonal 
breeding and feeding ground of some of the most highly-prized saltwater angling fish, notably 
the Giant Kingfish (Caranxa Ignobilis) and Big Eye Kingfish (C. Sexfaciatus). 
The large shoals which frequent the Mtentu Estuary every year between the months of October 
through to December / January, appear to be a unique phenomenon to this particular Wild Coast 
estuary. Although they have been sighted in other (Wild Coast) estuaries, their visits are neither 
of the same reliability or size that they are at Mtentu (Plate 7, pp 152). It would appear that this 
inimitable occurrence is linked to a specific set of ecological conditions that probably includes 
the general integrity of the system, the limited disturbance of the fish in the system, as well as 
salinity, turbidity and water temperatures. 
The Mtentu estuary is also home to a number of endemic flora species, including the rare Pondo 
Coconut palm, Jubaeopsis cqffra, (which has the smallest coconut) and is found growing only 
on die northern banks of the Mtentu and die Msikaba rivers (Cooper & Swart, 1992). 
• Water Quality: The Mtentu estuary scored 6.5 (out of 10) for its water quality. The 
comparatively low score was attributed to some cattle grazing and human settlement in die 
upper catchment. 
• Aesthetic State: The Mtentu estuary scored a high 9.9 (out of 10). This index is calculated 
using a wide variety of factors such as floodplain landuse, bridges, human usage, litter and 
rubble, turbidity and invasive vegetation. The Mtentu is considered to be one of the most 
pristine and aesthetically attractive estuaries in South Africa. Refer to Plate 5, pp 152. 
The estuary mouth is almost permanently open, demonstrating regular tidal exchange and a large tidal 
prism. Such a system is only likely to close as a result of exceptional marine factors (such as a storm), 
rather than reduced freshwater supply (Harrison et al, 1998; INR, 2003). 
(Source: Cooper & Swart, 1992; Harrison et al., 1998; INR, 2003) 
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5.3 Background 
In lieu of its significant environmental integrity and ecological functionality (Table S.l), the 
Mtentu Estuary was declared a 'marine protected area' in 1991. This was done with scant 
consultation of local communities who depended heavily on the estuary for subsistence. Prior to 
this 'protected area' status, management intervention on the estuary had been virtually non-
existent. Eastern Cape Nature Conservation, and their predecessors - the former homeland 
Transkei Nature Conservation - would occasionally arrest local persons for fishing and 
harvesting marine resources within the adjacent reserve (Mkambati), whilst recreational 
fishermen and outsiders were generally left to carry on illegal activities unrestrained. These 
outsiders had a considerable impact on the estuary and its surrounds, pillaging it of its high-
value organisms such as Brown Mussels (Perna pema) and the Eastern Cape Rock Lobster 
(Panulirus homarus) (Russell & Kuiper, 2001; PondoCROP, 2001c). 
After 1994, when Transkei was reincorporated into South Africa, control of the Mtentu Estuary 
fell to Marine and Coastal Management (MCM), the chief directorate within the national 
DEAT. However, since the nearest MCM officer is more than 800 kilometres away (in Cape 
Town), Eastern Cape Nature Conservation, who had since assumed authority for Mkambati 
Nature Reserve, acted as proxies for MCM. According to Mkambati's head ranger (Mapiya, 
pers comm., 2003) some game guards were appointed to monitor and control harvesting 
practices on the Mtentu boundary. However, due to limited resources and lack of power to 
enforce the law, the disjuncture which has occurred between the nde jure" and "de facto" 
situation at Mtentu, has resulted in a situation where outsiders would visibly flout MCM 
regulations (such as using motorised boats and fishing in the estuary), with little fear of 
reprimand or fines (PondoCROP, 2001c: 2). 
5.4 Procedural Establishment and Institutional Stakeholders 
It is against this background, that the Amadiba Community Tourism and Natural Resource 
Management Steering Committee (later to become ACCODA) requested PondoCROP to assist 
in exploring alternative tourism initiatives which would help diversify the fledging Horse and 
Hiking Trail (Case Study 1) and bring socio-economic upliftment to the region through 
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sustainable utilisation of its natural assets, namely: me Mtentu estuary (PondoCROP, 2001c; 
Bailey & Sperring, pers comm., 2003). 
At the same time PondoCROP had received a copy of a proposal presented to the Kwazulu-
Natal Nature Conservation Services, by a small flyfishing operater for a non-consumptive 
seasonal camp at Kosi Bay. The director of PondoCROP at the time, contacted the flyfishing 
operator (Ufudu), and following a successful site-investigation in September 1997, the idea of a 
low volume (no more than six rods on the estuary at any one time), eco-sensitive, catch-and-
release flyfishing operation, was presented to the Amadiba Steering Committee (PondoCROP 
2001c; Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). 
PondoCROP, the Steering Committee and Ufudu all believed that an enterprise of this nature 
could bring positive socio-economic and environmental benefits to the area. However, since the 
estuary had been declared a Marine Reserve, this effectively prohibited "any disturbance of fish 
and aquatic fauna in and around the estuary" (Ufudu Website, 2004:1). In order to operate 
'legally', Ufudu required an exemption permit from Marine and Coastal Management. After 
several letters and site visits, with no response, the Steering Committee eventually sent a letter 
to MCM's Chief Director, stating that an absence of communication from them in the next two 
months would be interpreted as support for the pilot project (PondoCROP, 2001c; Pretorius, B 
& P, pers comm., 2004). 
It was felt by all parties concerned, that an experimental camp period would provide an 
excellent opportunity for the operator to gather sufficient data and a 'record of experience', to 
assist in negotiating some compromise around particular MCM prohibitions, as well as an 
opportunity to demonstrate the type of social and economic benefits that such an operation 
might contribute to the local community (PondoCROP, 2001c; Bailey; Pretorius, B & P, pers 
comm., 2003/2004). The experimental camp was established for a two month period 
commencing October 1999 (PondoCROP, 2001c; Ufudu, 2004). 
According to Ufudu (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004): almost all of the limitations 
attached to this pilot concession were self-imposed. In PondoCROP's view: the fact that Ufudu 
were so willing to accept limitations: such as not using motorised rivercraft, self-imposed 
restrictions on the number of fishermen on the water at any one time, and identified non-fishing 
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'sanctuary' zones - clearly demonstrated Ufudu's goodwill and strong environmental ethos 
(PondoCROP, 2001c; Bailey, pers comm., 2003). 
A detailed record of the experience was compiled, including number of fish species caught, 
mortality rates, ecological data, and a full disclosure of the income generated for the 
community from wage and trust earnings. In the philosophy of a 'non-consumptive' outfit, a 
concerted effort was made to limit all possible ecological disturbances - to the extent that not a 
single organism from the estuary was consumed or purchased, and campfires were prohibited. 
During this two-month period, Ufudu contributed R15 780 to the Amadiba Trust (12.5 % of 
their gross turnover), and generated some R14 880 in wages (Ufudu Financial Records 1999-
2003). This amounted to a total income of R30 660 going directly into the local community, 
with no fish killed in the process. 
After the conclusion of this trial period, a detailed report was submitted to MCM. Hereafter, a 
case of "institutional timing" and "geographic coincidence" (Ashley & Ntshona, 2002: 49) 
began to play its part. It appears that MCM was going through some institutional changes, and 
a new post had been created to oversee 'Community Enterprise Development'. The new post-
holder saw the Ufudu Enterprise initiative as a means to put "flesh to his new mandate" (Ashley 
& Ntshona, 2002:48), which the Ufudu operator's promptly followed-up, as they happened to 
be in Cape Town at the time. (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). Ufudu were subsequently 
granted a 90-day trial concession (from MCM) commencing 1st October, 2000. The camp ran at 
an occupancy of 87%, and generated R85 000 for the Amadiba community from trust earnings, 
wage income, horse hire and sale of local crafts and produce (Ufudu Annual Report, 2000). 
Thereafter, MCM granted Ufudu a three-month catch-and-release permit at Mtenm, for a 
period of three years (2001-2003), with a conditional one-year extension for 2004 
(PondoCROP, 2001c; Ufudu Annual Reports, 1999-2003). 
The basic provisions of the agreement made between Ufudu and ACCODA were as follows: 
Term: Three years, with an optional one-year renewal in 2004. 
Period: Three months per annum from 31 September to 29 December. 
Set up Period: 20 September to 30 September. This would include training of the guides and 
" staff. 
Rental: 12.5 % of the Gross Daily Tariff. 
Wages: As per wages as at 2000 to increase at 10% per annum as from 2002. 
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In reflection, although Ufudu were technically operating illegally during their 1999 'trial 
period', a case of state inertia was largely to blame for this. Had Mtentu not been so 
exceptional in its location, or had the esteemed Kingfish not been such a drawcard, the private 
sector operators might well have begun to look elsewhere. 
5.5 Critique of Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts 
In 1999, the owners of Ufudu Flyfishing developed the following mission statement: 
"Our vision is to live in harmony with our environment and enrich the lives of the people and 
communities with whom we are involved, thereby creating our own brand of development that 
leaves an indelible stamp on the field of ecotourism, and in so doing enrich our own lives" 
(Pretorius, P, 2002: 1). 
Although recognising the somewhat lofty intention to "leave an indelible stamp on the field of 
ecotourismM, the Ufudu husband and wife partnership firmly believe their vision to encompass 
the goals that a responsible tourism operator should strive to achieve (Pretorius, B & P, pers 
comm., 2004). 
From the Case Study Questionnaire (Appendix 2), Ufudu identified the following objectives 
with respect to their enterprise's contribution to neighbouring communities. In order of 
priority: 
1) Increased skills and education - i.e. training in tourism related jobs, environmental and 
health education; 
2) Greater understanding and respect for and use of the environment and its natural resources 
through awareness, education and training; 
3) Improved security perceptions; 
4) Cultural or social enhancement - i.e. encouraging local persons to recognise value in the 
authenticity of their products, instilling greater pride and respect for local traditions and 
culture; and 
5) Permanent job creation. 
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It is interesting to note that despite generating R438 463 directly into the local economy in just 
fourteen months of operation (Table 5.3), the Ufudu operators do not rank 'Greater income 
earning opportunities and local economic development' in their Top-5 list of priorities. This 
was a conscious omission by Ufudu. Their justification inspires an interesting debate which 
shall be alluded to in the final discussion (Chapter 8). 
5.5.1 Economic Impact 
5.5.1.1 Direct Employment and Training 
Due to the size of the Ufudu operation, direct employment - in terms of number of jobs created 
- is bound to be limited. Even so, Ufudu employs 1.6 local persons: per Ufudu guest. During 
Ufudu's concession, a total of eight full-time skilled and semi-skilled jobs are created in the 
following capacity: 
• 5 Fishing guides (one for each guest), whilst the 5th guiding position has generally been 
shared between two guides (therefore 6 fishing guides employed in total - all male); 
• 1 Kitchen assistant (female); 
• 1 accommodation and general camp assistant (female); and 
• 1 camp manager (male); 
• There are also 2 local horsemen whom are contracted by Ufudu, whenever guests wish 
to take horse rides. 
The Ufudu operators have been very open with regard to staff and guide earnings. They make a 
detailed disclosure of these earnings in their annual report submitted to ACCODA, MCM, 
PondoCROP and other interested or affected stakeholders. Table 5.2 (as adapted from the 2002 
Annual Report) provides a broad indication of these earnings. A 10% annual increase in wages 
from 2002 was also agreed to in the original Ufudu-ACCODA contract. 
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Table 5.2: Wage (and gratuity) income generated by the Ufudu Employees for the period 22nd 
September to 21st December, 2002. 
MEMBER EARNINGS 
Camp Manager (1) 
Accommodation / Camp Assistant (1) 
Kitchen Assistant (1) 
FLYFISHING GUIDE EARNINGS 
(4 permanent, 2 part-time) 
OTHER GUIDES EARNINGS 
Horse Riding Guides (2) 
HORSE OWNER EARNINGS 
























R 18 317 
R 30 268 
R 1 3 9 5 
R1950 
R 51 930 
(Source: Annual Ufudu Report, 2002) 
5.5.1.2 Formal Economic Contribution 
Despite not listing 'Economic Contributions' as a main impact, Ufudu has over their five years 
of operation, made a substantial contribution to the income earnings of the wider Amadiba 
community (Table 5.3). Most of this income has been generated from the 12.5% of turnover, 
paid to the Community Trust. 
Table 5.3, as supplied by Ufudu, divides community earnings into: 
- Community Trust earnings (calculated as 12.5% of the guests gross daily tariff or of 
total turnover); 
- Individual income (a combination of wages, bonuses and gratuities paid to staff); 
- Horse hire (income received by local horse owners, those involved in looking after the 
horses, and horse guides during the Ufudu operation; and 
- Local produce and crafts (cash paid directly to the supplier of these items from Ufudu 
guests or the operators themselves). 
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Table 5.3: Total estimated earnings for the Amadiba Community from the Ufudu Operation, 
1999-2003 




3. Horse hire 
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(Source: Annual Ufudu Reports, 1999-2003). 
Notes: 
1. With the exception of 1999 which was six week season, 2000 to 2003 were twelve week seasons 
(three months from 29 Sept - 29* December) 
2. In 1999 local horses were hired but the income is reflected in the column for Individual income. 
3. In 1999 only a limited amount of local produce and crafts were supplied to the camp for sale, but 
this was apparently encouraged throughout the season and local people were far more forthcoming 
in the subsequent seasons. 
Community earnings have increased significantly over the years (Table 5.3) In fourteen months 
of intensive flyfishing, Ufudu has contributed R438 463 to the local earnings of Amadiba 
communities, at the expense of just three fish killed. Personal income (i.e. wages) amounts to 
R212 910, whilst the communities trust account has benefited to the sum of R203 059 from the 
negotiated profit-sharing of 12.5% on turnover. Horse hire earnings fluctuate from year to 
year, depending primarily on fishing conditions (if the estuarine conditions are favorable and 
guests are catching, horse rides take second-place). 
Of some concern however, are the declining earnings from the sale of local produce and crafts. 
Ufudu makes a concerted effort to display local crafts in the dining boma, and ensure that 
guests are aware that such items are for sale. Obviously, it is entirely dependant upon the 
furnishing 'tastes' of guests from year to year, but it is of some concern that income from the 
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sale of crafts has declined so significantly: from R 3 200 in 2001, to R 675 in 2002, and less 
than R 1 000 in 2003 (Annual Ufudu Reports 1999-2003). 
According to Ufudu (Pretorius, P, pers comm, 2004): in the first few years, community 
members were very enthusiastic about bringing their local basket, beadwork and carvings to put 
on display. Ufudu does not add any mark-up to their requested selling price. The clay pots and 
weave baskets proved particularly popular with clients. However, at some point the local 
suppliers began to substitute these traditional crafts with substandard leatherwork and ill-suited 
clothing items23. Guests did not really take to these new crafts and sales declined. Another 
influencing factor has been overpricing. Local crafters often send their children with their items 
and a price attached, which is often too high. When Ufudu has felt the item to be unduly 
expensive, they have tried to advise on a more realistic recommended selling price, but the 
children are usually not in a position to negotiate. The craft item is invariably taken home, and 
more often than not, not returned for sale (Pretorius, P. pers comm., 2004). 
With respect to fresh produce supply, Ufudu maintain that they are keen to purchase vegetables 
from local sellers, provided the quality is of acceptable standard and the price comparable to 
that they would pay in Port Edward shops. However, these two provisos have generally not 
been met and, due to their remote location, Ufudu caterers cannot rely upon the infrequent 
vegetable seller to meet their daily requirements (Pretorius, P. pers comm., 2004). The Ufudu 
enterprise have spoken to ACCODA about setting aside some portion of the Trust earnings to 
start a community vegetable garden. An outlay of capital would be required for the purchase of 
seed, gardening tools, and the installation of a basic irrigation system. However, these 
discussions remain to bear fruition. 
In terms of 'additional spending' within a SO km radius (as stipulated by South Africa's 
Responsible Tourism Guidelines), Ufudu spends on average, R4S 000 on groceries and 
approximately R2 000 in fuel (both purchased in Port Edward) during their three month stint at 
Mtenru. 
23 This was as a result of Triple Trust Training in the Amadiba community (under the auspices of the EU 
Programme) 
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5.5.1.3 Informal Economic Benefits 
On die whole, Ufudu guests fit die mould of successful, wealthy, and well-connected 
businessmen and professionals. Many of mem stand on a number company boards, with access 
to substantial corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds. Over the years, a number of these 
guests have discussed the option of using Ufudu's experience and links with the community, to 
initiate and help oversee sustainable community development projects, local SMME's, and 
more general social upliftment schemes (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm, 2004). 
Most of die offers have come, however, witti me proviso that Ufudu plays a strong facilitatory 
or supervisory role. Given die short concession (90 day lease) they have at Mtentu (with only a 
week to set-up before die arrival of back-to-back fishing groups) the Ufudu operators admit 
tiiey have not pursued mese offers with any vigour. However, tiiey maintain, tiiat should they 
be awarded an annual concession at Mtentu, this would become a high-priority agenda, given 
their strong links to, and relationship with many a 'potential' social benefactor (Pretorius, B & 
P, pers comm, 2004). 
In their five-years of operation, Ufudu has contributed R 203 059 to die ACCODA Trust 
account. ACCODA, in its early negotiations with Ufudu, declared that this income would be 
prioritised to 1) Health (building of a clinic); 2) Education (building of schools); and 3) the 
youth (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). 
The Trust was reportedly, "overly cautious" in its spending during die first few years 
(Pretorius, B, pers comm. 2004). The community's Trust earnings remained untouched for a 
number of years before Ufudu, in their 2002 Annual Report, expressed a concern that, other 
than those employed directly by their operation, die wider community was not seeing any 
tangible benefits from the existence of Ufudu. This they feared would translate into increased 
dissatisfaction and a devaluing of the natural resources upon which Ufudu and Amadiba (or any 
future tourism enterprise, for that matter) depended upon. The Ufudu operators suggested to 
die ACCODA Trustees that they hold a meeting amongst themselves, with the aim to establish 
a short, medium and long-term financial planning and spending strategy. 
The Trust has since built a cattle dip and a pre-school out of the monies received from Ufudu. 
However, as Ufudu (Pretorius, B, pers comm., 2004) recognise: "building a school is a 
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start...but it is really just the beginning. Equipping it with teachers, registering it with the 
Department of Education, and nurturing its long-term success in such a remote and overlooked 
area ... is where the real challenge lies". This is where strongly forged, and sustained, private 
sector/community partnerships could play an invaluable role. 
5.5.2 Occupancy Rates and Market Statistics 
Table 5.4 outlines the tariff structure and occupancy levels of the Ufudu operation in their five 
years at Mtentu (1999-2003). The annual trust earnings of the Amadiba community (calculated 
as 12.5% of the Gross Daily Tariff) are also included. 
Table 5.4: Tariff Structure and Occupancy Levels of Ufudu Flyfishing Company 1999-2003 
Year 
1999: 2 mo 
pilot period 
2000: 3 mo 
'official' 
trial period 


























R 250pp (accom) 
R650pp/d 
(flyfishing) 
R 795 pp/d 
R800 pp/s/d 
R880 pp/d 
R 950 pp/s/d 
R 1050 pp/day 
R 1000 pp/s/d 














R 100 pp/d 
R100 pp/s/d 





R 125 pp/s/d 
R 150 pp/d 
1 2 3 % 
Turnover 
to Trust 
R 15 780 
R 39 000 
R 44 050 
R 43 679 












(Source: Annual Ufudu Reports, 1999-2003; Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004) 
Notes: 
1. Occupancy is calculated as a percentage of 450 available bed nights - based on 5 guests per night, 
for the 90-day period of the permit. Although the original MCM permit only permitted four 
tl> anglers to fish at any one time, it was speculated that the new all-inclusive tariff package 
(which includes horse rides, guided walks and other 'non-fishing' activities) would help to attract 
non-fishing guests, thereby increasing the potential daily occupancy to five guests / day. As there 
are only four tents available at Mtentu camp, this would mean two persons would have to share. 
2. As a result of unusually heavy rain and very high water turbidity during the 2001 season (with 622 
mm recorded during the 3 month period), there were fewer fishing hours and less fish caught. This 
impacted negatively on bookings for 2002 (Ufudu receives approximately 50% repeat business), 
with occupancy levels at their lowest in their five years of operation. This indicates that the 
'quality of the fishing experience' probably plays a more significant role in terms of elasticity of 
demand (occupancy) than price (rack daily rate). 
The price (daily tariff) that Ufudu can charge its guests for a flyfishing experience on die 
Mtentu is ultimately determined by die market - i.e. the supply and demand - for this 
'exclusive* experience. Business logic dictates that businesses, acting rationally, will increase 
die price of their goods or services, until such time as die return from die increase in price is 
offset by a lower demand for that particular good or service (as resulting from the higher price 
being charged). This is referred to as die 'price elasticity of demand' (Lipsey et al., 1999). 
This coefficient remains to be determined for flyfishing on die Mtentu, but die high occupancy 
levels enjoyed by Ufudu tiius far (despite die relatively high daily rate for simple 
accommodation, and an annual 10% increase on this tariff), indicates that die 'Mtentu 
Flyfishing Experience' has an inelastic demand curve - meaning that die quantity demanded 
(i.e. occupancy) changes by a smaller percentage tiian does price (Lipsey et al, 1999: 94). In 
fact, it appears (Table 5.4) that inclement weather conditions have a greater effect on annual 
bookings, than does price. 
Furthermore, Ufudu employs a direct and personal marketing strategy - hosting yearly 'Hook-
ups' around die country; and maintaining tiieir guests as an "extended Ufudu family" 
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(Pretorius, P, pers comm., 2004), through an interactive and informative website, annual 
journal articles, and personal contact. This targeted marketing strategy obviously has some 
merit, for approximately 50% of Ufudu's clientele comes from repeat business (Pretorius, B & 
P, pers comm., 2004). 
5.5.3 Social Impact and Community Perceptions 
In an attempt to elicit the community's experience of the flyfishing enterprise, PondoCROP 
hosted a participatory workshop to discuss and identify critical issues around the Ufudu 
operation and an extension to the Ufudu concession. A broad assessment framework was used 
to consider potential social, economic and environmental impacts, as well as future planning 
directives (PondoCROP, 2001c). 
Since this group workshop had comprehensively explored the social issues I would have wanted 
to investigate with respect to this case study, it was unnecessary to carry out an Amadiba 
Household Survey. However, similar criteria and questions (as used in this group workshop) 
were employed in the Mbotyi Household Survey, in order to facilitate greater comparison 
between the selected case studies. 
As the Amadiba community comprises heterogeneous local interest groups, with potentially 
different perspectives, PondoCROP (2001c) took the decision to divide the group discussion 
into four separate focus groups. These were: 
• Members of ACCODA (Group 1, size of group (N) = 8 persons); 
• Local people who had been employed by Ufudu on the flyfishing operation (Group 2; 
N=5); 
• Local people who were active in the Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail operation but not 
directly involved in the flyfishing operation (Group 3; N = 18); and 
• Local community people who did not fall into any of the categories outlined above 
(Group 4; N= 27). 
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A questionnaire was employed as a prompt to discussion and open-debate was encouraged. 
Open-ended questions were presented first, in order to capture the broad perceptions of the 
different interest groups, before specific questions would 'shape' the way local participants 
looked at their experience. An attempt was made to separate the generic aspects of flyfishing on 
the Mtentu estuary from those aspects specific to the Ufudu operation. This however, was not 
always successful, particularly with 'general community members' who had little direct 
experience with either the flyfishing operation or the horse trail (PondoCROP, 2001c). 
As disclosed by the PondoCROP field report (2001c), it appears that none of the sixty 
community members interviewed, felt less happy about the idea of flyfishing on the estuary. 
The main reasons given for their overwhelming support for the initiative, included: new job 
opportunities, training opportunities (particularly flyfishing and catering skills, although in 
personal communications (2003), the fishing guides felt they could benefit from additional 
training in binding and flora identification), contributions to the local economy (from the 
multiplier effect of wage income and turnover paid to ACCODA), as well as monies accrued 
from the sale of craft and provision of local services such as the localised guided horse and 
hiking trails24. 
As is inevitable with any area of such high unemployment, the number of job aspirants 
exceeded a realistic level of job creation for a small operation such as Ufudu. However, it was 
recognised that the jobs created through the flyfishing operation, were "good" jobs in terms of 
payment and skills development and were considered significantly better than other jobs 
available in these rural areas. All the community interest groups mentioned that they would like 
to see the campsite continuously occupied. This was evidently linked to creating more job and 
income-earning opportunities. 
Some of the negative views or concerns that individuals voiced with respect to the flyfishing 
operation, included: 
• Having to work for a 'boss' (some people said they had become accustomed to the 
Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail model where they were 'self-employed' operators); 
24 Note that the locally guided day hikes and horse trails are separate product to the 4-day Amadiba 
Adventures Trail Package. 
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• The relatively small number of local people employed by, or involved with the Ufudu 
flyfishing operation, as opposed to the Amadiba horse trail; 
• All of the groups, except the general community group (who declined to comment due 
to lack of knowledge), felt the main negative impact of the flyfishing operation to be the 
way it interfered with the horse trail by occupying the only available campsite at 
Mtentu. They emphasised the need to provide alternative accommodation (of equivalent 
quality), for Amadiba trail visitors; 
• The uncertainty about when they would finish work each day. Flexibility and extra 
demands associated with the service industry, appeared to cause the greatest distress to 
the caterers; 
• Having to work during the 'holidays' and the absence of over-time pay was viewed as a 
hardship by some; 
• The fact that flyfishing requires specialist knowledge and equipment that local people do 
not have as yet, was viewed as a negative aspect by some respondents; and. 
• The only negative environmental impact associated with the flyfishing operation, was 
the perceived damage that more frequent vehicular might be doing to the access road. 
During Ufudu's 90-day concession, an estimated 20 round-trips are made (Pretorius, P, pen 
comm., 2004). It is unlikely that this frequency of vehicular traffic will cause 'damage' to the 
road. However, what is of concern to the Ufudu operators is that the upgraded road (funded 
through a DEAT Poverty Relief project) will bring more 'outsiders' (and more specifically, 
recreational fishermen) to Mtentu since they can now access the estuary in ordinary sedan 
vehicles (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). 
Generally, the different local interest groups did not feel that the flyfishing operation impacted 
'significantly' (either positively or negatively) on community unity. Some individuals noted that 
certain households had a history of accommodating and providing services for recreational 
fishermen, who had used the Mtentu estuary in the past. With the moratorium on all fishing 
activities on the Mtentu (other than those officially sanctioned under the community permit or 
Ufudu's concession), a number of households had complained that 'their fishermen' were no 
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longer visiting, resulting in lost income to themselves (PondoCROP, 2001c). It was interesting 
that this remark was made in spite of the fact that the community had a clear and agreed to 
contract with Ufudu and MCM that other fishermen would not be permitted on the river during 
Ufudu's concession, and with full knowledge that fishing on the river without a permit is 
illegal. 
Perceptions of Ufudu's impact on other income-earning opportunities, subsistence 
lifestyles and the natural environment: 
Only a fraction of the respondents commented that the flyfishing operation might interfere with 
local community members' harvesting practices on the Mtentu. Other than the occupation of 
the trail camp creating potential acrimony for Amadiba trailists (already mentioned), none of 
the groups felt that the flyfishing operation jeopardised or had any substantial negative affect on 
their other income-earning activities. In fact, it was emphasised that Ufudu supports these other 
activities - such as the local horse and hiking trails - by encouraging guests to partake in such 
activities during their stay. 
None of die groups felt that the flyfishing had a potentially harmful impact on die natural 
environment. In fact, ACCODA members noted the fact tiiat me Kingfish were not removed 
from me estuary, as being one of the most positive attributes of the Ufudu operation. 
Employment selection, perceived ownership issues and an extended concession: 
The ACCODA representatives (Group 1) felt that the community had a clear sense of 
ownership of the flyfishing operation on the Mtentu River. They clearly understood Ufudu to 
be the concessionaires, and not the sole-owners. This was in stark contrast to some of die 
community members who had worked with both Ufudu and the Amadiba Adventures operation, 
and felt that me flyfishing operation 'belonged' to die Ufudu entrepeneurs and that this 
arrangement was reflected in the profit-sharing, with the community receiving only one quarter 
of the profits and Ufudu taking the remainder (PondoCROP, 2001c) Some individuals 
commented that they got the feeling that the community campsite was more 'out of bounds' to 
local people, when die Ufudu operators moved in. 
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In response to the first grievance, Ufudu sat down with members from the Trust and undertook 
a costing exercise to show where and how the rack daily tariff charged of guests was spent. 
After marketing, equipment purchases, maintenance, wages and food costs, they showed that 
their share of the net profit came out more or less on a par with the community's takings. This 
appears to have appeased any discontent members (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). 
All of die ACCODA members and most of those directly involved with the flyfishing 
operation, correctly outlined the procedure for employment selection, explaining that Ufudu 
provided ACCODA with their job requirements and ACCODA selected whom they considered 
'appropriate' persons for the job. They believed this process to be fair. Of the general 
community members (Group 4) 93% said they could not express an opinion on how fair the 
selection process was because they did not know anything about it (PondoCROP, 2001c). This 
might indicate that the wider community are not yet fully informed of, or participant in, the 
actions taken by ACCODA and project participants. 
As a whole, the different community interest groups were unanimous in their support for the 
continuation of flyfishing at Mtentu, and the overwhelming majority were supportive of Ufudu 
continuing as operator. Nonetheless, this support was qualified. Given the negative impact that 
die flyfishing was having on the horse and hiking trail (H&HT), and in lieu of the fact that the 
H&HT was perceived as providing 'more widespread benefits' to the Amadiba community, 
they decided the flyfishing should continue, but subject to the construction of another campsite. 
The flyfishers and the trailists could then be accommodated concurrently, and the community 
would continue to benefit from both initiatives (PondoCROP, 2001c; Bailey, pers comm., 
2003). 
The second qualification related to the need to negotiate a new rental fee for the use of the 
Mtentu campsite facility, and staff wages. A few participants felt that other operators should 
also be given a chance (with a 'trial' period like Ufudu had) to operate at Mtentu, and then the 
best tender be awarded the lease. Most of the groups agreed that an operator should be given a 
three-year concession to run the flyfishing, subject to compliance with the social, economic and 
environmental terms of their agreement (PondoCROP, 2001c; Bailey, pers comm., 2003). 
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5.5.4 Environmental Impact 
" A culture of excellence, and a culture of conservation are the guiding philosophies of 
the Ufudu Flyfishing Experience" (Pretorius, B, pers comm., 2004). 
The Ufudu operators take pride in the fact that they have come as close to 'eco-friendly', 'low-
impact' and 'non-consumptive' tourism as you can find.... at least here in South Africa. The 
mobile tent operation, which accommodates no more than six guests a night (and no more than 
five fishermen), makes use of solar, paraffin and gas for cooking and lighting. No wood is 
burnt at the camp, whilst the old fashioned donkey-boiler has been replaced by an incredibly 
efficient Venturi heater system, for showering. From a single cup of paraffin burnt through a 
system of sheathed piping, enough hot water is generated for all Ufudu guests to take a hot 
shower (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). 
The operators make a point of sourcing their food stuffs 'locally' (from Port Edward, which is 
within a 50 km radius of the camp), but no fish or marine organisms are purchased from local 
collectors or extracted from the estuary for eating (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). All 
non-degradable rubbish is taken offsite, and where possible, recycled. Biodegradable wastes, 
such as vegetable peelings and soft foodstuffs, are buried and made into compost. 
The Mtentu campsite has two Eco-toilets, which are supposed to have a good ventilation and 
non-seepage design. These were fitted through the EU Programme for the Amadiba Horse and 
Hiking Trail camp. However, it appears their siting and efficiency has not been entirely 
satisfactory. A new design and siting is currently being investigated by ACCODA (who are 
responsible for the general maintenance of the camp) (Bailey; Pretorius, B & P., pers comm., 
2003/2004). 
It was Ufudu's expectation that a principal outcome of their operation would be an 
understanding, from the wider community, that a fish in the (Mtentu) estuary is worth far more 
to them (in terms of trust earnings generated from the fly fishermen and other tourism-related 
activities), than on their plates or the freezer-chests of outside fishermen - who may provide 
small and irregular earnings for a few local households, but whose plunder of marine 
resources, is clearly unsustainable in the long run (Pretorius, B, pers comm., 2004). 
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In light of the near total absence of monitoring and law enforcement on the Mtentu Estuary 
(despite being a declared Marine Protected Reserve), fish stocks, post-Ufudu's presence, are 
probably better off than they have been for some time. This is largely due to the agreement 
made between Ufudu and ACCODA, that it would be the community's task, to stop outsiders 
from fishing in the estuary, specifically during Ufudu's concession period, but in compliance 
with MCM regulations, all year round. It would appear that having been asked to leave by local 
community members, has made these recreational fishermen less brazen in their disregard for 
MCM's regulations. (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). Furthermore, in their five years at 
Mtentu, the Ufudu operators claim that they have never been offered marine harvestings. This, 
I believe, attests to the degree of community consciousness re: Ufudu's non-consumptive 
philosophy. 
However, this is not to say, that harvesting or fishing in the estuary has ceased completely. In 
terms of subsistence extraction, local communities have used the estuary for centuries and 
continue to do so. There is no conclusive evidence (i.e. backed by scientific investigation) to 
suggest that subsistence fishing and utilisation is having a negative impact on fish reserves. 
There is however, more justified concern surrounding the unsustainable harvesting practices of 
sessile organisms such as mussels and oysters (White et al., 2002; Fielding, pers comm., 
2003). On the whole, there has been little commodification25 of these resources. This is largely 
due to the remoteness of the area and the difficulties associated with transporting perishable 
harvests (i.e. fish, mussels, crayfish and oysters) to the nearest market place. Nonetheless, the 
Ufudu partners have recently been informed of a flyfishing guide who is using his newly 
acquired fishing skills to catch, kill and sell prized Kingfish, out-of-season. One would have 
hoped that the fishing guides, being principal beneficiaries of the project (and earning in the 
region of R7 000 from Ufudu wages and gratuities), would have rationalised the value of these 
fish stocks. This is an example of the "contradictory and inconsistent environment" which the 
Ufudu owners refer to as operating in (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). 
Although harvesting and fishing, of any form, is prohibited within a marine protected reserve, 
given the historical and subsistence dependence of local persons on the estuary, rigorous law 
enforcement would be likely to evoke strong protest from die local community (PondoCROP, 
25 Commodification of resources - where natural resources (such as mussels, oysters and crayfish) 
obtain a monetary value because of improved or regular accessibility to a market-place. 
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2001c; Russell & Kuiper, 2001). In November 2000, a participatory workshop was held, 
facilitated by PondoCROP and the Institute of Natural Resources, to work towards developing a 
'shared vision' and co-operative management plan for the estuary. The vision identified by this 
forum, recognises the importance of protecting the aesthetics, sense of place, and biological 
diversity of the Mtentu, for today and future generations and stipulates that existing, and 
potential, tourism developments should be founded upon the principles of "conservation, 
sustainability, active participation of local people, equity, acknowledgement of responsibility, 
application of best practices, training and capacity building" (Masi bam bane, 2001:1; Hay, pers 
comm., 2003). Ufudu however, have not been included as a 'stakeholder' on this forum. 
Although the objectives of the forum are well intended, it appears that its de facto powers and 
presence on me ground have been nondescript to date (Field Discussions, Hay, pers comm., 
2003; Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). 
Besides Ufudu's records, there has been virtually no empirical data collected on species 
numbers, migration patterns, feeding and habitat requirements of fish and other marine 
organisms in the Mtentu estuary. In order to gauge the true impact of subsistence and catch-
and-release flyfishing in the estuary, experimental and longer-term monitoring research would 
be required. By and large however, it is acknowledged that the flyfishing operation has 
certainly helped to attach a higher value to the protection, and good management, of the 
estuaries' resources (Bailey, Hay, Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2003/2004). Local 
communities are unlikely to be motivated to participate in the management of a resource 
(particularly if it means restricting their own activities), unless it provides them with a 
reasonable level of return or compensation. The removal of the community permit to engage in 
'catch-and-release' flyfishing, would quite likely, undo all aforementioned efforts at co-
management in the area. The exigency for MCM (through the National Subsistence Fisheries 
Programme) to issue and regulate subsistence fishing and harvesting permits (in order to 
legitimise local subsistence collection) should become a high-priority item for the Estuary 
Management Forum. 
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Plate 5: View over the Mtentu Estuary from the Ufudu / H&HT Trail Camp (Source: Colvin, 2004). 
Plate 6 (above left): Canoeing in the Mtentu Estuary (Source: Colvin, 2004) 
Plate 7 (above right): An Ufudu guest and guide, with a Kingfish caught in the Mtentu Estuary (Ufudu Website, 
2004). 
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5.6 Discussion and Future 
Despite generating substantial financial benefits and having established a positive relationship 
with the Amadiba community thus far, Ufudu's future at Mtentu appears indeterminate. At the 
end of their three-year concession (2001-2003), ACCODA agreed to a fourth year (an optional 
extension period stipulated in the original lease agreement). This makes 2004 the last official 
season for Ufudu. Since a new camp has been built for the Amadiba horse and hiking trail 
(funded through the EU WCCTI Programme), the original Mtentu camp is now free to become 
a full year operation, with ACCODA potentially providing an annual lease permit to any 
private-sector enterprise. 
Given their solid track record and relationship with the community thus far, Ufudu assumed 
that they might be given first option, or at least early notification, to submit an application for 
this new concession. It appears however, that this has not been the case. Ufudu met with 
ACCODA in April 2004, to discuss a possible long-term contract or annual concession focused 
around other non-consumptive adventure and nature based activities, such as mountain-biking 
trails and other 'special-interest' tourism activities (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). The 
Ufudu couple were rather taken aback when they were informed by ACCODA's chairperson 
uiat "they (i.e. ACCODA) were not currently in a position to talk about such things" 
(Pretorius, B, pers comm., 2004). The Chairman informed Ufudu that they had a number of 
tenders submitted for the Mtentu camp which they were giving due consideration to. By the 
time of my last discussion with Ufudu (16th August, 2004), there had been no further riposte 
from ACCODA. A further complication is that the PTO lease on which the Mtentu camp 
stands, and the MCM flyfishing permit, expire as of December 2004. According to the general 
manager of Amadiba Adventures (also an ACCODA trustee), these would first need to be 
renewed by the relevant government authorities, prior to ACCODA granting any new 
concession (Ndovela, telephonic comm., 2004). 
In terms of transparency and 'fair opportunity for all', it is natural that ACCODA should want 
to put the new concession out for tender (Trebble, pers comm., 2004). However, the manner in 
which it was done, appears to have been a rather disorganised, and perhaps even, surreptitious 
affair. As Ufudu point out (Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004): there were no clear terms of 
reference or broad parameters issued by ACCODA as to guide the design or structure for these 
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tender applications. Ufudu believed that they, of all potential applicants, should have been 
informed of these parameters and closing dates for submission. 
The provisos of the longer-term / annual lease agreement would obviously need to strike a 
balance between the needs of the concessionaire, and the needs of the community. The operator 
obviously requires a long enough lease to make infrastructural improvements, recoup capital 
expenses, and make a reasonable profit. The community, on the other hand, does not want to 
get locked into too lengthy an agreement, which might preclude more lucrative opportunities in 
the future. PondoCROP (as the communities' facilitator) recommended that a lease period of 
three-years, with an option to terminate if agreed conditions and regulations are not being met, 
would be sufficient to meet both the community and the private operators demands 
(PondoCROP, 2001c: 13). A year-by-year contract would be more likely to promote a myopic 
planning horizon, which could lead to less environmentally-sensitive practices. ACCODA is 
still to decide on the length of the new concession. 
On account of 'poor communications' with ACCODA, Ufudu have not submitted a formal 
application for the annual lease at Mtentu. Furthermore, they contend that the tender process 
should not be such a one-side affair - i.e. that of the bidding private sector. They uphold that 
the strength (and success) of their original contract came from the fact that it was the end-
product of exhaustive, yet inclusive, round-table negotiations with all potentially interested and 
affected stakeholders. They express a serious reservation about the aptness of tenders submitted 
by interested investors, whom have had little prior experience or dealings with the community 
and are submitting proposals without any clear guidelines from which to work from (Pretorius, 
B & P., pers comm., 2004). 
Whether, Ufudu's pioneering efforts (in originally securing the catch-and- re lease flyfishing 
permit for the community), and their socially and environmentally conscious performance thus 
far, will influence the new concession permit decided upon by ACCODA, remains to be seen. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that Ufudu has backing from many of the institutions involved at 
Mtentu, including the Institute of Natural Resources, the EU Programme (who according to the 
Ufudu operators, were quick to enlist the flyfishing operation to their portfolio) and even 
PondoCROP (2001c: 16; pers comm., 2003), whom although they have shared differences with 
Ufudu, have openly said: 
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"Given the track record of many operators on the Wild Coast, operators like Ufiidu, who act 
responsibly towards the environment AND who deliver against their commitments without 
making wild promises, should be encouraged". 
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDIES 
THE MBOTYI RIVER LODGE 
6.1 Introduction 
Mbotyi River Lodge (hereby, referred to as the Lodge, the hotel, or MRL) is a privately owned 
coastal hotel, situated halfway between Mkambati Nature Reserve and Port St Johns on the 
Pondoland Wild Coast (Figure 6.1). The land on which the Lodge stands is a demarcated 
Trading Site, originally issued by deed of Crown Land in 1922. Being an old Trading Post it is 
one of only a handful of sites along the Wild Coast, which confers freehold title to the owners. 
During die late 1980's a hotel, financed through die old Transkei Development Corporation, 
was established on die trading site. However, due to mounting political tension (and related 
incidents of violence) during die early 1990's, die hotel was forced to close its doors. The hotel 
lay vacant until a consortium of three Johannesburg businessmen (none of whom had any 
previous hotel experience) saw die hotel featured on an investment prospectus for the Wild 
Coast Spatial Development Initiative. Realising the value of die land upon which me hotel stood 
(i.e. freehold tide), they submitted a bid for its purchase in partnership with me hotel's 
previous owner. The deal took three years to negotiate, but in June 2001, sale and tide deeds 
were conferred upon die new owners. By this time, renovations were at an advanced stage, and 
die Lodge was ready to open in time for the 2001 Christmas season (Elias, 2001; 
Christodoulou, pen comm., 2003). 
This enterprise makes an interesting case study, for whilst the operator does not have any 
legally-binding or contractual agreement with die local community (i.e. not representative of 
any of Ferrar et al. (1997) 'community-based models'), me Lodge owners have recognised tiiat 
die participation of, and direct-benefits to die community, are vital to sustaining a healthy 
tourism industry in Mbotyi, and ultimately, die long-term success of their operation. A detailed 
documentation of die socio-economic impacts and contributions that die hotel has made to die 
local economy in its two and a half years since inception comprises die core focus of this case 
study, in conjunction with community perceptions extracted from a local household survey and 
a numerous cottage-owner interviews. 
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6.2 Study Site 
Mbotyi is located approximately 27 km from Lusikisiki26 and 25 km north of Port St. Johns, on 
the Pondland Wild Coast (Figure 6.1). The Lodge itself is located on the south-western bank of 
the Mbotyi estuary. This estuary extends ten kilometres inland and remains open all year 
round. Mbotyi is situated on the southern down throw side of the Egossa fault, which makes 
the surrounding terrain particularly steep and agriculturally poor, due to the shallow and low-
nutrient soils predominant in the region (Johnson, 1991, cited in Nicholson, 1997; Mullins, 
2002). The main access road to Mbotyi winds through the state protected, Ntsubane Forest, one 
of the largest and most diverse tracts of indigenous forest left in the Eastern Cape. This forest 
provides habitat for many threatened species including the Cape Parrot (Poicephalus robustus) 
and leopard (Panthera pardus melanotica) (Cooper & Swart, 1992; Mullins, 2002). 
Mbotyi was identified as a second order development node by the Wild Coast Tourism 
Development Policy (DEAET, 2000: 27), meaning that the area has been deemed suitable for 
"family holiday" tourism and appropriate recreational development. Mbotyi and Msikaba (both 
with a large number of legal and illegal cottages) are the only two second order nodes identified 
for the Pondoland region (DEAET, 2000; Wiggishof, 2003). 
There are a number of interesting sites and waterfalls to be visited within walking and riding 
distance of Mbotyi. Amongst the more spectacular natural features are Fraser and Magwa Falls 
(enroute to Mbotyi), Waterfall Bluff, and Cathedral Rock (visited by a circular day hike from 
the hotel). A large sheltered swimming beach, private lagoons, and many highly acclaimed 
rock and surf fishing spots in close proximity to the lodge, are further attractions (Mbotyi Site 
Visit, 2003 / 2004). 
26 Access is via a graded dirt road. The turnoff for this coastal road is on the southern side of Lusikisiki 
town, off the main R61. A four-wheel drive vehicle is not required to access this coastal resort (Mbotyi 
River Lodge Website, 2004). 
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Figure 6.1: Location Map for Case Study 3 and 4: Mbotyi River Lodge and the Mbotyi Joint-
Venture Campsite - Mbotyi, Pondoland Wild Coast, Eastern Cape Province. 
Case Studies 
Towns 






Coastal Conservation Area 
(1km buffer from Coast) 
Mkambati Nature Reserve 
(Source: Cartographic Unit, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2004). 
158 
6.3 The Tourism Operation: A revamped Family Hotel 
Although the original hotel was abandoned for almost a decade, the condition of the buildings 
and wooden bungalow units were in remarkably good condition considering their proximity to 
the sea. A bar and lounge extension was made to the original kitchen and dining room structure 
(Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). The Lodge has 48 double and twin rooms, all with ensuite 
bathrooms and a sea or lagoon facing patio/balcony. There are plans to build additional self-
catering units. Refer to Plate 8, pp 181, for aerial view of the Lodge. 
In a direct cost comparison with other family and luxury hotels along the Transkei Wild Coast, 
Mbotyi River Lodge (MRL) turns out to be the most expensive. MRL's rates are currently 
increasing at 15% per annum, whilst most other Wild Coast hotels are maintaining a 10% 
annual increase, in line with inflation (Bouwer; Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). According 
to the MRL's owners: their higher daily tariff and yearly increase, is a "conscious business 
decision". They maintain that they would rather have "fewer bums-in-beds'', and subsequently 
less pressure on the natural environment, staff resources, hotel furnishings and facilities, even 
if this means lower overall occupancy27, and attain a similar level of return from the higher 
daily tariff (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003/2004). 
6.4 Background 
The original title deed for Mbotyi River Mouth Trading Site, was made out to Jack Barber and 
Johannes Victor Kottich. The conditions of the grant, stipulated: 
• Payment of a perpetual quit rent of £1 Sterling per annum, to be paid punctually to the 
magistrate in Lusikisiki; and 
• The rights of the proprietor shall not extend to any deposits of gold, silver or precious 
stones which may at any time be discovered on the land. 
27 In terms of location, quality of accommodation, food and services, Mbotyi River Lodge is probably 
most comparable to Umngazi River Bungalows, which won Getaway Magazine's Best Value for Money 
Resort in South Africa from 1989 to 1999, and South Africa's Family Resort of the Year 2000 (Getaway 
Online, 2004). Umngazi currently boasts a 93% annual bed-night occupancy, whilst Mbotyi River Lodge 
is closer to 50%, with red week and holiday periods being fully booked (Bouwer, Goss; Christodoulou, 
pers comm., 2003) 
159 
Jack Barber later acquired the half share of Kottich, and traded there until his death in the late 
1950's. Barber was renowned as the Robinson Crusoe of Mbotyi. He and his wife had a great 
love for the outdoors and became very involved with the local community. During their time 
the only buildings on-site was a small corrugated iron trading store, a modest homestead, and a 
couple of shacks that would be let out to friends and intrepid holiday-makers (Mbotyi River 
Lodge (MRL) website, 2004). 
In 1960, after the Barber's had passed away, three Mount Frere traders: Grant, Jessop and 
Robinson, purchased the Trading Site and buildings for £50. Jessop lived on-site and operated 
the trading store for many years. However, the volume of trade became a trickle in latter years. 
A few more holiday shacks were built onto the Trading Site, and according to an old cottage-
owner (Button, pers comm., 2003): "there was a barely a day in me year when Jessop wasn't 
accommodating some weary traveller or hiker, walking down the coastline". 
In 1985, after Robinson and Grant had passed away, Jessop sold the site to Dr Mazwai, a 
medical practitioner in Lusikisiki. Mazwai purchased the site with a view to building a bottle-
store and hotel (Button, pers comm., 2003; MRL, 2004). The hotel, financed through the old 
Transkei Development Corporation, was called Mbotyi River Bungalows, and was operational 
during the late 1980's. In its first few years, the hotel enjoyed some success, but growing 
political strife preceding South Africa's first democratic elections, began to have a negative 
impact on the Wild Coast Tourism Industry. In August 1993, following the assassination of 
Chris Hani, Lusikisiki (just 27 km away) erupted into violent riot. It was deemed 'unsafe' for 
hotel guests to pass through Lusikisiki, and many were forced to leave their cars in Mbotyi as 
they were evacuated from the area by helicopter. After the last guests had left, the hotel closed 
its doors and remained untouched for a further eight years (Elias, 2001; Christodoulou, pers 
comm., 2003). 
Remarkably, during this entire interlude, there was not a single break-in or incident of looting. 
Cottage owners, who continued to visit the area, report that everything remained exactly as it 
had been left, albeit "the polished cutlery (as it was set for breakfast the last day) cumulating 
another layer of dust as the years passed by" (Button, pers comm., 2003; Ackerman, Scott, 
pers comm., 2004). The current owners claim to have drunk cokes from the hotel store-room, 
which had been left unlocked. There appears to have been an unwritten law amongst the local 
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community, to safeguard the hotel until such time as it could be re-opened (Christodoulou, pers 
comm., 2003; Discussion with Mbotyi Cottage Owners, 2003/2004). The new owners uphold 
that they realised this from the outset: 
"When we bought the hotel, it was not just a piece of land and a set of buildings we were 
attaining, but we were buying into an entire community: one that had enormous expectations of 
us to provide employment and economic opportunities * 
(Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). 
6.5 Procedural Establishment and Institutional Stakeholders 
According to MRL's new owners: government support for investors on the Wild Coast, has 
been deplorable. Despite the fact that the hotel first came to view on an investment prospectus 
for the National Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative, government's capacity and 
willingness to create an 'enabling' environment for private sector investment has been entirely 
lacking. Christodoulou (pers comm., 2003) cites the issue of basic infrastructural provision as 
a case in point. After the sale and transfer of deed, the hotel's new owners requested an 
extension of the Lusikisiki electricity grid down to Mbotyi. After months of correspondence 
with numerous government channels, to little avail, the new owners were forced to take out a 
substantial loan and provide electricity to the hotel at their own expense. The hotel's owners 
(Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003) firmly believe that it is "unrealistic and unacceptable'' for 
government to expect the private sector to foot the bill for infrastructure such as roads, 
electricity and water supply (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). 
6.6 Critique of Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts 
6.6.1 Economic Impact 
Mbotyi River Lodge came away as winner in the 'Best Economic Impact' category for 
emerging businesses in the 2003 Imvelo Responsible Tourism Awards. This was the second 
year of the awards, and attracted over 44 business applicants (Groenewald, 2003; 
Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). The submission criterion, were designed around South 
Africa's (2002) National Responsible Tourism Guidelines, Fair Trade in Tourism principles 
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and Pro-Poor tourism objectives. Since these are the same criteria which helped contextualise 
my case study questionnaire, MRL's Imvelo application served to supplement and corroborate 
these research investigations. 
6.6.1.1 Direct Employment and Training 
Ninety percent of staff28 employed by the Lodge are sourced from within a 50km radius of the 
enterprise. More than 80% of these employees, come from the six villages which constitute 
'Mbotyi'. Sixty-seven percent of the local employees are female (33% male), which is a 
deliberate policy. Both the owners and the managers felt that wages would be spent more 
prudently, and benefit more members within the community, should they accrue to women, 
"who are more likely to spend it on their families subsistence, clothing, or housing 
improvements'' (Christodoulou; Cooper, S and Duff, pers comm., 2003). 
MRL's owners have taken the decision that, wherever possible, labour will be sourced locally. 
The fact that the Mbotyi community acted as •guardians' of the hotel for the many years it lay 
abandoned, was undoubtedly a key motivation to this decision. In addition, transport issues and 
lack of staff accommodation, meant that it would be more convenient (and cost-effective) to 
source staff locally. Over 300 local applicants were interviewed for some 30 potential jobs. The 
existing skills base amongst the applicants was described as "virtually nil", and as such was not 
considered a key criterion for selection. Those applicants who were more proficient in English 
were considered for front-of-house jobs (such as waitressing, bar, hiking guides and reception), 
whilst this was not a prerequisite for kitchen or cleaning staff (Cooper, S, pers comm., 2003). 
The employment procedure appears to have been 'free and fair', but the reality was always, 
that the majority would leave disappointed. During the interview process, the hotel 
management reportedly made a concerted effort to stress that they were not only there as a 
source of direct employment, but a potential "market place" for other community members to 
sell or outsource their skills to (Cooper, S and Duff, pers comm., 2003). Of the newly recruited 
employees, only 20% reportedly possess a matric certificate, and prior to tiieir employment at 
MRL, only two had ever had a full-time job (Cooper, S, pers comm., 2003). This provides 
28 Forty-nine of the Lodge's 54 employees are 'local', excluding three senior management positions. 
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some indication of the dire state of unemployment, education, and formal training capacity 
existent in these rural communities. 
After the local employee recruitment, an intensive period of in-house training began in 
preparation for the December holiday season. Formal training was provided for the two hotel 
Field Guides who attended a three-month course in East London, partly sponsored by the EU 
Wild Coast Community Tourism Initiative. The guides received formal training in responsible 
tourism awareness, customer service and communication, trail organisational skills, tour 
guiding principles, and Level 1 nature guiding and first aid. 
In terms of capacity building and skills development, MRL has provided mostly 'in-house' 
training and mentoring to all local employees, within the fields outlined by Table 6.1. 
Furthermore, the Lodge has provided support to community members not directly employed by 
the hotel, but involved with other tourism services and activities at Mbotyi, such as the 
Lifeguards and River Rangers. 











No Persons trained and employed (gender / local) 
1 x lady from Lusikisiki: TTO sponsored hotel reception training 
course and received practical experience from MRL - now employed 
by MRL full-time * + 2 from Durban and Pietermaritzburg 
9 x Female staff, work in shifts * 
2 x Female * 
3 x Male, 2 x Female - local male been made head barmen and 
junior manager * 
lx Female * 
8 x Female, 2 x Male kitchen assistants* A head chef* was 
contracted from Pietermaritzburg, and has since trained her kitchen 
assistants to produce AA quality-rated food. 
8 x Females * 






4 x Male, 1 x Female * - 2 of the gardeners are part-time as they are 
also field guides 
lx Local Male * + lx male from Pietermaritzburg * 
1 x Female from Durban * 
During the refurbishment phase in 2001 all low- and semi-skilled 
labour was drawn from the local community (a 9km radius) and 
basic skills training was provided on the job 
(Source: Cooper and Norris Jones, pers comm., 2003) 
Notes: ' * * = Full-time employees. 
6.6.1.2 Formal Economic Contribution 
The estimated income to the local community from MRL wages29 is R500 000/ annum (Foggin, 
2003; Christodoulou, pers conun., 2003). This equates to an average wage of R850 per 
employee /month, which appears to be R100 higher than the average monthly wage reported by 
hotel employees in informal discussions (MRL employees, pers comm., 2003). 
The Lodge management said that they encourage staff to keep their earnings confidential so as 
to avoid jealousies and future conflicts (Cooper, S and Duff, pers comm., 2003), and from my 
investigations it would seem that most employees believe everyone to be on the same salary 
scale, regardless of their job portfolio. 
During the 8-month Lodge refurbishment phase (2001), the Lodge paid in excess of R300 000 
wages to builders contracted from local Mbotyi communities. A similar payment was made in 
2002, for the building of the joint-venture campsite, whilst renovations and construction of the 
new log cabins in 2003, generated a further R250 000 in local labour wages. The total wage 
earnings accrued to the community, since the opening of the Lodge, have been summarised 
below. 
This figure includes only those wages of'local' employees. 
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Table 6.2: Summary of Direct Income Earnings since opening of Mbotyi Lodge, Dec 2001 
Year 





after 2 years 
Formal Wage 
Earnings 
R 500 000 
R 500 000 
Part-time Wages 
R 300 000 
R 300 000 
R 250 000 
Total 
R 1 100 000 
R 750 000 
R 1 850 000 
(Source: Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003/2004). 
After two years of operation (Dec 2001 - Dec 2003), the direct income (from full and part 
wages) contributed to the local Mbotyi economy is estimated at Rl 850 000. This figure 
excludes the informal earnings and other economic opportunities created by the existence of the 
Lodge and the tourists it attracts. 
6.6.1.3 Informal Economic Benefits 
1) Local Outsourcing 
The hotel regularly sources fish and seafood harvestings (crayfish, mussels, oysters) from a 
number of local fishermen and women for whom they have reportedly procured permits30. The 
hotels' estimated seafood purchases are provided in Table 6.3. 
30 There is currently much confusion over subsistence and commercial harvesting licenses. According to a 
fisheries expert, who has done extensive research on marine utilisation on the Wild Coast: there is not a 
single hotel on the whole of the Wild Coast with a legitimate commercial license to purchase marine 
harvestings (Fielding, pers comm., 2003). However, he blames Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) 
for this, whose backlog of permit issue has become a matter of exigency. "Provided they are adhering to 
size and bag limits (which the MRL managers assure they are doing) then MRL is adhering to "the rules' 
per se" (Fielding, pers comm., 2003). 
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R 3 800 
R520 
R520 










R 21 400 
R3500 
R3500 
R 33 900 
(Source: Norris Jones, 2004). 
Notes: 
1. 'Low' season refers to the months: February, March, August, September, November 
2. 'High' season refers to the months: July, December, January 
3. Average = remaining months in year 
The figure provided for 'high' season crayfish purchases is of some concern considering the 
busy Christmas months (December - January) does not correspond with the 'open' season for 
crayfish31 collection. However, this amount may only be applicable to the July holiday period 
as the Lodge Owners insist that MRL do not buy crayfish out-of-season (Christodoulou, pers 
comm., 2003). 
The Lodge's caterers make a weekly trip into Lusikisiki to stock up on food and beverage 
supplies (within the Imvelo's criterion for 'local' food purchases). R14 000 is spent on these 
purchases during average season months, increasing to R40 000 during peak season / holiday 
periods. The Lodge will only make emergency purchases from the local Mbotyi Trading Store 
(Cooper, S, pers comm., 2003) but this spaza store has benefited from tourist purchases -
initially from hotel guests purchasing sweets and cold-drinks but now also from self-catering 
campers. For example, this store now stocks energy drinks and mineral water (an inflated 
luxury, which locals certainly could not afford to purchase) as a result of tourist demand. 
31 The crayfish season is officially closed from 1 November - 1 March every year in order to afford stocks 
an opportunity to breed and mature (de Villiers, pers comm., 2003). 
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The Lodge has purportedly tried to secure a regular fresh produce order from the local 
community, suggesting a vacant piece of communal land (near the maturation ponds) be 
cultivated, and offering to assist with the installation of irrigation. Apparently MRL made it 
known that they would be willing to purchase all the fresh produce the community could 
provide them with, provided quality and pricing was equivalent to what they would pay in 
Lusikisiki. This was intended to be a win-win situation - saving both the hotel and the 
community vegetable producers on fuel and transport logistics. One of the managers evidently 
distributed seeds to some interested growers, but the return has been insubstantial and erratic. 
She has since established a vegetable garden within the hotel grounds (looked after by the hotel 
gardeners), and the produce produced mus far has been "excellent" (Christodoulou, pers 
comm., 2003). 
In speaking with community members, it appears there was some disagreement over the prices 
the hotel was willing to pay for the produce, and other households mentioned that they were 
reluctant to grow crops as they were likely to be grazed by animals or stolen. In short, they felt 
it not to be worth the effort. The majority of households interviewed, agreed that farming was 
becoming a less popular activity in Mbotyi, especially amongst the younger generation who 
perceived it to be 'old school'. Many of them blamed decreasing yields, drought years, and 
decreasing soil fertility for the increasing apprehension to farm. If they could afford to buy all 
their foodstuffs from town, they would prefer this, but most households still planted some 
maize, beans and other subsistence crops i.e. pumpkins and mdumbi's, out of necessity (Mbotyi 
Community Survey, 2003 / 2004). 
Perhaps what is needed is a more formalised channel for selling this produce. At Umngazi 
River Bungalows, a 'Market Day' is held three times a week, where local community members 
can sell their fresh fruit and vegetables to the hotel. The hotel purchases just about everything 
they can supply, with a fair price negotiated. Higher prices are paid for better quality produce, 
in order to maintain a business incentive. Apparently, in the beginning, community members 
would all be harvesting the same crops at the same time (resulting in saturated supply), but the 
market days have been a very good learning exercise for them. They now discuss amongst 
themselves and have worked out a rotational schedule for harvesting. They have also learned to 
diversify their produce, with some members producing herbs that the hotel requires (Bouwer, 
pers comm., 2003). 
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It may be just a matter of persistence, but fresh produce supply remains a largely unexploited 
income earning opportunity for the Mbotyi community. Self-catering campers provide an 
additional untapped market. 
The final outsourcing opportunity which MRL provides for the local community, is the 'nanny 
service', which the hotel offers to its guests on a self-employment type contract. Should hotel 
guests wish to employ a child-minder, the Lodge reception has a list of reputable persons whom 
they will contact (on the guests behalf) and then the guests pay these local ladies directly. The 
recommended rate of pay is R 10.00/hour, or part thereof (Norris Jones, pers comm., 2004). 
Table 6.4 provides the estimated income that this outsourcing contributes to the local Mbotyi 
communities (calculated on approximated figures provided by Norris-Jones, pers comm., 2004) 
Table 6.4: Income into Mbotyi community from outsourcing nanny services 
Number of 'nannies' 
employed 













R 3 600 /month 
R 14 400 
R 46 800 





R 32 400 






(Source: Norris Jones, 2004). 
2) Support for Local Tourism Enterprises 
It would appear that the hotel owners have a very generous and holistic view of tourism 
development in Mbotyi (Sperring, 2003; Wiggishof, pers comm., 2003; Field Observations, 
2003/2004). They realised from the outset that in order to create a tourism friendly 
environment in Mbotyi, it was essential to maximise opportunities for the community around 
the hotel and its guest. The unequivocal support shown for many of the localised community-
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operated activities, and the creation of the joint-venture campsite (refer to Chapter 7), bears 
testimony to this. 
However, there appears to have been some 'conflict of interest' with the hotel managers, as 
evidenced by the brazen management-style of one of the managers in particular (who has since 
left) and the initial lack of support or understanding for local community projects such as the 
horse trail, the community campsite and similar projects. These issues have nevertheless, been 
addressed (Bailey; Christodoulou; Haynes; Sperring, pers comm., 2003; Sperring, 2003). 
The Lodge has shown strong support for the following local community projects: 
• The Horse Trail 
As part of the EU WCCTI's undertaking to develop a horse and hiking trail32 which traverses 
the entire northern Pondoland coastline, PondoCROP (the EU's main enterprise development 
agent) helped establish a local horse trail business at Mbotyi with the intention that the business 
would, in time, be linked to other localised trails (PondoCROP Business Plan, 2002 e). The 
current product on offer is a two-hour roundtrip, traversing through a diversity of natural and 
cultural environs, catering to a wide range of rider capabilities and costing R75/adult. 
The owners of Mbotyi River Lodge have shown magnanimous support for the initiative, 
agreeing to provide overnight and temporary stabling for the horses (near the Lodge entrance in 
clear view of guests), promote the activity to hotel and campsite guests, handle all bookings and 
receipts of cash, co-ordinate horse-owners and guides, as well as provide storage for equipment 
(i.e. bridles, saddles, helmets and rain gear), at no cost to the community business 
(Christodoulou & Sperring, pers comm., 2003; Mbotyi Site Visit, 2003). 
According to Christodoulou (pers comm., 2003), although PondoCROP helped institute the 
business, in December 2001 (with a fully-booked Christmas season to capitalise on) the Mbotyi 
Horse Trail Trust were seriously lacking capacity re: marketing and administration systems, 
feeding arrangements, product standardisation, and reservations. One of the partners wives, 
32 The Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail / Amadiba Adventures was envisioned as a component of this longer trail 
network. 
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who is an experienced equestrian, paid for all her rides and helped establish the temperament of 
each horse as well as providing sound advice on trail routings which would incorporate a wide 
variety of grassland, forest, beach and village biomes, and be suited to mixed ability riders. 
As laid out in the Mbotyi Horse Trail Business Plan (PondoCROP Business Plan, 2002d): the 
horse trail was anticipated to provide 21 direct employment opportunities at start-up, with 
income-earning opportunities for up to 23 individuals (at a cost of R 2 383 per job). In its first 
season of operation (2001), nearly all the horse trail clientele came from hotel guests, but the 
campsite now also contributes a significant portion of the horse trail client base. 
The monthly turnover of the business, as estimated after two years of MRL receipts (cited in 
Foggin, 2003), was: 
Potential monthly turnover in 'high' season=R20 000 x 3 months 
Potential monthly income in mid season = R10 000 x 3 months 
Potential monthly income in low season=R5 000 x 6 months 
This equates to a potential annual income of R 120 000 to the Mbotyi community. However, 
the actual EU mid-term figures (with trail statistics provided by PondoCROP) determined it to 
be in the region of R 70 000/year (ECODES, 2003). 
The Mbotyi horse trail has developed into one of the most successful local community projects, 
although this was not always the case. It is alleged that during the first (2001) operational 
season, one of the hotel managers was blatantly patronising and disparaging of the trail, not 
making an effort to sell the product, or being prepared to accept the occasional problem 
associated with its day-to-day operations (Undisclosed source, pers comm, 2003). When made 
aware of this fact, the hotel owners removed this individual from having anything to do with 
the horse trail and reaffirmed the Lodge's support for the trail by including occupancy targets 
(i.e. for the horse trail) in die management contracts (Undisclosed source, pers comm, 2003). 
In odier words the Hotel managers were forced to support me trail, in spite of personal views 
or perceptions they might have. A full-time activities manager was also appointed to help 
facilitate stronger ties to other local community initiatives. 
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According to the lodge owners (Christodoulou, cited in Foggin, 2003), the success of the horse 
trail has led to a greater concern for the general health and condition of the horses. There are 
still a number of problems associated with the running of the trail, particularly around food 
purchases and transportation, tack maintenance, and vaccinations, but the operation appears to 
be growing from strength to strength. Whilst undertaking fieldwork in the area, a group 
commissioned by Triple Trust (funded by the EU Support Programme) were running a training 
workshop in horse care and guiding. 
• The Mbotyi River Guides 
Mbotyi had four members (all male) enrolled in a national DEAT sponsored 'River Rangers 
Programme,- a poverty alleviation project designed to train and equip people from previously 
disadvantaged backgrounds to set up micro enterprises based on riverine and coastal adventure 
activities A year-long course provided selected candidates with a theoretical background in 
riverine ecology, environmental monitoring and basic fauna] and flora identification, in addition 
to practical boating, first aid, fly-tying and customer service skills. The idea is that, kick-
started with the necessary training and equipment33, each guide can establish their own River 
Tripping business, contracting their services to local hotels, holiday cottages or other tourist 
enterprises in their respective areas (Bouwer and Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). 
The year long course concluded in December 2003, so the December, 2003/January, 2004 
holiday was effectively the first income-earning opportunity for these guides. From discussions 
with two of the guides, the projects potential looks optimistic. MRL has been supportive of die 
initiative, allowing the guides to store their boats on the hotel property, compiling a write-up 
about the programme and posting it in the local craft store and campsite, and promoting the 
river trips as a recommended activity to MRL guests (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2004). 
According to one of the river rangers, the hotel activities manager initially did not make an 
effort to promote them (during the first two weeks of December hotel guests were allegedly not 
informed about the River Guides at all), but this improved after the guides voiced their 
33 Every river guide has been equipped with a boat and paddle, guiding outfits, life-jackets, flyfishing rod 
as well as fly-tying equipment and feathers, binoculars, and fauna and flora reference books. They have 
also been provided with a bicycle for transportation (to and from the river), and have received a basic 
salary of R 700/ month for nine months, whilst training. 
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concerns through the Community Trust chairman, who raised the matter with the hotels 
management (Mkhanwa, pers comm., 2004). 
The cost of a three hour guided river trip (up the estuary, and which includes a short forest 
walk) is R SOpp, with children under five years charged half-price. The total income (earned by 
the four guides combined) during the month of December 2003, was estimated at R 2 000 
(Mkhanwa, pers comm., 2004). Discussions took place in early January (2004), and as such, 
the initiative was really too new to determine its financial profitability. 
After speaking to a number of campsite guests and local cottage-owners who had taken the trip 
(Mbotyi Site Visit, January 2004), most were highly impressed with the level of knowledge and 
professionalism the guides had displayed (and two in particular). Some persons commented 
they would perhaps like to hear more about the local culture and history of Mbotyi, and another 
felt that paying full-price for his six and eight-year old children was a bit unfair considering the 
trip had to be significantly shortened (they could not manage the walk). A re-evaluation of the 
pricing structure, especially with regard to children's rates (> 5 but under 12 years) might be 
needed. 
Overall, it appears that the River Rangers Project has potential to be well supported in Mbotyi, 
especially with patronage from the hotel and campsite, whose target market is primarily middle 
to high-income domestic family and nature-orientated tourists. This was confirmed in follow-up 
discussions with the hotel managers (Norris Jones, and Duff, pers comm., 2004) who provided 
rough estimate figures for the number of guests taking river trips. It appears that as many as 
360 guests/month have booked river trips during high season months, around 240 during 
average season months, and about 60 during low season months. Assuming the full charge rate, 
this would equate to as much as R18 000 combined river guide earnings during high season 
months, R12 000 during mid-season months, and R3 000 / month the remainder of the year. 
Using the same 'season' classifications as was employed in the Horse Trail (economic 
contribution) estimate, the potential annual earnings of the Mbotyi River Guides (all together) 
are: 
Potential monthly turnover in high season=R18 000 x 3 months = R 54 000 
Potential monthly income in mid season=R12 000 x 3 months = R 36 000 
Potential monthly income in low season=R3 000 x 6 months = R 18 000 
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This would mean a potential annual contribution to the local economy in the region of 
R 108 000/ year. 
• The Mbotyi Life-Guards 
The Mbotyi River Lodge has arranged accommodation for the Wild Coast Life Guards (Plate 9, 
pp 181) and storage of their equipment in one of the hotels outbuildings (Christodoulou, pers 
comm., 2003/ 2004). There is, however, some controversy over why this privately owned 
company (based from Port St Johns) has been awarded the life-saving contract for the holiday 
seasons, when there is a local life-saving club (the Mbotyi Life savers Association) with 
experienced members who have the necessary training and equipment34. The monopoly of this 
outside company (present at all the Wild Coast resort areas visited during field investigations) 
requires some explanation by the local Qaukeni and OR Tambo District Municipality, who 
awarded the contract. 
- The Hotel Field Guides 
MRL employs two freelance guides, who are employed part-time as gardeners in the hotel. 
When guests request a guided hike they provide this service as independent operators and hikes 
take precedence over gardening duties. Their guiding fee is R 100/day for groups under ten 
persons. Groups larger than ten are required to employ both guides (at R100 each). The guides 
are not paid by the hotel for days they spend out in the field, but during low-tourist seasons, 
they are at least, guaranteed an ongoing wage. Their combined potential monthly earnings (as 
self-contracted field guides) is estimated as: 
Potential monthly income in high season= R2 500 x 3 months (from 2001-2003 hotel 
records show an average of 25 guided hikes/ month during holiday periods) = R7 500 
34 According to the Squadron leader for this local club, their members are affiliated with the Wild Coast 
Lifesaving Association and are more qualified in terms of sea-rescue techniques and First Aid than die 
young boys working for the privately contracted company. They also reportedly have superior equipment 
(which I was shown), sponsored by Anglo-Gold, through the connections of a cottage-owner (Soyipa,pers 
comm., 2004). 
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Potential monthly income in mid season=R1 500 x 3 months (guide approx IS hikes/ 
month over mid-season months) = R4 500 
Potential monthly income in low season=Rl 000 x 6 months (guide about 10 days in the 
month) = R6 000 
TOTAL = R 18 000 income per annum (/ 2 guides) 
This figure excludes tips, which are estimated to be an additional 50% on this income. Tips are 
difficult to quantify, but it is not uncommon (from discussion with management and the guides 
themselves) to receive as much in 'gratitude' as their daily fee. 
In discussion with the Field Guides, they demonstrated excellent knowledge of local fauna and 
flora, whilst all the guests I spoke to who had taken a trail, were highly impressed by their 
professionalism, responsibility and knowledge of the area. Both guides have been sent on a 
three-month training course, but much of their fauna/flora knowledge has been self-taught from 
reference books. Triple Trust (the NGO responsible for skills training on the EU Programme) 
are reportedly arranging for these field-guides to receive more advanced training, so they can 
become registered with THETA's (South Africa's Tourism, Hospitality, Sport Education and 
Training Authority) Tour Guides Association (Cuba, pers comm., 2003). 
• The Mbotyi Craft-Centre 
The most recent 'community outreach' development is that of the Mbotyi Craft Centre. The 
building in which the crafts are housed used to be the local spaza store and shebeen. Its location 
(en-route to the beach and within clear view of the hotel bar and sundeck) was such that it was 
becoming an increasing "intimidation'' and "eyesore" to hotel guests who were forced to walk 
past it in accessing the beach (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). MRL's owners decided to 
purchase the dilapidated building, with the view to turn it into a local craft and information 
centre, whilst the trading store was moved up the road (into premises owned by MRL), out of 
view of the Lodge's residents. 
After renovations, the 'Mbotyi Crafters Market' opened for business on the 20* December, 
2003. The shop was designed as an outlet for local crafters to display and sell their wares, with 
the proviso that the item is made personally, and by hand. It was hoped that the store would 
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help to forge wider alliances with similar businesses and distributors - thereby increasing the 
cratters distribution network and boosting local household earnings (Christodoulou and 
Gillespie, 2003). 
In my last site visit, lO-^"1 January 2004, the craft-store had been opened for less than a 
month, but sales to date, were encouraging. The shopkeeper had recorded close on R5 000 
worth of sales (R3 333 going directly to the crafters, and Rl 666 to cover her salary, electricity 
and monthly rental). The Lodge owners have employed a very friendly and 'skilled' sales lady 
to oversee the running of the shop. Prior to her promotion to the craft-centre, she was 
employed as a kitchen assistant, in the Lodge. 
The establishment of the craft-centre has significant 'latent' potential to boost local household 
income, however, mere is a palpable need for focused skills training in local craft and 
handiwork. Currently, over ninety-percent of the crafts displayed, come from one local artist -
a fairly well acclaimed textile artist who has his own studio near Magwa Tea Estates, and two 
of his students. A local Mbotyi Beadwork Project, which received training from a Cape Town 
based NGO (Ogle, C, pers comm., 2003), has provided a number of beaded items (with 
necklaces in particular, proving a popular and affordable tourist novelty), but apart from this 
local initiative, there are less than a handful of 'local* (i.e. Mbotyi) submissions (Sigoca, pers 
comm., 2004). Whether this is because they are unaware that they can display their crafts 
without charge (a showroom for anyone, provided it is local and hand-made), or whether they 
simply do not have the crafts available, remains to be established. According to the shopkeeper, 
it is more a case of people "not having the skills or the materials with which to start" (Sigoca, 
pers comm., 2003). 
This is where the EU Training Support Programme could be of assistance. A couple of week-
long training workshops in specific, market-informed handicrafts may be of tremendous benefit 
to keen (but unskilled) local crafters. Often a skill exists (such as beading or sewing ability), 
but assistance is needed in designing products that tourists would want to buy - i.e. tourist 
market awareness. The Lodge owners recognise this. One of their wives, an artist herself, and 
a local cottage-owner who heads up the Midlands Arts and Crafts womens group, has offered 
to run some community workshops and provide guidance to this end (Ackerman, S, pers 
comm., 2004; Christodoulou, J, pers comm., 2004). 
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From numerous discussions with hotel and campsite residents, cottage owners and day visitors 
to Mbotyi, most believed the craft centre to be a 'meaningful' and 'positive' development, 
although a number of respondents mentioned overpricing as a potential shortcoming. 
• The Campsite Joint-Venture 
This has undoubtedly been the single largest undertaking in terms of community enterprise 
support and development. However, the campsite joint-venture should not be considered a 
philanthropic business partnership. There are benefits and profits to be shared equally amongst 
the lodge and community partners. Provided both partners appreciate and respect what the 
'other' brings to the business, this establishment has the potential to generate meaningful 
employment, outsourcing and income-earning opportunities for the entire Mbotyi community. 
This business initiative has been documented as an independent case study (Chapter 7). 
6.6.2 Social Impact and Community Perceptions 
6.6.2.1 Relationship with cottage-owners 
It seems that the re-opening of the Mbotyi hotel was met with some apprehension from local 
cottage-owners, who during the years the hotel lay vacant, had continued to visit the area and 
were potentially the only source of 'tourist' income for the local Mbotyi community35. From 
numerous discussions, it would appear that many of cottage owners viewed the hotel's re-
opening as a threat to the 'sense of place' they so enjoyed about Mbotyi (Holmes, Scott, 
Button, Ducasse and other 'legal' cottage-owners, pers comm., 2003/2004). According to 
MRL's owners, many cottage owners feared that the hotel might become a gateway for 'mass 
tourism' in the area and pursue a timeshare model, ubiquitous with other coastal holiday resorts 
(such as on the South Coast of Kwazulu-Natal). 
When one considers the profitability of timeshare, I believe it is testimony to the owners intent, 
that they never pursued this development path. The fact that they have taken a deliberate 
business decision to increase their daily tariffs over and above other Wild Coast Holiday resorts 
39 Cottage owners regularly allude to this fact in justifying their value and status in the community. 
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(an average 5% higher annual increase than competitors), at the sacrifice of lower bed-night 
occupancy, is confirmation that saturating Mbotyi with tourists is not their business strategy. 
Many of the cottage-owners have come to realise this, with the hotel/cottage-owner relationship 
gradually improving since the hotels inception. Nonetheless, there remain some common issues 
of contention, which the cottage-owners voiced against the Lodge and its management. I cannot 
speak for the entire cottage-owner community, but some common grievances included: the 
rather "bolshy" and "high-handed" approach that the Lodge owners have taken to matters in 
Mbotyi. Many accused the Lodge of acting as if they were "the best thing to have happened to 
Mbotyi", and generally discounting all that the cottage owners have done for the local 
community prior to, and during, their time in Mbotyi (Undisclosed Sources, pers comm., 
2003). The Lodge owner's appear to have 'indifferent' response to this sentiment. 
Another common issue of dissent raised by the cottage-owners, was the non-residents' policy 
which the Lodge has instated. MRL has taken a controversial decision to prohibit all persons 
that are not hotel residents, from using any of the hotel facilities or entering its premises. 
Where under the previous ownership, cottage-owners had enjoyed an occasional meal or drink 
at the hotel, this is no longer permissible. 
According to MRL's new management, the motive behind this "non-compromise" policy is that 
when the hotel first opened its doors it was unreservedly used and abused by cottage-owners, 
Lusikisiki day-trippers, and campers "who were paying R 60 /night in order to camp but used 
the hotel's facilities as their extended amenities". The hotels management took the "hard 
decision" that they would rather lose out in extra income from food and bar sales to outsiders, 
and weather the disenchanted grumbles from disappointed cottage-owners, than lose future 
hotel guests (Christodoulou; Cooper; Duff; pers comm., 2003) After the decision had been 
made, it "had to be a cross-the-board policy" 
"There just can't be any half-measures or compromises on this rule. If we permitted a 
couple of cottage owners to come in and watch 'die bokke' play, it would be no sooner 
perceived as 'racism' if we prohibited the Bafana Bafana play-off" 
(Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003/2004). 
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However, many of the cottage-owners claimed that there are ways and means of getting round 
this issue: like having a dress code, or a permit-system in which those cottage-owners (or 
others) who wished to use the hotel facilities occasionally, could pay an annual fee for use of 
such. A number of cottage-owners alluded to the fact that not one of the other hotels on the 
Wild Coast had such an exclusive non-residents policy: "what makes Mbotyi River Lodge think 
they are above everyone else?" (Discussion with cottage-owners, 2003 / 2004) 
6.6.2.2 Resident Community Perceptions 
From a detailed questionnaire survey conducted on 30 Mbotyi households (during June 2003 
and January, 2004), 86% of the households interviewed felt that the hotel's re-opening, was a 
very positive development, principally because it provided the community with jobs, and a 
marketplace to sell their seafood harvestings. A small percentage of households (17%) 
mentioned that the hotel was beneficial to mem, because it brought more tourists down to 
Mbotyi, to whom they could sell other products or services, such as crafts and the community-
owned Horse Trail. Some 20% of households expressed a mild anxiety that the hotel may be 
trying to 'take over' Mbotyi in purchasing all the buildings around them, but the benefits from 
the hotel generally outweighed these concerns. 
In terms of the jobs provided by the Lodge, the majority of households felt MRL's employment 
process to be 'fair', and wages 'reasonable'. Naturally, there were a few households that were 
disappointed, usually as they did not have one family member employed in either the campsite 
or the hotel. Interestingly, a number of households alluded to how tiring it was to work in the 
hotel: "you cannot stand and rest there, you must be looking busy all the time'' (Mbotyi 
Household Survey, 2003), and there was some dissatisfaction voiced about one manager in 
particular, who has since left. 
Only two households (7%) mentioned the 'non-residents policy' as being exclusionist. The 
majority accepted it as a hotel rule, which they did not see any need to challenge. Seventeen 
percent of households interviewed felt that the hotels presence was beneficial to the community 
(especially in terms of providing jobs), but given a choice between having only the campsite or 
the hotel in Mboyti, they said they would chose the campsite as "... the community has more 
say on what goes on there" (Mbotyi Household Survey, 2003). 
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However, what is perhaps of greater concern is that some 27% of the households interviewed 
actually thought the campsite was an extension of the hotel - i.e. they did not understand it to 
be a community-hotel joint venture partnership. 
A number of cottage owners mentioned how it must have come as a "disbelief for the local 
community, when after acting as guardians of the abandoned hotel for so many years, one of 
the first thing the new owners did was erect an electric-fence around the entire property. They 
felt the exclusionist undercurrents accompanying this action would have angered the 
community. (Mbotyi cottage owners, pers comm., 2003; Bishop, pers comm., 2004). However, 
not one community member ever mentioned this issue36. According to the lodge owners and 
management (pers comm., 2003), the electric fence is "not for people, but to keep goats and 
cattle out". 
6.6.3 Environmental Impacts 
The natural environment surrounding Mbotyi River Lodge, is perhaps its biggest attraction and 
marketing strength. The sustainability and long-term success of the Lodge is closely reliant 
upon the maintenance and good health of this environment. Whilst there is little question that 
the Lodge's existence places greater demand on the natural resource base (i.e. water extraction 
/ sewage disposal, fishing and marine harvesting, and more people frequenting the area) there 
are many ways in which the hotel can mitigate its impact and make potentially positive 
contributions with respect to the management and preservation of its proximate environ. 
A substantially more detailed study would have to be conducted to assess the full environmental 
impacts of the Lodge. However, from a broad case study perspective, there are a number of 
issues which require urgent redress (as identified and acknowldged by MRL's owners). 
Firstly, the issue of the hotel's waste disposal is a particularly litigious. With no recycle plant 
within a SOkm radius of Mbotyi, the hotel's refuse simply contributes / adds to the burden of 
poorly serviced inland towns, such as Lusikisiki, Flagstaff and Bizana. The Lodge is left with a 
situation where they must either bury, burn or transport their solid waste offsite. According to 
36 They were not however, explicitly questioned about the issue. 
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Chistodoulou (pers comm., 2003) organic and paper waste is burnt on the hotel grounds, whilst 
non-flammable waste (tins, bottles, plastics) are buried in a designated rubbish pit. 
The location of this rubbish pit has caused some dissent amongst Mbotyi cottage-owners, the 
local chief, and the Lodge. It would appear that the original dump-site identified by the DEAT 
was rejected by the chief because it was too close to his homestead (Malindi, pers comm., 
2004). He earmarked another site, behind (but still within) the frontal dunes at the south end of 
Mbotyi beach, which is currently being used by both the hotel and the Coast-Care workers37 
(Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003; Churchill, pers comm., 2004). Due to the transitory nature 
of the sand dune, the current dump-site is not effectual at containment. This has evoked a 
number of complaints from cottage-owners (particularly on the south side of the estuary); 
whilst the Lodge recognises the urgency of investigating alternative sitings and/or refuse 
disposal options. 
The second issue of concern, is the potential overload of the hotel's sewerage treatment works. 
MRL inherited a system of open-air maturation ponds, which were adequate to treat the hotel's 
effluent, but the added burden from the campsite (especially during peak holiday periods) has 
necessitated the need for a larger and more efficient system. Options are currently being 
investigated. 
There have been no scientific studies as yet, to assess the impact of harvesting (for subsistence 
or commercial sale) of fish and other marine organisms, in the vicinity of Mbotyi. MRL 
purportedly adheres to closed seasons, bag and size limits, and only purchases seafood from 
licensed persons. However, the increased 'commodificatiorf of marine resources from demand 
created by the hotel, cottage owners and self-catering campers, is likely to have some negative 
impact on these resources. 
Although the Lodge does not market itself as an ecotourism operation per se, it endeavours to 
instil an ethos of 'responsible tourism' amongst its visitors. Small efforts: like erecting a sign to 
37 CoastCare: Is the brand name given to the programme designed at implementing the White Paper for 
Sustainable Coastal Development. It is a DEAT - MCM funded initiative, which amongst other objectives, 
provides employment for local persons assigned to maintain designated sections of the coastline (MCM, 
2003). Two Coast-Care teams operate out of the Mbotyi area (employing ten individuals each) - the first 
team is responsible for the stretch of coastline north up to Msikaba, and the other, for the coastline south 
down to Manteku (Churchill, 2004). 
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remind visitors diat 4x4's on the beach are prohibited; and a strict policy of only purchasing 
wood carvings made from exotic tree species (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003), has been a 
start. 
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Plate 8: An aerial view of the Mbotyi River Lodge (Source: Colvin, 2004). 
Plate 9: The Wild Coast Life Guards on duty at Mbotyi (Source: Colvin, 2004). 
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6.7 Discussion and Future 
On the whole, it would seem that the owners of MRL have a munificent attitude towards 
'sharing the tourism pie' at Mbotyi. However, they also make no pretences about their 
commercial motives. They do not profess to be social benefactors, but wish to be 
acknowledged for the real jobs they have created and economic opportunities they have 
fashioned. 
As is made clear by this case study, the experience and business savvy of private sector 
investors, can facilitate substantial economic benefits and opportunities to the local community 
or region in which the tourism enterprise operates. However, considering the dire situation of 
poverty and unemployment in the area, the number of jobs created or benefits received might 
never be conceived of as being enough. In the same breath, the lodge operator's allude to the 
"cupped hand coming out all too easily in Mbotyi" (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). The 
situation of dependence and expectations is something, which they would like to move away 
from. Not everyone aspires to be an entrepreneur, and only a fraction of those that do, actually 
have what it takes to get things off the ground (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). The lodge 
partners are more than willing to assist and mentor those individuals whom show such 
initiative. Social objectives are not MRL's mantra, but they firmly believe they have made a 
tangible difference towards poverty alleviation in the local community, through the direct 
(principally employment and economic) contributions and spin-off opportunities created from 
the Lodge's existence. 
The Lodge owners did however, explicitly allude to the fact that many of the 'community 
outreach' initiatives they had attempted to institute had been thwarted by the tenacious and 
bigoted attitude of the ex-Community Trust chairman. "Until such time as he is removed from 
the Trust, or prepared to demonstrate more amiable co-operation with the Lodge, MRL's 
interaction and support for the community will be constrained" (Christodoulou, pers comm., 
2003). 
The future of Mbotyi River Lodge is probably the most assured of all the documented case 
studies, principally because the owners possess title deeds to the land and the enterprise has 
proved popular and profitable. However, the Lodge should be cautious of not out-pricing itself 
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from the family and domestic tourist markets, and would be advised to play a more active role 
in the protection of the natural environment, upon which sustained tourism to the region, will 
depends upon. 
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CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDIES 
THE MBOTYI CAMPSITE: A Joint-Venture Partnership 
7.1 Introduction 
In February 2001, discussions were initiated between the owners of Mbotyi River Lodge (Pry) 
Limited and committee members of the Mbotyi Community Development Forum regarding the 
development of a joint-venture campsite to provide more budget and family- affordable 
accommodation in Mbotyi. This case study provides a working example of Ferrar et al. (1997) 
management sharing community-tourism model. Since the campsite is still a relatively new 
initiative, its economic impact is briefly discussed whilst greater focus is made of its procedural 
establishment and the lessons learnt from its early institutional tussles. 
The joint-venture (j v) arrangement was instigated on the premise of mutual benefit sharing. The 
hotel owners recognised that the participation of, and good relationship with, the local 
community was vital to sustaining an emergent and successful tourism industry in Mbotyi. At 
the same time, the community acknowledged that having the hotel owners as business partners, 
would be of value in terms of the financial resources, skills, and expertise they could bring to 
the operation. 
7.2 Study Site 
The four-hectare site earmarked for the development of the campsite was a vacant, degraded, 
piece of communal land, directly opposite the hotel, which had been used as a grazing area for 
cattle and goats. The site was not particularly attractive with a large amount of alien vegetation 
encroachment and evidence of human disturbance, but this was considered to be remediable 
through rehabilitation and a strategic camp design (Mullins, 2002). The site was selected due to 
its proximity to the Lodge, which would facilitate the supply of linked services such as 
electricity, piped water, waste and sewage disposal, with associated economies of scale. It was 
also located conveniently close to the shop, with a good access road to the beach and views of 
the coastline to the east (refer to Figure 6.1, for Location Map). 
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The southern boundary of the site is marked by a small wetland and a holiday cottage, whilst a 
freshwater tributary (from which the hotel extracts its water) marks the north-eastern boundary. 
A secondary school is located approximately 80 metres from the campsite, constituting the 
western boundary (Mullins, 2002). 
Owing to its location 'within the village', with adjacent cottages, school, and a nearby shop, 
detracting somewhat from its 'sense of wilderness', the campsite was considered most 
appropriate to the drive-in tourist / family market (Mullins, 2002; Christodoulou, pers comm., 
2003). The discerning ecotourist or wilderness trailist would not be especially attracted to uiis 
campsite. 
7.3 The Tourism Operation: An affordable Wild Coast Holiday 
The Mbotyi campsite has 13 allotted sites, eight shared kitchen facilities (each with a 
preparation and sink area), one ablution block with six flush toilets, six hot showers, and a 
communal eating boma (MRL, 2004). The campsite is serviced by an electricity mains supply 
and piped water, which the hotel agreed to extend to the campsite. The campsite also makes use 
of the hotels sewerage system, which has a maximum capacity of 300 users. During peak 
holiday seasons the system reportedly takes strain (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2004). The 
campsite has its own phone line and there is a payphone 100 metres away (just outside the 
shop). The road to the campsite is a well-graded dirt track, which is accessible by all vehicles. 
The campsites perimeter is fully fenced with 24-hour security and all sites have an electrical 
point and braai faculties (Mullins, 2002; Field Observation, 2003). 
The peak season camping rate is R90 / adult per day, and R4S / day for children under 11 
years. This will be increased to R100 and R50 respectively, in preparation for the Easter and 
Christmas vacations 2005 - 2006 (Sotshange, pers comm., 200; MRL, 2004). In a price 
assessment of comparatively fitted Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife sites, Mbotyi Campsite charges 
double the average adult / daily rate. When quizzed about the 'relatively' high tariff structure, 
Mbotyi Campsite Trustees sustain tiiat it is calculated with the incentive of profit maximization, 
dictated by relative supply and demand. The elasticity of demand on such a location is evidently 




In February 2002, the director of the Pondopark Development Forum (which was operating 
under the auspices of the Wild Coast SDI at the time), was requested by MRL's owners and 
the Mbotyi community to assist in 'fast tracking1 a campsite development, so that it may be 
ready in time to accommodate the overflow of tourists (from the Mbotyi River Lodge) for the 
2002 Easter long-weekend. It was through his involvement that the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEAT's) Poverty Relief programme came to be the principal funding 
agent of this joint-venture campsite. DEAT's magnanimous commitment towards the project, 
can however, be allied to an 'alternate agenda' (de Beer et al., 2002; Masibambane. 2002; 
Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). 
The Mbotyi JV Campsite proposal arrived at a time when DEAT was looking to initiate its own 
pilot tourism project, to demonstrate the kind of spin-off opportunities local communities might 
expect from the development of the Pondoland Park, with the anticipation of securing greater 
community buy-in for the park as a result (Refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3.1). According to a 
Pondopark Progress Report (de Beer et al., 2002: 18): this "pilot tourism project would be a 
means to demonstrate successful implementation of current policy directives and test the 
implementation of new and emerging policy and ideas". 
Mbotyi was earmarked as a suitable site, since it was widely accepted as a (potential) 
development node, already had committed private sector investors in place, and fitted in with 
Poverty Relief criterion as being an area 'previously disadvantaged' by prior development 
efforts. Furthermore, the Pondopark forum had met strong opposition from the Mbotyi 
Community (stemming largely from rumours and bad-mouthing instigated by the community's 
Development Forum Chairman and the local headmen), and so the development of this jv 
campsite could potentially improve relations and win-favour with the community (de Beer et 
al., 2002; Cooper; Christodoulou; Malindi, pers comm., 2004). 
Whatever the underlying motives behind the backing of this initiative, the fast-track 
development of the Mbotyi jv campsite - being just over three months from early negotiations 
to final bricks and mortar - is an exemplary case of what can be accomplished with respect to 
tourism development on the Wild Coast, should the political will exist. This record speed 
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development came as a "kick in the teeth" to those involved in the EU Programme - whom 
after adhering to every rule in the book and waited for over a year, had still not secured one-
year PTO's on their coastal trail camps (Bailey, pers comm., 2003). 
7.5 Procedural Establishment and Institutional Stakeholders 
The 50/50 partnership of this joint-venture, was not correlated to the financial (or other) 
contributions made by either party, but a 'goodwill' agreement from both parties. It was agreed 
that profits (net income minus expenses and loan repayments) would be divided equally 
amongst the two partners (Masibambane, 2002). The Lodge owners were willing to finance the 
initial establishment costs of the campsite by providing a soft-interest loan, in addition to 
providing business, marketing, and maintenance expertise to the enterprise. They would also be 
responsible for establishing and helping to oversee the administration system of the campsite. A 
long-term lease on the land, once approved by the national Department of Land Affairs (DLA) 
and a resident labour force, would constitute the community's contribution to the partnership 
(Wiggishof, 2002; Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). 
Prior to negotiations regarding the development of this campsite, the Mbotyi community was 
not represented by a legal committee or council, outside of their tribal structures. There was 
however a rudimentary 'Development Forum' established, whose members claimed to be 
looking after the tourism and business interests on behalf of the Mbotyi community (Dlamini, 
Wiggishof, pers comm., 2004). However, their democratic representation, lest accountability, 
to the rest of the community was somewhat questionable. 
It was decided that a legally constituted 'Trust' would be the most appropriate entity to 
facilitate the future socio-economic and business needs of the Mbotyi community 
(Masibambane, 2002) However, the legal advisors tasked with instituting the Mbotyi 
Community Trust cautioned against the managerial representatives of this Development Forum 
assuming the role of trustees on this newly instituted Community Trust. It was recorded as a 
matter of concern that this appeared to be the case, and noted that unless proper procedures 
were followed in the establishment of the Trust, the Master of the High Court (whose task it is 
to approve the Trust) would have no alternative but to reject the application (Masibambane, 
2002). This is a pertinent warning, in light of the controversy that was to come after the 
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previous director of the Development Forum assumed chairmanship of the new 'Mbotyi 
Community Trust'. 
The same two members who served on the original Development Forum, became Chairperson 
and Treasurer respectively for the Mbotyi Community Trust, and thereafter fulfilled the role of 
trustees on the joint-venture Campsite Trust. According to both individuals, however, they 
were "democratically elected" by the Mbotyi Community Trust as trustees to the Campsite 
Trust (Ngwevu and Dlamini, pers comm., 2003/2004). The establishment of the Community 
Trust was the first of four prerequisites in the development of the joint-venture campsite. The 
other three requirements included environmental impacts, a land tenure agreement, and the 
terms and conditions of the joint-venture itself. (Bailey and Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). 
The National Department of Land Affairs granted the Mbotyi community a fifteen year lease on 
the four hectare plot of land demarcating the campsite's boundaries (Christodoulou, pers 
comm., 2003). There was an alleged land restitution claim on the site by an ex officio 
community member, but it appears that comparable redress was settled, out of court, by 
national DLA (Bailey and Sperring, pers comm., 2003). The 'rent' (payable to the Mbotyi 
Community Trust) on the lease of the land, was agreed to as 10% of the accumulated annual 
turnover from the campsite accommodation, and that if at any time rates, taxes or similar 
charges were levied against the property, such charges would be paid by the Campsite Trust 
and off-set against the rent payable to the Mbotyi Community Trust (Deed of Trust, 2002). 
This stipulation has particular bearing for the events that transpired after the first rental period. 
Although the hotel owners were willing to finance (via a soft-interest loan to the Campsite 
Trust) all the infrastructural costs of the campsite, the appointment of Poverty Relief as the 
Funding Agent, meant that this was no longer necessary. Poverty Relief contributed 
approximately R 900 000 to finance the construction of the fixed and immovable assets. It is 
not Poverty Reliefs policy to fund depreciable or movable assets (i.e. accommodation and soft 
furnishings), so Mbotyi River Lodge secured a R 200 000 low-interest loan to finance these 
overheads. It was agreed that the loan would be fully repaid before profits from the Campsite 
were distributed amongst its shareholders (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). 
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The actual construction phase of the campsite took just over three months, after a preliminary 
environmental scoping study was done in compliance with the NEMA's (Act 107 of 1998) 
environmental principles. An application was made to DEAT for an exemption from a full 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) because the Scoping Report found the potential impact 
of the proposed campsite to be 'minimal' in terms of socio-economic and environmental 
impacts (Mullins, 2002; Wiggishof, 2002). 
7.6 Critique of Socio-Economic Impacts 
7.6.1 Economic Impact 
7.6.1.1 Direct Employment and Training 
The campsite employs four full-time persons: a general manager, a trainee manager/ 
receptionist, a cleaner, and two security-guards (who share the full-time position). During the 
busy holiday periods, 3-4 temporary staff are employed to assist with general camp 
maintenance and cleaning. Their earnings are not included in the annual wage estimate. 
The four permanent employees were all put through a formal application and screening process 
conducted by the Campsite Trustees. Seasonal staff, are however, appointed through the local 
tourism councillor on the Mbotyi Community Trust (Christodoulou and Ngwevu, pers comm., 
2003). It appears that this individual has helped to select suitable candidates for all the tourism-
related jobs in Mbotyi, from the River Rangers Programme, the Lodge and Campsite staff, to 
the EU Horse and Hiking trail guides. During the Mbotyi Household Survey (2003/2004), a 
number of community members alluded to this situation, expressing a valid concern that he 
may have too much influence in the development initiatives taking place in Mbotyi. Two 
respondents pointed out that of the four full-time campsite employees, two came from his 
immediate family (Mbotyi household survey, 2003/2004; Personal Observations, 2004). It also 
appears that the hotel uses this individual extensively as a source of employment and 
communication conduit to the local headman. 
In his defence, this individual was reportedly reluctant to have his daughter apply for the new 
receptionist job at the campsite, but the hotel partners thought her to be the most capable 
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candidate and suggested he stand down from the election committee. She has since proved her 
competency (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). Nonetheless, concerns over the clout of one 
individual, are warranted. Considering the risks of nepotism, partiality, and inter-community 
jealousies, the Lodge should caution against becoming too dependent on one key informant and 
source of employment. Admittedly, building a relationship of trust and mutual understanding 
with a motivated individual in the community is not a fast-track matter. Furthermore, the 
Lodge owners believe this person to be "a hard-working and capable individual who 
understands their (business) philosophy" (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2004). 
7.6.1.2 Formal Economic Contribution 
Although it is still too early to make a thorough appraisal of the economic profitability of the 
campsite, the returns after the first two years of operation look promising. 
After the first year of operation (4th June 2002 - 2003) the rental paid to the community 
amounted to R14 500 (10% of the RMS 000 annual turnover on accommodation) and the 
portion of the profits distributed to the community by the Campsite Trust, was in excess of 
R20 000. This amounted to a sum in excess of R34 500. 
In the second year of operation, the Gross Profit (before tax) after ten months of operation was 
approximately R130 000. Tax on community trusts is apparently 40%, which leaves a net profit 
of R78 000 to be divided equally between the hotel and community partners (R39 000 each). 
The campsite Trust does however have an obligation to first repay the R200 000 loan taken out 
by the Lodge partners. Nonetheless, over and above this profit share, the Mbotyi community 
accrued 10% rent on the annual accommodation turnover, which amounted to approximately 
R20 000 from the 2003/2004 annual estimated sales of R200 000. 
The potential amount accrued to the Mbotyi Community Trust from rental payment and profit 
distribution in year two of operation was R59 000. The wage payment to campsite employees 
(all Mboyti residents) amounted to R60 000, meaning that the potential total income accruing to 
the local community in the campsites second financial year (4* June 2002-2003) was R119 000 
(Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003/2004). 
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Although the Campsite was never going to be a source of large employment for the Mbotyi 
community, simply due to the nature of self-catering accommodation, the benefits to the 
community will come from rental and profit distributions - to be used for general community 
upliftment and support of other development initiatives. Although at the time of writing, the 
community is yet to see a cent from these 'benefits', the financial profitability of me business 
has been encouraging. The fact that the campsite has been fully booked during the holiday 
seasons is proof that this is a sought-after product. However, the high (in-season) daily rate 
necessitates the maintenance of high-standard facilities and quality service delivery. 
7.6.1.3 Informal Economic Benefits 
A number of other income earning opportunities have resulted from the campsite development. 
These include jobs as gillies38, sale of firewood, and outsourcing opportunities such as laundry 
and dishwashing services (Christodoulou and Sotshange, pers comm., 2003). Temporary 
employment was also created in the construction and general maintenance of the campsite. 
Wherever possible, the campsite sourced local labour, but since the Mbotyi community is 
characterised by a low skills base, some specialised artisans had to be contracted from outside 
the area. These artisans, did however, impart valuable skills to those local persons working 
under them (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). The Campsite Trust Deed advocates a non-
discriminatory employment policy, with women and one disabled community member 
employed during the construction phase (Foggin, 2003). 
38 Fishing gillies: young local boys who are employed to assist in amongst other things: catching bait, re-
baiting lines, gutting the fish and making the camp-fire. They get paid on average between R 20 - R 25/ 
day 
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7.6.2 Social Impact, Community Perceptions and Institutional Sustainability 
After wide stakeholder discussions and thorough investigative research, it is established that the 
Mbotyi jv Campsite has been beset by institutional teething problems, specifically relating to 
the functioning of the Trust. It would appear that the problems have stemmed largely from the 
internal dispute and rift developed between the two elected community trustees, and the 
insolent, some will argue 'racist', behaviour shown by the (Ex) Chairman of the Mbotyi 
Community Trust, towards the Lodge partners of the Campsite joint venture. 
According to one PondoCROP fieldworker: whilst the lodge may not have delivered 
sufficiently on some of their responsibilities ('mentorship of the business' was hereby 
identified); the Mbotyi Community Trust's handling of their business has been at the very least 
"embarrassing", and "demonstrated little understanding of the purpose or nature of a joint 
venture" (Undisclosed source, pers comm., 2003). Within two months of the official opening of 
the campsite on the 4* June, 2002, the community partners - and principally the (ex) Chairman 
- was insisting that the agreement with the lodge partners be substantially reworked, with them 
being given a smaller share of the profits, or the community proceed without them (Sperring, 
2003; Sperring, pers comm., 2003). 
The first issue of dispute arose when the community chairperson requested that six caterers be 
employed to cater for the camp. This was rejected by the lodge partners as "superfluous", since 
most campers came for self-catering. It was suggested that caterers could be employed on 
short-term contracts, when and if the need arose, but that it was financially unviable to have 
them as full-time employees of the camp. According to PondoCROP and the lodge owners, the 
chairman then tried to employ "bullyboy" tactics to force the lodge owners to agree with him, 
by threatening to close the business (Christodoulou & Sperring, pers comm., 2003). 
However, the real conflict transpired soon after the payment of the first rental and profit 
distribution. The terms of the Trust Deed state that profit will only be distributed after the fidl 
loan that MRL procured (used to purchase the soft-furnishings and depreciable assets), had 
been repaid. However, after the first year of operation, the lodge owners thought it would be a 
generous gesture to demonstrate some leniency regarding the repayment conditions and agreed 
that they would pay over some portion of the first-year profits, over-and-above the rent accrued 
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to the Community Trust. This amounted to a cheque of R 37 429, paid directly to the Mbotyi 
Community Trust account (Christodoulou & Sperring, pers comm., 2003; Sperring, 2003). 
The lodge partners were pleased about the profitability of the campsite in its first year, and 
deliberately made the rental (plus some profit) payout in April of 2003 (two months prior to 
year end), so that the campsite's success could be reported to the community in their Annual 
General Meeting (AGM), scheduled thereafter. The lodge partners felt that the community 
needed a greater sense of ownership in the campsite, and was confident that the rent and profit 
distribution would help to instil this sentiment (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003; Kraai, 2003; 
Sperring, 2003). One can appreciate how it riled the lodge partners when the AGM's brief 
financial audit skimmed over the recently accrued profit and rental income from the campsite 
(Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003; Kraai, 2003). 
At the same time, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Community Trust was being 
internally split through personality differences, political power play, and ulterior agendas -
principally between the Trust's Chair and the Treasurer (PondoCROP field officers, pers 
comm., 2003). The 'conflict' came to a head soon after the first payment was made into the 
community's trust account, with a heated disagreement over the nature (and accountability) of 
the spendings, unconstitutional trustee elections and dismissals, a court interdict with 
counterfeit signatures, followed by costly court cases and counter-affidavits (Bailey, Sperring; 
Wiggishof, pers comm., 2003). 
This Trust debacle, has however, served to demonstrate to the community the consequences of 
not taking responsibility for and ownership of their Trust - i.e. that they will be the ultimate 
losers in terms of lost income (due to misappropriated funds and costly legal fees), and future 
investor insecurity. Those who have acted in an advisory role to the Mbotyi Commnity Trust, 
hope that the reality of this lost income will serve as a "wake-up call" to the community, to 
realise the importance of appointing trustees who will represent their interests, and that they 
should be informed, as a matter of procedure, on all the Trust's decisions and activities 
(Wiggishof, pers comm., 2003). 
What became evident during the course of this case study, was that there was a very poor 
understanding of the role and responsibility of the Trust. From discussions with other 
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Community Trust members, it has become clear that a few commanding figures on the Trust 
have used the other Trustees as 'pawns' in their personal wranglings. The fact that three of the 
Trust members I interviewed could not provide the most basic definition for the role and 
purpose of the trust, was a distressing find. It appears that very little preparation, or 
consideration, went into the voting of the Community Trustees, for apart from the few polished 
individuals heading it up (and subsequently splitting it up), the other Trustees (at least the ones 
I met) were either timorous individuals who would not dare question, poorly educated, ill-
informed, or entirely 'disinterested' in the activities of the Trust (Mbotyi Household Survey, 
2003/2004). 
From a questionnaire survey of over thirty households, only three households admitted to 
knowing anything about the Trust debacle. Only 52% of households reported to be aware of, or 
have informed knowledge of the Trust, whilst the remainder either had no knowledge, or so 
little information that they were not prepared to give an opinion of their perceived purpose of 
the Trust. A few households which maintained to have a good knowledge of the Trust, 
described its role as 'representing the community', but the majority of households were vague 
about the purpose and/or functioning of the Community Trust, usually equating it to 'having 
something to do with the Campsite?' (Mbotyi Household Survey, 2003 / 2004). 
7 J Discussion and Future 
From the development of the Mbotyi joint-venture campsite, a number of key findings, lessons, 
and future recommendations, can be made: 
1) There is clearly a market demand for low(er)-budget, self-catering accommodation 
facilities on the Wild Coast. Since the campsites daily tariff is appreciably higher than 
comparable campsites, it is likely that the location and appeal of the 'Wild Coast 
Experience' fuels demand over the popular holiday periods. The niche tourist market is 
evidently friend and family groups, with red-peak periods being fully booked, despite a 
fifty-percent increase in the net daily tariff over these periods. However, in order to 
maximise annual profitability, it is recommended that other target markets be sought. One 
suggestion may be to target school or university field groups. The relative accessibility of 
Mbotyi to both Kwazulu-Natal and Eastern Cape institutions, (relatively) good road access, 
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and a unique biophysical and marine environment (Mann, 1998, cited in White et al., 2002) 
makes the location ideally suited to learning and research. 
Another niche market may be providing venue and catering facilities for local training 
workshops or assemblies. The hotel offers upmarket conference facilities but these are not 
always affordable (or suitable) for community skills training courses or local government 
and NGO meetings. During my field visits, I was surprised to find that mere were a number 
of these organisations working and running training programmes in the area. Mbotyi 
campsite, with its central dining-boma and kitchenette facilities, is well equipped to host 
one- or multi-day training workshops, meetings or similar proceedings. Mbotyi would 
certainly offer a safer and more aesthetically pleasing setting than inland service towns such 
as Lusikisiki. This type of tourism could also provide local SMME spin-offs in terms of 
catering requirements, with local women groups providing the catering on a roster basis. 
2) The community needs to recognise that meir private sector partner has entered into a 
business contract with them, principally, to generate profit. In order for the partnership to 
be successful and sustainable in the long-term, there should be a mutual understanding of, 
and respect for, this business relationship. Whilst some philanthropic overtures may have 
helped facilitate the partnership in the outset, this should not be expected to continue to 
govern the business relationship. 
In the same manner, the private sector partner needs to acknowledge their community 
partner as equals - assisting them where necessary but also drawing from their perceptions 
and experiences. 
3) Private sector partners can make an important contribution to a business, in terms of the 
financial, marketing and business planning / operational expertise they bring to the 
partnership. In a joint-venture partnership of this nature there is a considerable degree of 
skills transferral (usually to the inexperienced community partners) but measures need to be 
put in place to ensure that should these persons leave the business, this investment is not 
entirely lost. Perhaps a system of 'mentorship' should be instituted where those learning 
new skills are obligated to train others beneath them. This would ensure a more 'seamless' 
transition should employees be promoted to a higher rank, or decide to leave the project. 
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4) The Mbotyi joint-venture campsite is an exemplary case of what can be done (and just 
how quickly) when the political will exists, backed by a motivated private-sector operator. 
The fact that it took less than nine months to obtain government sponsorship, secure a long-
term lease from National DLA, establish a local Trust, and lay the campsites bricks and 
mortar, is testimony to this. 
Although the Mbotyi Community Trust has encountered major 'teething problems', this in the 
view of PondoCROP arbitrators and other observers (including the hotel owners), is "not 
necessarily a bad thing'', on the following grounds: firstly, it has helped the community to 
realise the importance of their Trust, who up until then, had shown virtually no interest in the 
Trust's purpose or activities. Secondly, the hotel owners stood their ground during the whole 
affair, and showed the community and the other Trustees that they were not prepared to be 
'bullied into compliance'. They refrained from 'personalising' events, but also made it quite 
clear that they did not view the Campsite joint-venture as a philanthropic project, but a business 
partnership with strong profitability objectives and obligations which required respect from 
both partners. Whilst they showed themselves to be committed business partners (and that they 
were certainly not going to pull out at the first sign of conflict), the hotel trustees are not 
prepared to let individual power struggles, internal dynamics, or an apathetic community affect 
the success of the campsite joint-venture. The hotel owners sought their own legal counsel 
during the Trust debacle and may propose that the community contribute towards their legal 
expenses (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003). 
Now that the (ex) Chairman has been legally removed from the Campsite Trust, there remains 
the issue of institutional memory loss. The hotel trustees invested a considerable amount of 
time and effort in mentoring their community partners with respect to the campsites 
administration system, maintenance, financial auditing, and marketing expertise. This will be 
lost to the project. After some resolution was found with respect to the Mbotyi Trust conflict, 
PondoCROP offered to run a one-day workshop with the Trust (and any other community 
members who wished to attend) to help them gain a better understanding of the Trust deed, 
their legal rights and obligations, and proper procedures to deal with conflict. PondoCROP 
were quick to point out that these were all "anticipated'' problems, associated with a "fast-
track" development process - such as the Poverty Relief funded campsite (Undisclosed sources, 
pers comm., 2003). 
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Whilst this may be true in part, it is not as if the EU instituted Community Trusts (which took 
substantially longer to establish) have not experienced their share of problems. It does however 
appear, that there should have been more workshops and discussions held with the community 
around the role and responsibility of the Trust, and the importance of voting-in suitable and 
accountable candidates to serve on this committee. Understanding the Trust Deed, the 
responsibilities it entails, and procedures for conflict resolution should be a prerequisite 
requirement of all trustees. Nonetheless, the effectual 'high-jacking' of trust activities by the 
(ex)-Chairman, might have happened in even the most legally-binding and procedurally correct 
of Trusts. The important thing is that the community and remaining trustees learn from their 
mistakes, and strive to become more participant and vocal in the activities of the Trust, whilst 
demand for greater transparency, should become a fundamental concern. 
In conclusion, the Mbotyi jv campsite has demonstrated that with a small amount of capital, a 
motivated private sector partner, and government backing; considerable economic benefits can 
be generated for the local community, at little sacrifice to subsistence and other income -
earning opportunities (the campsite being developed on a small tract of unused grazing land). 
Whilst the campsite required relatively little infrastructural development or seed capital, the 
project would never have taken shape had it not been for the grant-funding provided from 
government and the experience and motivation brought to the development, by the lodge 
partners. The early profitability and occupancy of the business has been encouraging. This can 
be in large part attributed to the marketing efforts of the hotel, and the benefits derived from 
'economies of scale' from sharing services with the hotel (such as sewerage, electricity and 
water provision). 
This case study has shown that a certain degree of philanthropy may be required to get a 
community-private sector partnership started, but this should not be expected to govern the 
nature of the business relationship. It is the community's responsibility to be attentive to the 
workings of their trust and demand accountability from the Trustees they appoint to look after 
their affairs. As this study has revealed, failure to do so, will result in the community (the 
'purported beneficiaries') being the biggest losers in terms of misappropriated earnings and 
future investor reserve. 
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CHAPTER 8: EVALUATION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an evaluation of the four selected case studies in relation to the 
theoretical framework and critical questions proposed by /in this study. The key catalysts, 
success factors, limitations and 'pro-poor' credentials (i.e. net benefits for the poor 
neighbouring communities) of each of the documented enterprises will be discussed with 
reference to the conceptual and theoretical models documented in the literature review (Chapter 
2). The key findings and recommendations made from these case studies will then be 
considered with respect to the key developmental opportunities and constraints pertaining to the 
region (as identified in the contextual overview - Chapter 3). This critique will be of relevance 
to the success and sustainability of other community-based and 'pro-poor* tourism initiatives, as 
well as future tourism development planning in the region. 
8.2 Case Study Evaluation 
The following section provides a critical evaluation, and comparison, of the documented case 
studies with respect to the critical questions proposed by this study, and the conceptual theory 
(Chapter 2). 
Are the four selected case studies exemplars for 'sustainable' tourism and how do they 
compare in terms of their net socio-economic benefits, environmental and institutional 
sustainability? 
Although different ownership and management approaches characterise the four select case 
studies, each contributes in some form to the socio-economic uphftment of its locale, and are 
underpinned by sustainable development principles - i.e. that they seek to be socially, 
ecologically and economically sustainable developments. 
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Commencing at the one end of the tourism model scale, the Amadiba Horse and Hiking 
Trail, was a pioneering initiative in an area with no prior tourism experience, and a largely 
unskilled, subsistence rural economy. Pimbert and Pretty (1994, cited in Roe et al., 2000) 
would classify this kind of initiative as community 4 self-mobilisation' with the Amadiba 
community retaining control and ownership over meir resources but developing a contractual 
agreement with an external agency for funding and support. Ferrar et al. (1997) and Spenceley, 
(2003£>) recognise that local NGO's and external agents can play an important 'advisory' role in 
the development of community-based tourism (CBT) initiatives. In the case of Amadiba 
Adventures, it is clear that the local NGO, PondoCROP, has provided the vision and impetus 
behind the development of this Horse and Hiking Trail, and then as the lead NGO in the EU 
WCCTI Programme, provided the critical link to donor funding. 
According to Cronin's (1990) criteria for what constitutes 'sustainable tourism', Amadiba 
Adventures scores high in terms of being initiated along 'ethical principles' and 'participation 
of local persons'. The operation has also been particularly mindful of local cultures and 
livelihoods, being purposefully designed to provide a complementary income-earning 
opportunity (not substitution) to local subsistence and rural livelihood strategies. Maintaining a 
"diverse and flexible range of livelihood options'' was also identified by Shackleton (2000, 
cited in DEAT, 2002a: 2) as being critical to the sustainability of any community-based natural 
resource management project. 
Although the Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail was initiated a number of years prior to the EU 
WCCTI's involvement, had it not been for the significant grant funding and extensive technical 
support provided through the EU Programme, Amadiba Adventures would probably never have 
attained its current level of 'success'. Whilst external agents can be invaluable in providing 
start-up capital and specialist assistance to a development that rural communities would be 
unlikely to have little previous experience with, Ashley et al. (2001), Ashley and Jones (2001) 
and Halstead (2002), stress the need for support agents to continuously assess the level of 
support they provide and the dependence they may be creating. It appears that whilst 
PondoCROP implicitly recognised this fact, their inability to communicate training 
requirements and select suitable candidates (in order to build capacity and reduce the situation 
of dependency on themselves), for the training component of the EU Programme, has not 
helped to advance the sustainability of this community-run initiative. 
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The situation in which Amadiba Adventures now finds itself - considering issuing a tender for a 
private sector partner - is appreciably incongruous to the original tenets and conception of the 
business: that of an entirely community-owned, and operated, tourism project. Whilst Amadiba 
Adventures (AA) would probably benefit greatly from the experience and input of a reputable 
private sector operator (and quite likely see larger benefits from a more efficiently run business 
with higher occupancies), it may also send a message to the community that they are considered 
incapable of running the operation alone. From interviews and discussions with employees and 
AA staff, the sense of pride they felt at being both the owners and operators of this business, 
was a common sentiment. The value of non-financial benefits - such as increased skills and 
capacity, renewed pride in local cultures and the natural environment, decision-making power 
and greater community cohesion - should not always be placed second to direct financial 
benefits and job creation. PondoCROP (2002a) identified the attribute of 'collective ownership' 
as being critical to the success of any community-based tourism initiative. 
Furthermore, it has been argued (PondoCROP personnel, pers comm., 2003) that the 'sole-
community venture' as identified by Ferrar et al. (1997) provides an excellent 'springboard' for 
communities to gain a better understanding of tourism and their prospective role therein. The 
establishment of the institutional structures (such as the Community Development Trust, 
ACCODA) and inter-governmental co-operation agreements through the development of the 
community-owned Horse and Hiking Trail, could help to create a more 'enabling' environment 
for future private sector partnerships in the region. 
In terms of its economic impact and role in uplifting poor rural livelihoods, Amadiba 
Adventures has had a comparatively widespread impact, albeit at low remuneration levels. Of 
all the documented enterprises, AA's philosophy is probably the most closely aligned to the 
tenets of 'pro-poor' tourism (Ashley et al., 2000; 2001), with an emphasis on employing freely 
available assets (i.e. the local horses and natural environment) to reduce poverty and improve 
the livelihoods of Amadiba households. This is clearly reflected in the employment and 
remuneration strategy of the business, with 57 jobs (though only 22 of these are full-time) being 
created from a trail that up until 2002, ran at under 50% occupancy. 
Ntshona and Lahiff (2003ft: 43) maintain that "direct personal benefits" (i.e. through wages) 
are generally preferable to more general, indirect community benefits (such as profit-sharing 
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agreements) distributed through local structures. Amadiba Adventures appears to operate on the 
same sentiment, purposely employing more people than is probably necessary (albeit at lower 
remuneration levels than SA hospitality norms, and with a large percentage of these employees 
being part-time), in an endeavour to maximise the spread of financial benefits. This means that 
more households within the region are likely to benefit in a direct manner from the wages of 
family members employed in the community business. This distinctly 'pro-poor' approach may 
also help to instil a greater sense of ownership in the business, and provide local communities 
with material incentive to protect the natural environment upon which this Trail depends. 
However, besides those employed directly by the Trail business, there was little evidence in 
this case study to suggest tangible income benefits from outsourcing and economic multiplier 
opportunities. Whilst small spin-offs do occur, they are not nearly as 'formalised', or 
dynamically endorsed, as they tend to be when a private sector operator has been involved, 
such as the case with Mbotyi River Lodge (MRL). Whilst there appears to be growing demand 
for the Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail (reflected in the annual growth in turnover from 
R280 000 in 2000, to over a million Rand in 2003), the lax bookkeeping and business 
protocols, that has characterised the venture thus far, will need to be addressed in order for the 
business to become more economically sustainable. 
The irony of the Amadiba case study is that the EU Programme could have provided an 
excellent opportunity for training and capacitating those individuals employed under its 'lead-
project', so that the situation which exists today, where only the current Trails Manager has 
any genuine capacity to sustain the community business, might well have been different. 
Although the importance of a local champion in driving community-based initiatives, is widely 
recognised by the literature (Fabricius et al., 2001; Jones, 2001; Halstead, 2002; Ashley & 
Wolmer, 2003; Trotter, 2003), the fact that the Trails Manager could at any stage leave the 
business, calls the issue of AA's institutional sustainability into question. If the EU Programme 
had managed to institute a Facilitation and Support Unit (which was proposed to lessen the 
dependence mentality that Amadiba Adventures had on the Programme and PondoCROP 
particularly) then this would have assisted the immediate sustainability and future of this sole-
community tourism model. Regrettably, the Amadiba community is now faced with the 
situation where they, like so many other rural communities with rights to land of high tourism 
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potential, are seeking a private sector partner instead. The partnership between the Amadiba 
community and Ufudu has been one such partnership. 
According to Ferrar et al. (1997) classification of community tourism models, me Amadiba -
Ufudu arrangement exemplifies the 'Financial Incentive Model' with the Amadiba community 
benefiting from employment and a concession fee paid into the local Community Trust39. Of all 
the tourism operations documented, the Ufudu Flyfishing Operation appears to generate the 
highest economic return for the lowest environmental impact. Generating R 438 000 for the 
local economy in fourteen months of operation, at die expense of just three fish killed, and 
rigorous self-imposed restrictions on the amount of natural resources consumed during their 
time of operation, the Ufudu Flyfishing Operators are an exemplary model for 'genuine 
ecotourism'. 
This catch-and-release flyfishing operation is characterised by the lowest possible consumption 
of non-renewable resources, focus on small tourist groups, conservation of biodiversity and a 
'learning experience', local benefit-sharing, and meaningful participation from neighbouring 
communities - all guiding principles for genuine ecotourism initiatives (Section 2.3.3). This 
'ecotourism branding' has helped to attract an elite category of special-interest tourist, who are 
willing to pay Rl 350/night (2004 Tariffs) for simple tent accommodation, good food, personal 
attention, and a 'once-in-a-lifetime' fishing experience. Neale and Nicholson (1998) and 
Swarbrooke (1999) argue, that many 'ecotourists' are motivated more by their desire to see 
pristine ecosystems first hand, than a wish to protect the environment or contribute towards the 
socio-economic upliftment of neighbouring communities. Whilst this may be true of some of 
Ufudu's guests, the reality is tiiat, witiiout their willingness to pay for this 'exclusivity of 
experience', there would be no socio-environmental benefits at all. On the other hand, the fact 
that these fishermen come with the understanding that it is only a 'catch-and-release' operation, 
in addition to the many offers of support (financial and other) to local SMME and community 
development projects, is testimony to me 'ecotourist values' of many of Ufudu's clients. 
Had it not been for the perceived value of die natural resource base - i.e. die pristine Mtenm 
estuary and its annual sojourn of Kingfish, this operation might never have materialised. 
39 The negotiated fee was 12.5% on turnover, which is considered a 'generous' profit-sharing ratio by 
Ashley and Ntshona (2002). 
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Governments role in facilitating this partnership was significant in that they provided the 
Amadiba community with a high-value asset - the catch-and-release flyfishing permit - but 
without the enthusiasm and tenacity of Ufudu to pursue the venture, the Amadiba-Ufudu 
partnership would probably still be another proposal 'on paper'. 
Although Ufudu are operating in a MCM protected area (which beyond their three-month 
exemption permit prohibits any disturbance to the fish or organisms in the estuary), in light of 
the near total absence of monitoring and law enforcement on the estuary, the income received 
from the flyfishing operation has instilled, to some degree, a greater sense of stewardship 
towards the estuary and its fish resources. Nonetheless, there are still reports of the community 
turning a 'blind-eye' to recreational fishermen stocking up their freezer chests with high-value 
marine organisms (such as mussels, fish and crayfish), and local river guides employing their 
newly acquired skills to catch and sell fresh fish to local markets. At what level of benefits, if 
at all, such transgressions would cease entirely, is perhaps a moot issue? 
For its size, and brief period of operation (3 months of the year), Ufudu has made a tangible 
contribution to advancing the income earnings of the local Amadiba community. In their 14 
months at Mtentu, Ufudu has generated over R203 000 for the Amadiba Community Trust, 
R212 910 in salaries and wages, and approximately R22 500 in support for localised activities 
and purchases from the community - principally horse hire and local craft sales. Whilst the 
number of people employed by the business is few, the salaries and gratuities earnt by Ufudu 
employees are the highest of the documented enterprises and would be considered 'very good' 
in comparison to other income-earning opportunities in the region (Field Comparisons, 2003; 
Bailey; Pretorius, B & P, pers comm., 2004). According to PondoCROP personnel, one of the 
community's criticisms of the Ufudu operation, (pers comm., 2003 / 2004) is that whilst those 
employed by the Ufudu fair well (from 'good' salaries and generous gratuities), these earnings 
are limited to a few persons (i.e. the eight full-time persons employed by the operation). This is 
in contrast to the Amadiba Adventures model, where many more people are employed, but at a 
considerably lower remuneration level. This concern, however, does not hold much weight, as 
the wider community is supposed to benefit from the profit-sharing agreement that Ufudu has 
with ACCODA (12.5% of Gross Profit which goes directly to the Community Trust). 
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Due to the short-term nature of their contract, Ufudu have not actively pursued local SMME 
linkages or other local outsourcing avenues. However, given their relationship to many 
potential social benefactors (their regular clientele including many high-profile and influential 
businessmen), this should become a high-priority agenda for Ufudu, if their concession at 
Mtentu is renewed. 
Despite having developed a good working relationship with the community and delivering on 
their promises (Ufudu consciously set out not to raise unrealistic expectations), Ufudu's future 
at Mtentu is by no means assured. Their four-year (extended) concession comes to an end on 
the 29 December 2004, and thereafter the Amadiba community are in a position to take on a 
new private sector partner should they so wish. Whether Ufudu's pioneering efforts (in 
originally securing the catch-and-re lease permit for the community), and their socially and 
environmentally conscious performance thus far, will influence the new concession contract, 
remains to be seen. If the flyfishing permit is not renewed by Marine and Coastal Management 
(MCM), then this might turn the tables considerably: Ufudu would be unlikely (and unwilling) 
to charge the rates they do without the flyfishing drawcard. A private sector partner such as 
Wilderness Safaris - who would invest large sums to upgrade the existing camp and market it as 
an exclusive wilderness experience - would probably be able to charge similar or higher daily 
rates, with or without, the flyfishing permit. Who the community selects as their private sector 
partner therefore depends largely on the renewal of the flyfishing permit40 (a government 
responsibility) and the perceived socio-economic benefits accompanying a new or renewed 
partnership. 
In concluding, the Ufudu operators have demonstrated just how much tourists (and that is 
domestic tourists) are prepared to pay for a 'unique' tourism experience. The 'Mtentu 
Flyfishing Experience' displays an inelastic demand curve: where the quantity demanded (i.e. 
occupancy) appears to be effected less by price than it does by inclement weather conditions 
and related Ashing success. This is an important consideration for future tourism planning in 
the region. The Ufudu operation, being small and low-impact, has generated tangible economic 
benefits for resident communities at minimal environmental cost (in fact, by attaching a 
monetary value to the protection of such resources, they have had a positive environmental 
40 However, according to an ACCODA Trustee (Ndovela, telephonic comm., 2004), the renewal of the 
flyfishing permit by MCM is "looking promising", and is anticipated to have been processed by the end of 
November, 2004. 
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impact), but this would not have been possible without the 'exclusivity' to which guests feel 
they are entitled. A nodal approach to tourism development, with different types of tourism 
confined to particular nodes, as was originally proposed by Els and Taylor (1979), and 
reiterated by Nicholson (1997) and de Beer et al. (2002), would be critical to the sustained 
success of an operation such as Ufudu. 
The Mbotyi River Lodge is one of few operations on the Wild Coast where the owners possess 
title deeds to the land. This case study is representative of Spenceley (2003fc) 'community 
tourism model' - being private land, with private operators who demonstrate a strong sense of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Although the owners of this hotel have no legally-binding 
contract of social or economic responsibility to the community, of all the documented case 
studies, Mbotyi River Lodge (MRU makes the largest formal contribution to the local 
economy, in addition to facilitating extensive informal earnings through support for localised 
activities and community SMME linkages. 
The income accruing to Mbotyi communities from MRUs wages is estimated at RS00 000 per 
annum, with employee wages between 63-99% higher than the wages paid to full-time staff 
employed in Amadiba Adventures. Over and above their regular wages, MRL has boosted the 
local economy through part-time wages paid to persons employed in the extension and 
restoration phase of the hotels revamp, and the building of the joint-venture campsite. The total 
direct earnings (from full and part time wages) into local Mbotyi communities since the hotels 
inception - December 2001 up until December 2003 - is estimated to be close to R1.8S million. 
These earnings exclude the informal income and spin-off opportunities created by the existence 
of the Lodge and the tourist market it provides. Although they have no binding responsibility to 
their neighbouring communities, it would appear that the Lodge owners have an altruistic view 
of tourism developments) around Mbotyi. They realised from the outset that it made good 
business sense to maximise local outsourcing opportunities and tourism activities for the 
community around the Lodge and its guests. They have done this in numerous ways, including 
the contracting of nanny services, support for the local horse trail, river guides, and initiating 
the Mbotyi craft-centre and joint-venture campsite. Besides boosting local incomes, the local 
household survey (Mbotyi Household Survey, 2003/2004) revealed that these outsourcing 
opportunities have helped to create a positive attitude towards tourism in the area. The 
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financial, administrative, marketing, and logistical support (in varying degrees) provided by 
MRL to these local and associated tourism enterprises, has been invaluable to their inception 
and sustained operation. Moreover, without the captive market provided through MRL, it is 
unlikely that any of these community enterprises would have been viable at all. The importance 
of private sector drive in expanding income-earning opportunities to the wider community, 
should not be underestimated. 
Since MRL's owners possess title to their land, the institutional sustainability of Mbotyi River 
Lodge is inherently more stable than any of the other documented operations. Nonetheless, the 
acceptance and attitude of its neighbours, is critically important to ensuring its sustained 
success. Mbotyi made an interesting location for study as it had so many of the dynamics, 
conflicts, different stakeholders and interest groups, in force (and in conflict) along the wider 
Wild Coast. A number of haphazard 'illegal' cottages were being built during the course of 
investigations, whilst legal cottage owners were rallying together to try and arrest this 
incursion. The battle lines had been drawn between those of old and those of new, and whilst 
many of the cottage-owners continue to harbour some resentment towards the Lodge (especially 
over the controversial 'non-residents' policy), this appears to be abating with time. The 
community, on the other hand, for the most part, consider the re-opening of the hotel to be 'an 
answer to their prayers'. Whilst the number of jobs provided could never realistically fulfil the 
hopes of such a high number of unemployed, it appears the majority of local households 
perceive MRL's employment process to be 'fair' and remunerations 'reasonable' (Mbotyi 
Household Survey, 2003/2004). 
However, it was interesting to discover (as disclosed through the Household Questionnaire 
Survey) that less than a fifth of households linked the hotels' re-opening to being positive in 
terms of providing them with a larger tourist market to sell their wares to, or support for their 
localised activities. This 'entrepreneur culture', so endorsed by government and local 
development agencies, seems to remain somewhat subdued in these rural heartlands. Access to 
seed capital and sustained mentorship, provided through a committed and experienced private 
sector person, is often what is required to get local SMME's functioning. 
In closing this case study: MRL's owners do not profess to have a 'pro-poor' tourism 
philosophy. On the contrary, they attest that through "capital motivation" and an understanding 
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of "what's good for you, is good for me" (Christodoulou, pers comm., 2003), they can deliver 
the type of socio-economic benefits that any 'pro-poor' operator would aim for. Whilst they do 
not wish to be perceived as 'social benefactors' or 'pro-poor practitioners', mey hope to be 
acknowledged (principally, by die local community) for me jobs mey have created, economic 
opportunities they have provided, and the real business partnerships they have forged. 
The development of the Mbotyi joint-venture campsite has undoubtedly been the most 
prominent of these 'community partnerships'. However, one would be mistaken to consider this 
project as anything less than a business partnership. The Mbotyi campsite development is a 
50/50 joint-venture, between me two principal owners of Mbotyi River Lodge and die Mbotyi 
community (represented by two members of tiieir Community Trust). The defining 
characteristics of tiiis joint-venture initiative are closely akin to Ferrar et al. (1997) 
'management sharing' community tourism model - with a merge of assets, weight of decision-
making in proportion to share of ownership in business, and a corporate style business structure 
defining the nature of this partnership. Since the campsite is still in an early phase of operation 
its potential socio-economic impact was broadly assessed, with a more detailed consideration 
made of the procedural establishment and 'lessons learnt' from its early institutional 
dissonance. 
Although it is still too early to make an accurate assessment of the economic sustainability of 
the business, the returns after the first two years of operation have been encouraging. A sum in 
excess of R34 500 was deposited into the Community Trust account after the first year of 
operation (from a 10% rental payment and a profit distribution), followed by a gross profit 
(before tax) of R130 000 in its second-year, to be shared equally amongst me two partners, 
over and above a R20 000 rental payment. Although still in an incipient phase, the economic 
returns derived from die campsite business are significant in relation to any other potential 
Community Trust income. 
The fact that by the time this research had concluded, none of die income had yet been assigned 
to benefiting die 'wider community' in terms of community outreach or development projects 
(such as the much desired clinic), is of some concern. It is widely recognised (Palmer et al., 
2000; Ashley et al., 2001; Cattarinich, 2001; PondoCROP, 2001A; Spenceley et al, 2002; 
Fabricius et al., 2003) mat a range of benefits (both financial and non-financial) should be seen 
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by the community soon after the tourism enterprise is established, in order to facilitate its 
acceptability and longer-term sustainability. Halstead (2002: 17) emphasises the timing of these 
benefits as being critical to obtaining community 'buy-in' to a project. Cash in the bank, 
especially when the amount is kept secret from the wider community as the Mbotyi Community 
Trust has done, does not help to instil a sense of ownership in the enterprise, or advance the 
concept of tourism to its purported beneficiaries. ACCODA (the development forum through 
which income received from Amadiba Adventures and Ufudu is channelled) is also guilty of 
stockpiling money in the community's trust account and not providing the community with an 
adequate range a short, medium and long-term benefits to show for the money. Whilst 
superfluous spendings should obviously be guarded against, a stash of money in the community 
trust account, is of not much use to the poor rural households (many of whom are living below 
the poverty line), whom these tourism enterprises are designed to benefit. Regrettably, in the 
case of the Mbotyi joint-venture campsite, a large percentage of these earnings will go towards 
settling legal fees before the community receives any benefit from it. This is a disheartening 
scenario, but not a 'new* phenomenon for community-based tourism initiatives (Fabricius et 
al., 2001). 
The institutional conflicts experienced by the Mbotyi joint-venture campsite have provided 
some important insights and lessons to advise future community-based enterprises and private 
sector-community tourism partnerships. The Mbotyi Trust debacle highlighted the importance 
of a community taking responsibility for, and ownership of, the management body (i.e. their 
Community Trust) instituted to represent their interests. In not doing so, they will invariably be 
the biggest losers in terms of lost income and future investor apprehension. The institutional 
conflict, which originated not between the joint-venture partners but through a personality clash 
and power struggle between the two appointed community partners, has hopefully served to 
enlighten the community that they should be informed, as a matter of procedure, of all their 
Trust's decisions, and appreciate the importance of appointing trustees who will represent their 
interests over selfish agendas. 
Lack of transparency, manipulation (with poorly informed Trustees vulnerable to coercive 
persuasion and subordinate power-plays), lack of community knowledge around the purpose 
and responsibility of their Trust, and a general disinterest with regards to the campsite 
development (being a joint-venture initiative designed to give them a greater stake in tourism 
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development at Mbotyi), were some of the main factors to blame for the institutional anarchy 
experienced soon after the opening of the campsite. However, it appears that matters are being 
resolved, with many 'hard lessons' learnt in the process. The Mbotyi joint-venture campsite has 
potential to become a successful community-private partnership, provided effective conflict 
resolution strategies and institutional monitoring and accountability protocols are put in place. 
This should be advised upon, and implemented, by an external facilitator who has reputable 
experience in such fields. 
Despite its early institutional problems, the Mbotyi joint-venture campsite is still a great 
example of what can be done - and just how quickly - when the political will exists, backed by 
a motivated private sector operator. The fact that it took less than nine months to secure 
government funding, obtain a long-term lease granted from National DLA, a Community Trust 
established, and lay down the bricks and mortar for this campsite development, is testimony to 
this. 
8.3 Key Findings and Recommendations 
The following key findings and recommendations are made from a critique of the 'lessons 
learnt' and 'successes' of the documented tourism operations and a thorough appraisal of the 
regions socio-economic, institutional, and environmental context (Chapter 3). 
• A situation of protracted tenure reform and 'legal plurism' (Wiggishof, pers comm., 
2003) continues to present one of the biggest limitations to potential investment and 
development in the Pondoland region. The failure of the Wild Coast SDI, the shelved 
Mkhweni Lodge and Pondopark proposals are just some examples of proposed 
development initiatives which have failed to take shape, as a result of the politically 
sensitive and complex institutional environment which pervades the Eastern Cape's Wild 
Coast. Secure land rights and defined access to, and use of, natural resources are key 
assets which rural communities can bring to me 'bargaining-table' in negotiating new 
tourism partnerships. However, in order to lay claim to these assets, rights to lease or 
transact this land first have to be bestowed upon residents and previously dispossessed 
communities. This is so that communities may use the land as collateral (in joint-venture 
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partnerships), whilst private sector investors are afforded contractual security. It is 
evident from this study, that whilst government recognises the importance of 'fast-
tracking' land reform in historically marginalised areas, such as the Wild Coast, their 
ability to do so continues to be hampered by cumbersome internal procedures, unclear 
and overlapping institutional mandates, rifts between different spheres of government, 
and a clear absence of spatial planning guidelines. 
• As tourism has been widely recognised (and agreed upon) as a key developmental sector 
for the region (ECDC, 1998; DTI, 1999), a detailed 'Spatial Planning Framework' 
should be drafted in consultation with, and agreement from, all sectors of government 
and potentially affected stakeholders. As was originally proposed by Els and Taylor 
(1979, cited in Nicholson, 1997), this spatial plan should delineate specific tourism 
development 'nodes', with potential development confined to these zones. It should be 
governments prerogative to provide basic infrastructural services such as roads, water 
and electricity to these 'nodes' (prospective tourism investors cannot be expected to 
finance these basic services), whilst those stretches of coastline between development 
nodes should acquire greater conservation, or non-development status, so as to maintain 
the undeveloped naturalness for which the area is acclaimed and upon which a sustained 
tourism industry hinges. 
• This research has revealed, that 'fast-track' development on the Wild Coast is possible 
provided the development finds a high-profile, or government-champion, and the 
political will exists. The Mbotyi joint-venture campsite has been a case in point here. It 
is, however, argued (Fabricius et al., 2001; Jones, 2001; Kepe, 2001; Ashley & 
Wolmer, 2003) that rushing a tourism development which requires community 
participation and acceptance to become sustainable, is more likely to encounter conflict 
in time, or have a higher incidence of failure. Whilst this is recognised, given the 
number of empty promises made to communities living on the Wild Coast, a 'fast-track' 
development - even if early conflict resolution is required - is probably still preferable 
to no development at all. Evidence from this research revealed that even when 
institutional and establishment procedures are followed by the book (for example, 
PondoCROP's application for a lease on the coastal trail huts), there is no guarantee that 
the development will proceed as planned, or that it will not encounter institutional 
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conflict. What is clear is that participatory monitoring and conflict resolution 
mechanisms should be in place to provide early and effective resolution. 
• The situation which currently prevails, where those with disregard for the law (such as 
the illegal cottage owners) continue to enjoy the spoils of the Wild Coast; whilst 
potentially positive developments are encumbered by an enduring state of tenure 
insecurity and unclear legislation, requires urgent redress. A nodal approach to 
development (as recognised by Nicholson, 1997) is imperative to maintaining the 
integrity of the biodiversity and marketing forte of the Wild Coast. However 'illegal' 
cottages are a direct threat to this spatial planning, and are in reality, unlawful 
developments on 'prime real-estate'. Until the role and authority of the traditional land 
allotters (i.e. the chiefs) is clearly delineated by law, the Wild Coast will continue to be 
beleaguered by haphazard and inappropriate developments, whilst communities will 
ultimately bear the cost of investor reticence and stifled development. 
• Besides access to capital and the specialised business expertise which a private sector 
operator can contribute to a tourism partnership, this study has demonstrated that the 
economic benefits for communities from aligning with an experienced private sector 
partner, are on the whole, greater than the sole-community based tourism model. This is 
because the private sector usually has a stronger drive to maximise profit - often through 
higher occupancies resulting in more full-time employment - and from sustained revenue 
from royalties, bed-night levies, and/or concession fees (depending on the terms of 
agreement of the private sector-community joint venture). A motivated private operator 
is also often well placed to initiate and assist with local SMME activities that would 
contribute to a wider tourism experience for their guests. Considering the isolation 
factor and general lack of experience that communities have in tourism-related 
businesses, sustained men tor ship and a 'captive' market provided through a private-
sector enterprise, is of considerable value. 
• Whilst there is clear market demand for 'alternative' tourism experiences, as the 
Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail and Ufudu Flyfishing Experience show, operators 
need to ensure that the product and services they deliver are of consistent standard and 
meet the expectations of their target market. Care should be taken not to discount or 
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marginalise the domestic tourism market in tariff structuring or product development, as 
they continue to constitute the majority of tourists visiting the Wild Coast (Haynes, 
2003). Domestic support for tourism products such as the Amadiba Trail and Ufudu, 
reveal that there are 'special-interest' tourist groups who are willing to pay more for an 
exclusive experience or opportunity to experience the Wild Coast for its undeveloped 
beauty. 
• It is widely recognised that an NGO, external agent, or local champion, often provides 
the initial 'spark' for the development of community-based projects (Katerere, 2000; 
Fabricius et al., 2001; Jones, 2001;Ashley & Roe, 20026). This was true of all four of 
the case studies. However, what is of greater exigency to the longer-term sustainability 
of the operation, is how this idea is presented to the community (obtaining community 
buy-in), and the manner in which the process is taken forward - i.e. the level of 
participation from local communities in the conceptualisation, development, and 
management of the initiative. It has been said that an 'adaptive' learning approach is 
integral to the success of any bottom-up or community-based initiative (Russell & 
Kuiper, 2001; Ntshona & Lahiff, 20036). This is true, but in the case of the sole-
community venture, an external agent is usually required to provide an enabling 
framework of support for these changes. A local community champion, to drive the 
initiative, can be very useful (and often critical) to obtaining community participation in 
the project. However, donor agents and project facilitators should guard against 
providing a few select individuals with unfettered powers, and should aim to ensure that 
the project champion remains party to the wider consultation process (Halstead, 2002). 
Both Amadiba Adventures and the Mbotyi joint-venture campsite are testimony to the 
kind of institutional instability created through focusing skills training on a single local 
champion. Should this person leave the project, a major vacuum or situation of 
institutional memory-loss is created, which provides a tangible threat to the 
sustainability of the project. This situation could be avoided by either providing skills 
development and capacity to a wider number of employees, or ensuring that the project 
leaders have a responsibility to transfer their newly acquired skills to those working 
beneath them (i.e. provide mentorship themselves). 
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• Skills development and capacity building are critical to the sustainability of any tourism 
operation. A private sector partner or operator will usually provide this through 'in-
house' training of employees, whilst a community-based venture is inherently more 
dependent on training opportunities provided through external agencies. In donor-driven 
programmes, it is critical that the training needs of the community are assessed prior to 
implementation, and that sustained monitoring and follow-ups are carried out to assess 
the impact and efficacy of this training. 
• Considering their familiarity with the area and rapport with communities, local NGO's 
are well placed to assist with the development of community-based projects. However, 
unless the NGO has prior tourism development experience, they do not always have the 
business management, product development and marketing expertise, required to make 
the initiative the success. This study suggests that the strength of NGO's lie in 
community facilitation, conflict resolution, and as intermediaries between different 
government, community and private sector stakeholders. All of these functions are 
critical to the sustainability of community-based tourism operations. However, as 
Wahab and Pigram (\991b) identified: sound organisational, marketing, planning and 
technical expertise, are also key requisites to making tourism developments sustainable. 
NGOs seldom possess this expertise, and would be better placed as project managers, 
contracting (and co-ordinating) authorities in these fields to assist with the strategic 
planning, development, training and managerial-design of community-based tourism 
enterprises. 
• Ashley and Garland (1994), Murphy (1994), Ashley et al. (2001), and Fabricius et al. 
(2001) maintain that a spread of benefits (both financial and non-) in the short, medium 
and long-term is required to maintain community support for tourism in a region. 
Whilst it has been shown that benefits derived from the sustainable utilisation of natural 
resources, often contribute towards a greater sense of responsibility for the natural 
environment, this should not be an implicit assumption. The link between the benefits 
derived from tourism, and greater environmental protection, are not always explicit, as 
the Ufudu case study revealed. The timing of benefits is also critical. Communities need 
to see a range of benefits in both the short and long-term. Cash in the bank does not 
help to sell the tourism product to the wider community. Community trustees should be 
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aware of this, and should be required to provide a full disclosure of income earnings 
(from rental, profit distributions and the like) to the wider community. 
• Donor funding is most useful in providing 'seed capital' to community-based 
enterprises. However, care should be taken that the input (be it financial, managerial or 
technical expertise) provided by these outside organisations, is not so great that the 
community business cannot achieve sustainability without it - i.e. a situation of 
dependency created on grants and external expertise as has occurred with the Amadiba 
Horse and Hiking Trail. Jones (2001) maintains however, that external agents should 
realise that they have committed themselves for the long haul. They should provide 
"high-quality, light-touch facilitation" (Fabricius et al., 2001: 47) to the commumty 
operation, so that when funding and support does come to an end, the community would 
have developed the skills and capacity to 'go it alone'. Whilst external funding can help 
a community-based business grow (as was the case with Amadiba Adventures), this 
'growth' can come too quickly or change the original character of the project. These 
changes may threaten the genuinely 'participatory' and 'local qualities' upon which the 
enterprise was conceptualised, and jeopardise sustainability of the operation once donor 
support is withdrawn. 
• Whilst a situation of grant-dependency (as referred to above) should aim to be avoided, 
such a situation should not render a community-project a 'complete failure'. Trotter 
(2002), from her investigation into achieving local economic development through 
natural resource-based tourism in Kwazulu-Natal, maintains that whilst many small-
scale tourism projects become grant-dependent, they have nevertheless made a positive 
contribution to improving local livelihoods (i.e. from employment and income 
generation) during the time they have been backed by donor support. This is certainly 
true of the Amadiba Horse and Hiking Trail. Even if Amadiba Adventures were to take-
on a private sector partner, the experience that the commumty has had, and the benefits 
(principally financial) accrued from operating the trail will not be forgotten as soon as 
EU support is withdrawn. 
• When entering into joint-venture partnerships, it is important that both partners have an 
understanding of, and respect for, the business relationship. Whilst some philanthropic 
214 
overtures may have helped facilitate the venture at the outset, this should not be 
expected to continue to govern the partnership. Furthermore, this research experience 
has shown that 'round-table' negotiations and an adaptive management approach (as 
opposed to following a 'blueprint' model) leads to greater institutional sustainability and 
acceptance by all parties concerned. 
• Finally, 'community control' does not necessarily translate into egalitarian 
organisations, as the Mbotyi joint-venture campsite revealed. Whilst Community Trusts 
are believed to be as the most legally-binding and easy-access vehicle for communities 
to enter into legitimate third-party developments; they are not exempt from conflict or 
institutional breakdown. The wider community should be informed, as a matter of 
procedure, with any new Trust establishment, on the role and purpose of their Trust, the 
importance of information-sharing, and the need to elect democratic and accountable 
Trustees who will represent their interests before their own. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This study aimed to present a critical appraisal of different tourism operations (representing 
different models of community participation and benefits from tourism) in operation along the 
Pondoland Wild Coast, in terms of their 'pro-poor' impact, socio-economic, and environmental 
sustainability. 
What has become clear during the course of this research is that assessing the overall 
sustainability of any particular operation is a difficult task due to the number of variables which 
go into making a tourism venture 'successful'. In measuring the 'costs' and 'benefits' of any 
operation, we invariably end up making a number of assumptions about the priority needs of 
the poor. In so many development initiatives, 'success' of a project is often measured against 
the number of jobs created and the amount of money generated for the local economy. Whilst 
the importance of these criteria are unquestionable, non-financial benefits - such as increased 
skills and capacity, renewed pride in local cultures and their natural assets, decision-making 
power and greater community cohesion - are often sidelined in the process. The implicit 
assumption of jobs and direct financial benefits, being the chief arbitrator of success, leads to 
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wider debates regarding the most appropriate models for community involvement in tourism 
development. If it is jobs and cash-benefits which are sought-after, then the private sector 
tourism model (with a private concessionaire making some form of profit-sharing agreement 
with the local community and providing a number of direct jobs) would probably be the best 
way forward. Halstead (2002) in her assessment of factors contributing to successful 
community-based tourism development in Caprivi, Namibia, concluded that there was no one 
formula which constituted a 'successful' tourism model, but that success and long-term 
sustainability should be measured against a broad spectrum of social, economic and 
environmental parameters. Whilst one operation may appear economically successful, this 
success might have come through, for example, autocratic decision-making or iniquitous wage 
remittances - neither of which sows the seeds for a successful operation in the long term. 
As this research revealed, there are few operations which can be exemplars for all three pillars 
of sustainability i.e. that they are entirely socially, economically, and environmentally 
sustainable. Furthermore, how do you compare one operation which may be having a positive 
environmental impact with smaller financial benefits (such as Ufudu), to another which 
provides larger financial returns, but at greater cost to the environment (such as Mbotyi River 
Lodge)? I personally do not believe the two operations can be diametrically comparable. 
Halstead (2002) maintains that if an enterprise can prove itself financially viable over time, 
creates awareness of the importance of natural resource protection, and has both tangible and 
intangible socio-economic benefits for community, then it should be viewed as a successful 
community enterprise. How then, did the four tourism operations documented in this study, 
perform? 
All the tourism operations case studied, have to varying degrees, produced net benefits for the 
poor - a key criterion for a tourism development to be considered 'pro-poor' (PPT website, 
2004a). However, the scope and size of these benefits, differs widely between die various 
operations with Mbotyi River Lodge producing the largest financial benefits (from both formal 
wage contributions and informal income spin-offs); but in terms of financial benefits with the 
least environmental cost, Ufudu undoubtedly performs the best. Besides Ufudu's endeavour to 
instill a financial incentive behind protecting the Mtentu estuary, none of die documented 
operations have really made any significant progress in mobilizing local communities to make 
an explicit link between natural resource protection and poverty alleviation through sustainable 
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tourism. Whilst there is strong evidence to suggest that increased awareness of the value of 
their natural resources has contributed towards a positive change in people's perceptions and 
behaviour to their natural environment, it is a naive reduction to assume that this will always be 
the case. The link between income generation and promoting better natural resource 
management could be made more explicit through environmental education training and the 
operators themselves. Whilst Section 24 of South Africa's constitution (Section 3.6) makes 
provision for the use of natural resources in local livelihood strategies, these 'rights' come 
attached to a certain set of responsibilities. If we consider local communities to be the 'de facto' 
owners of the natural resources, then one would expect them to place limitations on themselves 
and use the resources in a sustainable manner. This could be carried out through self-imposed 
regulations, community monitoring, and law enforcement for those who break the rules. 
However, a common sentiment which came out of the Mbotyi Household Survey (2003/2004), 
was that an outside authority (such as Nature Conservation) would still be required to assist - in 
a participatory manner - with law enforcement and management. Interestingly, of all the 
operations, Amadiba Adventures was the only one which defined its purpose as a means to 
diversify incomes and contribute towards poverty alleviation, but not replace local livelihood 
activities. 
The 'non-financial' benefits which Shackleton (2000), Roe and Urquhart (2001), Shackleton 
and Fabricius, (2001), DEAT (2002a), and Spenceley and Seif (2003) maintain are equally 
important, have in all of the documented operations, been prioritised below direct financial 
benefits. Whilst Amadiba Adventures had an imitable chance - with funding from the EU 
WCCTI Programme - to draw attention to, and focus on, these non-financial benefits (such as 
environmental education, skills training and capacity building) this has largely been a missed 
opportunity. Neither Ufudu nor Mbotyi River Lodge related plans to try and increase their 
contribution of non-financial benefits, with MRL being particularly interested in the financial 
benefits (which they perceived to be the most 'tangible' contribution) they were contributing to 
the local community. The perception that social and other benefits would stem from increased 
financial earnings appears to be an implicit assumption held by the majority of the tourism 
operators interviewed. This assumption is neither 'right' nor 'wrong', but could be worth 
keeping in mind in the future planning of 'pro-poor' or 'community-based' tourism 
developments. 
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In concluding, this study has revealed that the Pondoland Wild Coast is faced with numerous 
socio-economic and environmental challenges, including: extreme levels of poverty and 
unemployment; lack of basic infrastructure and services (i.e. roads, water and electricity); a 
history of deliberate underdevelopment; prevailing tenure insecurity; political power struggles; 
unclear legislature and overlapping jurisdictional mandates; direct environmental threats such as 
the proposed toll road and mining; haphazard and illegal developments; and poorly defined 
spatial development planning. Given its pristine, yet fragile environment, coupled with acute 
poverty and a history of underdevelopment, it is not really a question of whether the area 
should be 'developed' or 'conserved' - for it requires both - but how much conservation, 
balanced by sensitive development, is necessary to have a positive impact on poor rural 
livelihoods without irrevocably damaging the natural resource base. As has been demonstrated 
by this study, tourism developments which endeavour to be 'responsible', 'low-impact' and 
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Interview Form (Place) 
Structured, open-ended 
(Pmb) 
In-depth semi-structured Interview 
(Umngazi) 
Structured open-ended 
(Silaka Nature Reserve, PSJ) 
2 x in-depth semi-structured 
Interview (Mbona / Kloof) 
In-depth discussion & E-comm 
(Port St Johns) 
Telephonic comm. - structured, 
open-ended. 
E-comm. - structured 
Telephonic comm.- S/S & O/E. 
Informal Discussion (Tourism 
Indaba, Durban) 
Semi-structured, in-depth interview 
+ Telephonic comm., (Pinetown) 
In-depth, s/s interview. Email 
correspondence, Pietermaritzburg 
Informal Discussion, Focus Group 
(Durban / Pondoland Trail) 
Telephonic comm. - structured 
S/S Interview 
(Mkambati Nature Reserve) 
Pers comm. (Umngazi) 
Pers comm., (Tourism Indaba, 
Durban) 
S/S interview (PSJ) 
Informal Discussion & S/S E-
Organisation / Job Portfolio 
Senior Environmental Reporter for Natal 
Witness 
Manager of Umngazi River Bungalows 
Deputy Provincial Director of Eastern Cape 
Department of Land Affairs. 
Ex-Conservation Director of South Africa's 
Wildlife & Environment Society & Head of 
PondoPark Steering Committee 
Owner of Out span Inn & long-time resident 
of Port St John's 
Eastern Cape Nature Conservation Officer. 
ECODE Consultant on Mid-Term Review 
Independent Fisheries Research/Training 
Consultant. 
(Ex) Marketing Manager of Umngazi River 
Bungalows 
CEO of Goss & Co, Owner of Umngazi 
River Bungalows & potential developer of 
Mkweni River Lodge. 
Director of Institute of Natural Resources, on 
EU Programme Steering Committee and 
involved with Eastern Cape Estuaries 
Management Programme. 
Hambanathi Wild Coast Trail (Pondoland) 
Conservation Director of South Africa's 
Wildlife and Environment Society 
(WESSA). 
Head Ranger at Mkambati Nature Reserve -
Eastern Cape Nature Conservation. 
Deputy Director of Veterinary Service for 
National Dept of Agriculture 
Domestic Marketing Co-ordinator for 
Eastern Cape Tourism Board 
Port St John - SDI Officer 










> 30 Tourists 














comm (Cintsa, East London) 
Informal Discussion (Tourism 
Indaba, Durban) 
In-depth S/S Interview (PSJ) 
Informal Discussion & E-comm 
S/S Discussion. (Pmb) 
In-depth, S/S interview & C/E 
Email-Comm. 
Email-comm 
In-depth O/E Interview (PSJ) 
Tourist Perception Survey: 
Combination of C/E & O/E 
questions - quantitative 
4 x in-depth s/s interviews, email 
& telephonic comm. O/E, C/E 
(Mzamba) 
Telephonic comm. - O/E 
Pers Comm (Mbotyi) 
2 x in-depth, s/s interviews, 




S/S interview (Mzamba) 
Telephonic Comm - C/E Quest 
S/S interview 
(Mtentu Trail Camp) 
In-depth. S/S interview, 
quantitative case-study 
questionnaire / Email & tele 
comm. (Kloof) 
2 x in-depth, s/s interviews & focus 
grp (Mzamba / Durban) 
Pers comm. (Mtentu Camp) 
Buccaneers Backpackers (Cintsa) 
Operations Manager for 'Open Africa' 
Managing Director of WWF-SA contract on 
EU WCCTI 
PHd candidate; Institute of Natural 
Resources - 'Responsible Tourism' expert 
Organiser of the 'Wild Ride' - multi-day 
MTB event in southern WC section 
External Consultant to EU WCCTI 
Programme 
Secretary for the Wild Coast Cottage 
Owners Association 
Economic Editor for Business Report & the 
Star newspaper 
Visiting Tourists, Pondoland Wild Coast 
PondoCROP Director and Project Manager 
Project officer on EU WCCTI Programme 
Management Unit. 
Director of Triple Trust Organisation -
NGO contracted to EU WCCTI Programme. 
Enterprise Development Portfolio on 
Programme Management Unit of EU 
WCCTI 
Academic & Tourist Consultant to World 
Tourism Organisation 
Amadiba Adventures Trail Manager and 
ACCODA Trustee 
Local Guide, member of Amadiba 
Adventures Management Committee and 
trustee of ACCODA. 
Owners of'Ufudu Flyfishing'. 
PondoCROP Field Officer - Amadiba 
Region. Contracted to EU WCCTI 
Development Bank of South Africa 
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Wiggishof, Karl 
CS 3&4: Mbotyi 
River Lodge & 
Campsite 





























3 x in-depth, s/s discussion 
/interviews. Email & telephonic 
comm. (Port St Johns / Durban) 
S/S questionnaire & Informal 
Discussion (Mbotyi) 
S/S Interview (Mbotyi). 
S/S questionnaire & Informal 
Discussion (Hilton) 
S/S (O/C/E) interview (Mbotyi) 
3 x In-depth s/s interview, 
structured quantitative case-study 
questionnaire. Email & telephonic 
comm (Hilton) 
Pers comm. S/S, (Mbotyi) 
In-depth S/S interview (Mbotyi) 
Informal Discussion (Mbotyi) 
In-depth, S/S interview (Mbotyi) 
S/S questionnaire (Mbotyi) 
In-depth S/S Interview (Mbotyi) 
In-depth discussion (Mbotyi) 
S/S q'aire (Mbotyi) 
Informal S/S Discussion (Mbotyi) 
In-depth, S/S interview 
S/S discussion, Mbotyi 
In-depth, S/S interview + 
Telephonic comm. (Mbotyi) 
Pers comm. & C/E Email comm. 
(Mbotyi) 
In-depth, S/S discussion, (Mbotyi) 
2 x In-depth, S/S discussion & 
q'aire (Mbotyi /PMB) 
S/S interview: O/E & C/E 
questions (Mbotyi) 
In-depth S/S discussions (Mbotyi) 
Masibambane Specialist Legal Consultant 
Community & Environmental lawyer 
contracted to EU Programme 
Mbotyi Cottage Owners (legal) 
Trainee Manager in Mbotyi River Lodge 
Mbotyi Cottage Owner (legal) 
Headman of Mbotyi 
Co-owner of Mbotyi River Lodge and JV 
Campsite Trustee 
* Wife of MRL Co-owner 
Coast-Care Project Manager 
Ex-Manager at Mbotyi River Lodge - Food 
& Beverage Division 
Mbotyi Community Trustee 
Ex-Chairman of Mbotyi Community Trust 
and Ex-Trustee on Mbotyi Campsite Trust. 
Mbotyi Cottage Owner (legal) 
Mbotyi Campsite Manager 
Owners of Mbotyi Backpackers 
Mbotyi Cottage Owners (legal) 
Mbotyi River Lodge 
Manager at Mbotyi River Lodge - Food / 
Beverage & Accomodation 
Mbotyi River Ranger 
Treasurer on Mbotyi Community Trust and 
Trustee Member of Mbotyi Campsite Trust. 
Manageress at Mbotyi River Lodge -
Finance & Administration Division 
Daughter of David Ngwevu & trainee 
receptionist at Mbotyi Campsite 
Legal Mbotyi Cottage-owner 
Shopkeeper of Mbotyi Craft Store. 




Quantitative Household Q'aire 
Survey: O/E & C/E Q's 
Captain of Mbotyi Life-Savers Association. 
Mbotyi Community 
Key; 
S/S = semi-structured (interview) 
O/E = open-ended (questions) 
C/E = close-ended (questions) 
Pers comm. = Personal Communication but not a prepared interview 
E-Comm = Email correspondence/communication 
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Appendix 2: 
Ufudu Case Study Questionnaire Framework 
1. History 
1.1 How did this operation / enterprise come into being? From where & whom did the vision 
originate & who were the original stakeholders? 
1.2 Please outline the process taken in order to get UFUDU operational. Details could include: 
identifying the various government, community, private-sector & NGO stakeholders, process of 
negotiation, lease agreements & degree of contractual security, partnership arrangements & so 
on. Do you believe the existing arrangement to be effective and equitable? In what ways could 
it be improved? 
1.3 What influence has your operation had on local and regional policy directives? 
2. Land Rights and Tenure Reform 
2.1 Are you satisfied with the current level of tenure security for your tourism enterprise? Please 
elaborate, considering such matters as: return on investment vrs calculated risk, restructuring of 
the tourism industry towards PDC's (previously disadvantaged communities), political 
transformation and so on. 
3. State Involvement: from planning to implementation 
3.1 Do you believe that government has played a supportive and constructive role in facilitating 
tourism development on the Wild Coast? You can refer foremost to your personal experience, 
or should you wish, make more generalized comments. Please comment on government's role 
with respect to development policy guidelines / restrictions, service & infrastructural support, 
tenure reform, environmental legislation & management, capacity (from national directors to 
local councilors), support for local SMMEs, or any other issue you consider relevant to 
government's role in facilitating tourism development on the WC. 
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4. Economic Impact 
4.1 Please describe the ownership and management structure of your enterprise & highlight the profit-
sharing & wage arrangement with employees & local community 
A) Direct Employment 
4.2 Do you have a set policy or strategy in place to advance equality in terms of gender, ethnicity, age 
and disability in the permanent/casual staff you employ? Is there a forum for reporting progress on 
the implementation of this objective? 
4.3 What is your procedure for employing new staff? Is the position publicly advertised (how?) to the 
wider community, made on recommendations by existing staff, ACCODA mgt unit, word-of-mouth, 
or in another manner? 
4.4 Is it your enterprises policy to pay above minimum wage? How would you rate your wages/salaries 
relative to other tourism enterprises? 
B) Economic Benefits 
4.5 Please describe the economic benefits that neighbouring communities gain from your business & 
effort to encourage local (- i.e. within SO km) participation in the tourism industry. This could 
include: business linkages, SMME assistance (such as sale of crafts .orders for local vegetable 
produce), service (river guiding & horse trails) & product purchases (i.e. goods & groceries bought 
within 50km of Mtentu), philanthropic donations from third parties or your enterprise, direct 
employment, infrastructural improvements, community trust earnings. For each benefit you 
identify, please estimate the approximate financial value per annum (i.e your 3 -month lease 
period) and approximate number of local persons who share in this benefit.: 
If your enterprise has provided or taken any of the following measures to assist local SMME's, 
please provide further details: 
1) Providing credit or guaranteeing loans to potentially promising emerging entrepreneurs 
(historically disadvantaged). 
2) Providing marketing, mentoring, training, visitor feedback (on products & services rendered), 
and/or managerial support to emergent (HDI) entrepreneurs. 
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3) Assisting formal / informal sector enterprises to develop effective structures, or join existent 
bodies for marketing and tourism development. This can include assisting the informal sector to 
become recognized within the formal sector; encouraging local enterprises to add value to their 
products by improving the quality of the goods they produce, or being more innovative and 
(tourist) market-driven with the services they are offering. 
4) Work together with other formal sector enterprises to maximize benefits for local community 
enterprises. 
5) Showcase local business initiatives to visitors and encourage them to spend more money in the 
local economy. This can be done by encouraging them to visit local bars or restaurants, buy 
local arts and crafts, and partake in cultural or adventure tours offered by a local operator. 
6) Foster the development of community-based tourism products through the use of existing 
facilities, activities and attractions whilst encouraging entrepreneurs to develop complementary 
products based on market demand and visitor feedback /comments. 
7) Promote outsourcing of food purchases to the local community granted quality, quantity and 
reliability persists. This may require 'kick start' capital loans for the purchase of seed and/or 
basic farming equipment, workshopping and/or agricultural extension officers to advise on crop 
selection, rotation, permaculture, and appropriate technologies which will boost quality and 
yield. A fair market price should be negotiated for produce purchased. 
8) Consider co-operative advertising, marketing and the promotion of new & emerging products 
and attractions. Especially where these products adhere to Fair Trade and Tourism principles. 
9) Where co-operative / joint business ventures are entered into with local entrepreneurs or 
community members, ensure that risk is equitably shared (amongst all partners) and that there 
is a transparent system of profit-sharing in place, developed through legal & equitable contracts. 
C) Impact(s) on Local Infrastructure 
4.6 Do you believe that tourism - and your operation specifically - can / has had an impact on 
infrastructure in the region (positive or negative)? Has any action been taken by you or others to 
enhance positive impacts i.e. improved access rds, building of a school etc? 
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5. Community Empowerment, Capacity Building and Training 
5.1 Do you believe that communities in die Amadiba region have organized themselves effectively 
around tourism? From your perspective, have they gained or lost political influence, self-esteem, and/or 
capacity? How do you believe that tourism in general, & your operation specifically, has impacted on 
the poorest & most marginalized sector of communities living in the Amadiba region? 
5.2 Please describe your efforts to raise local awareness around tourism & to increase local PDI's 
(previously disadvantaged individuals) capacity to contribute meaningfully towards your tourism 
product. This could include recognized training programs, awareness campaigns, in-house training and 
soon. 
6. Social Impact: Responsibility and Monitoring 
6.1 What research (- if any -) was conducted prior to the establishment of your operation, to get an 
understanding/appreciation for the local safety, infrastructural, resource, educational, historical, 
political and cultural context of die local area and community? If possible please provide the scoping 
report or a summary of these findings with particular reference to historical relationships / ties to 
tourism development in the area? 
6.2 Have mere been any educational programs included in die local school curricula or a public 
awareness campaign targeted at the wider community pertaining to die potential positive / negative 
aspects of tourism & environmental awareness around the natural resources upon which this industry 
depends? 
6.3 Is there any form of monitoring program / social audit in place to help identify potentially adverse 
social impacts with a view to minimize or negate diem in the short to longer-term? What methods (if 
any) have been taken to ensure that communities are participant in this monitoring process? Do you 
believe that die majority of individuals see die benefits / potential benefits of tourism in the region? 
6.4 Finally, could you please detail and quantify die nature of social investment made by your 
enterprise into the local community (- as defined within SOkms of your enterprise). This could 
include financial, technical / training, material or infrastructural support to such tilings as education, 
health services, awareness / training workshops & so on (you may have addressed some of these 
contributions in the above questions). 
Prioritising socio-economic impacts 
6.5 Below is a list of potentially positive socio-economic impacts that your tourism enterprise could 
have on the local community. Please rank the top 8 impacts, in order of significance. I.e. if you 
believe the biggest (positive) socio-economic impact that the enterprise has made on the local 
community is 'job creation', then rank that as * 1 \ 
• Permanent job creation 
• More casual labour opportunities 
• SMME (Small, medium and micro enterprise) facilitation i.e. credit provision & general support 
to up-and-starting small businesses. 
• Greater income earning opportunities and local economic development from local sourcing and 
expanding economic linkages 
• Increased skills & education i.e. training in tourism related jobs, environmental and health 
education 
• Funds for the community through philanthropic donations (from the enterprise and/or their 
guests) 
• Improvements in infrastructure (roads, electricity, water, telephones etc) 
• Improved 'security' perceptions 
• Cultural or social enhancement (- locals recognize value in the authenticity of their products, 
instilling greater pride and respect for local traditions and culture) 
• Improved political environment and/or positive influence on policy directives pertaining to 
tenure reform (i.e. helping the poor to secure 'rights' over tourism assets by way of securing 
land rights), investment promotion & economic transformation/empowerment. 
• Increasing local participation in tourism policy and decision-making. 
• Increased community empowerment and capacity building i.e. involving the local community in 
planning & management decisions, whilst equipping them with the negotiating skills needed to 
engage with private sector 
• Supporting community-based organizations to get directly involved with tourism or commitment 
to joint ventures (jv's) with previously disadvantaged individuals / community groups 
• Greater understanding / respect for / and use of the environment and its natural resources 
through awareness, education and training. 
• Other: 
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7. Environmental Impact 
7.1 Do you believe your operation to be a working example of environmental best practice / eco-
responsible tourism? Please qualify your response. Also consider areas where you feel there may be 
room for improvement. 
7.2 Do you believe local community resource utilization (marine, estuarine & forest harvestings) to be 
environmentally sustainable? If not, please explain where /how /why some practices are unsustainable & 
where your enterprise has tried to increase awareness &/or intervene against unsustainable or illegal 
practices. What do you believe could/should be done to mitigate these practices? 
7.3 Has your enterprise any plans to promote an increase or maintenance of biodiversity in the area i.e. 
estuary management plan, co-operative agreements, NRM workshops, law enforcement & monitoring 
program. 
7.4 Does your enterprise set aside a percentage of its profit for environmental protection / restoration? 
The Responsible Tourism Guidelines encourage enterprises to report the percentage of this investment 
and look to increase their contribution by 5% annually. 
8. Resource Utilisation by Ufudu 
The following questions are quite specific - please answer diem to the best of your knowledge. I 
appreciate that UFUDU inherited a base camp from which to operate, and are not the sole decision 
makers in actions taken at Mtentu. 
Water Consumption 
8.1 From where and how (what method of extraction) do you meet your enterprise's water 
requirements? Are you satisfied with die quality, reliability & cost-efficiency of this water provision? 
Please elaborate 
Power 
8.2 What is your main source of energy - solar, paraffin, candle, generator, electrical, other? 
8.3 Has your operation introduced any energy saving measures such as: using lower energy appliances, 
d imming lights or architectural design features to make use of natural lighting and ventilation. 
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8.4 Are there any plans or targets in place to try increase the proportion of energy used from renewable 
resources - solar, wind, hydroelectric over a Syr plan? Responsible Tourism Guidelines aim for a 10% 
improvement over three-years. 
Natural Resource Utilisation 
8.5 Can you showcase any example of 'appropriate technology' used by your operation to reduce 
demand on natural resources, production of waste, pollution or environmental impacts? For example: 
using only biodegradable soaps and detergents or using solar hotboxes to cook certain evening mains. 
8.6 Would you know the approximate amounts of diesel, paraffin and petrol consumed in the monthly 
running of your enterprise? 
Sewage and Waste Disposal 
8.7 How does your current sewage treatment / disposal operate? Are you satisfied with the current 
system and if not, what measures are being investigated/taken to improve the situation? 
8.8 Has there been any form of monitoring with respect to the quantity and quality of sewage outflow 
into the estuarine environment? If so, what are the findings? 
8.9 Does your operation have a recycling policy? If so, please outline the procedures and measures 
taken to 'recycle' waste products. Responsible Tourism Guidelines advocate a 5% reduction and/or 
recycling of paper, plastic, metal and glass with a 15% target increase over 3 years. How does your 
operation measure up? 
8.10 In what ways have you tried to instill an 'environmental ethos' amongst your guests. Would you 
say that your clientele generally has a strong environmental ethos? 
8.11 Do you believe the local guides you employ are proficiently knowledgeable in local fauna/flora, 
ecological systems and environmental issues? Do they have adequate practical experience & theoretical 
grounding to communicate this knowledge with guests? 
9. Changing Policy and Future Challenges 
9.1 If you had to shortlist the major lessons learnt after 4 yrs operation at Mtentu - what would they 
be? Do you believe this enterprise can be a showcase to others (potential and existing) on the Wild 
Coast in 'responsible tourism' & why? 
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9.2 Will you voice your opinion on the following "proposed" developments: 
a) mining at Xolobeni 
b) N2 coastal highway 
C) Pondoland Park 
9.3 What do you believe to be the principal challenges &/or opportunities facing 
A) your tourism enterprise, within the next 5 - 1 0 years? 
B) tourism development on the Wild Coast in general (within the next decade)? 
Thank-you so much for your time and patience. If there is anything in this questionnaire which you do 
not want to dislclose, or feel is effectively answered by one of your reports, that is fine. Any 
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Mbotyi Household Questionnaire Survey 
A. General Household Data 
1. Name(s) of person(s) interviewed: DM D F 
Age: 
2. What community do you associate yourself with & who is your 
i) Traditional authority 
ii) Local municipality / councilor 
3. Who is the head - or responsible for decision-making - in this household? 
4. How many people (in total) are living in, and supported by, this household: no of adults + no of 
children? 
5. What is the highest level of education any one of your family members has attained? 
6. How many members of this household are working or earning a monthly income to support this 
household? In what capacity? 
7. What is the main income earning activity for this Hh? 
8. Approximately how much is your combined monthly household income? 
B. The Role and Status of Mbotyi Community Trust 
9. Are you aware of, or participated in, decisions taken by the Mbotyi Community Trust and what do 
you understand the role of the trust to be? 
10. Do you believe the trust is performing its function/purpose, or are there things you would like to 
change about it - what? 
11. Do you believe the people heading-up the trust were fairly elected and/or been transparent and 
accountable in their representation? 
C. Natural Resource Use & Management: Broad-based Q's 









Reed/grasses Marine harvestings 
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13. What natural resources do you believe to be 'plentiful"! 
14. Which resources have you noticed becoming scarce? Are there any that you previously utilized, that 
are no longer available? 
15. Are there any ongoing conflicts concerning the use of / access to / and/or rights to natural 
resources? If yes, what is the nature of this conflict and who are the parties concerned? 
16. Do you believe the harvesting practices of this community (& more generally: communities on the 
WC) to be sustainable? Please qualify (& be specific about resources) 
17. What do you think the role of government - and its conservation authorities - should be in 
protecting and managing natural resources? 
18. Are there any 'traditional' system(s) for managing natural resources in the area? Do you think 
communities could /should play a more active role in managing their natural resources? . Is there a need 
for greater community law enforcement and/or monitoring? 
D. Income Generation from Natural Resources 
19. Which resources can you / do you sell to tourists or local markets - to whom & when? 
20. Approximately how much do you earn (per annum) from the sale of these resources (listed 
individually). 
21. Which resources would you rank as most important ito: 
i) Income generation, and 
ii) Family subsistence 
E. Agriculture 
22. What crops does your household grow? 
23.Do you sell any of these crops? To whom & what is your average monthly /yearly income from this 
activity? 
24. Do such crops grow better now than they did in the past? Y/N - Why? 
25. What do you think could help improve yields (ito of quality & quantity)? Why? 
26. Would you say there has been an overall increase, decrease or non-change in people engaging in 
agriculture over the last ten years? 
Livestock 
27. What livestock does your Hh own & for what purposes) are they kept? 
28. Do you believe overgrazing to be a problem? Please qualify 
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F. Tourism Perceptions 
29. Has your experience with tourism in the area been positive or negative? Why? 
D Positive D Negative D Both D No experience 
Why? 
30. What do you understand of a "tourist" and "tourism"? 
31. Please express your feelings on the following tourism enterprises: 
i. the Mbotyi River lodge (hotel) 
ii. Mbotyi Campsite 
iii. Backpackers 
iv. Holiday cottages 
32. Do you believe the 'community' was adequately consulted and/or participant in the decision-
making prior to the development of these tourism operations? 
33. Are any members of your Hh 'formally' employed in the local tourism industry i.e. - employed 
directly by either the lodge, holiday cottages, campsite. What is their job, and what 
skills/training did they have that might have got them the job? 
34. What type of tourism would you like to see developed / promoted in this area? 
35. What type of tourism (if any) do you think the community could have greater ownership and 
management of? 
G. Legal / Illegal cottages 
36. Do you believe the presence of holiday cottages to be a positive or negative thing? Why? 
37. How do you think the wider community feels towards these cottage owners? 
38. Are they legal i.e. do they have permission to be there? 
39. Would you support their removal? 
H. Local Economic Development and Infrastructure 
40. Which of these services would you rank as priority for the community (ranked 1-5 in order of 
priority): 




centre / hall or church 
Reticulated sewage / 
improved sanitation 
Agricultural extension 






facilities i.e. clubhouse 
/ soccer field 
Access to home loans 
and micro bank loans 
Skills Training 
workshops 






Direct Employment in 
the formal sector 
Other: 
More casual labour 
opportunities 
More reliable & cost-
effective transport 
system 
41. Do you believe that government is doing a good - fair job with respect to delivering on their 
promises in providing basic (water, lights, roads, sewage & refuse disposal) services? Please 
elaborate. 
I. Tenure Security and Development options 
42. What type of 'development' would you like to see happen in this area? 
43. Do you feel 'secure' that the land you occupy now will be yours to pass on to your children or 
would you like to have more defined/ clear ownership rights? 
44. Do you know anything about the Pondoland Park Proposal? 
45. Do you support it? Why? 
46. Do you know anything about the proposed coastal highway? 
47. Do you support it? Why? 
48. Would you support mining in the region? Why? 
49. What do you believe the main factors or reasons to be, hindering development in this area (and 
the Wild Coast in general)? 
50. Where do you think the biggest opportunities - for improving your livelihoods - on the Wild 
Coast lie? What should government and the people of the Wild coast be focusing on / trying to 
develop, to improve the lives of the rural poor? 
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Appendix 4: 
Key Legislation pertaining to Environmental Protection and Development on 
the Wild Coast 
• The Nature and Environmental Conservation Ordinance, 19 of 1974 
Pertains to the protection of wild animals, freshwater fish, flora, rules relating to hunting, and 
cultivation of indigenous flora. It has been adopted by the new Eastern Cape government, and 
is required to be read in conjunction with the 'Decree* until such time as the Eastern Cape 
Department of Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism (EC DEAET) has established its 
own statutory nature conservation board. According to Wiggishof and Pienaar (2001:87) the 
department has already produced a draft Green Environment paper and a draft Nature 
Conservation Bill, which is proposed to 'consolidate* the nature conservation laws of the 
former Transkei and the Cape Ordinance into one comprehensive Eastern Cape Nature 
Conservation Act. 
• The Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (referred to as the 'ECAO 
This Act provides for both the protection and exploitation of the environment, in line with the 
principles of 'sustainable development*. Protection of natural and ecological processes, 
aesthetic beauty, waste management, preservation of local bio-diversity, and the promotion of 
sustainable natural resource utilisation are the principal objectives behind this act, whilst the 
regulations set out are most significant in so far as they relate to Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) and Coastal zone management (Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001; Barnard et. al., 
200341). 
• The National Environmental Management Act, 107 of 1998 (the NEMA) 
This Act, which came into force in January 1999, emphasises the need to promote greater co-
operative governance and public interest in the environment (refer to pp 56). According to 
41 Barnard, D., Barnard, C, Friend, F. and Visser, H. 2003. Road Map to Environmental Legislation. 
Impact Books CC, Pretoria. 
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Wiggishof and Pienaar (2001), this Act is especially important to the Pondoland Wild Coast in 
that, apart from me National Forests Act, it is the only available legislation which directly 
facilitates the appropriate mechanisms required for the establishment of environmental 
management co-operation agreements42. 
Limitations of the Act: 
- Requires substantial government buy-in and support; 
- The administrative and institutional processes associated with integrated environmental 
management are often complex and open to interpretation (Wiggishof, 2003). 
Other Acts pertaining to the protection, utilisation, and management of environmental 
resources along the Pondoland coastal zone, include: 
• The Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983: replaced the Soil 
Conservation Act 45 of 1946. The Acts objective is to provide for the conservation of 
natural agricultural resources through the maintenance of potentially productive land, by 
the combating of erosion, protection of (fresh) water sources, vegetation, and the 
combating of weeds and invader plans (Barnard et. al., 2003). 
• The Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 (MLRA): the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism is the individual responsible for the administration of this Act, and 
the regulations thereof. The Act aims to guide 'optimum utilisation* by ecologically 
sustainable development of marine living resources. It recognises the need to utilise 
42 Environmental Management Co-operation agreements: The National Constitution, NEMA (1998), 
the National Water Act (1998), and the White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa 
(2002) all stipulate that the management of natural resources should be conducted in a "facilitatory and 
co-operative manner". Co-management involves the building of partnerships between communities and 
other stakeholders in which decision-making power, responsibility and authority for natural resource 
management is shared (Mohamed, 2000: 39) This 'participatory' management approach has evolved as a 
retort to the militant and coercive preservationist approach applied in the past. A number of estuarine co-
management forums are in the process of being implemented along the Pondoland Wild Coast (Sihlope & 
Russel, 2002; INR, 2003). 
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marine living resources for human resource development, employment, economic 
growth, and capacity building within the fisheries and mariculture branches, but adopts 
a precautionary approach consistent with sustainable development objectives of National 
Government (Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). 
Chapter 4 of this Act, gives provision to the establishment of a marine protected area (MPA). 
It outlines the following prohibitions as applying to marine protected areas: 
No person may, without the requisite permission: 
- fish or attempt to fish; (even 'catch and release' requires a permit from MCM); 
- take or destroy any fauna and flora other than fish; 
- dredge, extract sand or gravel, discharge or deposit waste or any other polluting 
matter, or in any way disturb, alter or destroy the natural environment (this should 
negate mining within the MPA zone); 
- carry on any activity which may adversely impact on the ecosystems of that area; 
Furthermore, no person shall, except on the authority of a permit: 
- engage in fishing, collecting, killing, attempting to kill, disturbing, harassing, keeping 
or controlling of, or selling of, or be in possession of, any fish caught from a fishing 
vessel or vessel in a marine protected area. 
(Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001:133) 
These regulations have particular bearing, since the formal declaration of the Pondoland MPA. 
- The National Water Act 36 of 1998 
This is the most authoritative piece of legislation concerning the governance of water issues 
in South Africa. It aims to ensure the protection of both the quantity and quality of water 
resources (including estuaries), in the interest of all water users and the sustained 
functioning of the ecological reserve. It recognises the need for integrated management of 
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all aspects regarding water resources and, where appropriate, the delegation of management 
functions to a regional or catchment level, so as to ensure the highest (practicable) level of 
participation (Barnard et al., 2003; Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001). 
It is therefore an important supporting Act, in facilitating co-management and co-operative 
agreements around key water bodies such as the Estuary Management Forums. 
• The National Forest Act 84 of 1998 
The National Forest Act highlights the promotion of sustainable forest management and the 
development of forests for environmental, economic, educational, recreational, cultural, 
health and spiritual benefits. It endorses community forestry and participation, especially by 
previously disadvantaged persons, in all aspects of forestry and the forest product's 
industry. 
Importantly, for a proposed Pondoland Conservation Area, it provides a detailed procedure 
for the declaration of a forest nature reserve, forest wilderness area, and "...any type of 
protected area (PA) which is recognised by international law and practice" (National Forest 
Act, 1998 cited in Wiggishof & Pienaar, 2001: 104). It clearly defines the implications of a 
PA in terms of prohibition on cutting, disturbing, destroying, or removing of forest 
products. 
In addition to these key Acts, the following White Papers are of relevance to environmental 
management in the area: 
> White Paper on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of South Africa's Biological 
Diversity. DEAT, 1997 
> White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa. DEAT, 2000 
> White Paper for the Development and Promotion of Tourism in South Africa. DEAT, 1996 
> Policy on Subsistence Fishing in South Africa. DEAT, 1999. 
> Wild Coast Tourism Development Policy, 2000 
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Appendix 5: 
Summary of the main criticisms, and counter-rebuttals, in the 
Wild Coast Toll Road Debate 
MAIN CRITICISMS 
1. Challenge to the rationality, cost and 
proposed alignment of the N2 Toll Road 
Many of the critics are not against, the 
development of the road per se, but are opposed 
to the current alignment. They claim that the 
debate has been reduced, by Dr Olver and 
government, into development versus 
preservation, rather man a justified concern about 
proper placement of the road that would ensure 
maximum benefit to local communities whilst 
sustaining the marketable natural assets (i.e. its 
pristine beauty and significant biodiversity) of the 
Wild Coast. They maintain that there has been 
insufficient investigation of alternative routings 
that would not need to bisect a global biodiversity 
hotspot, nor cost the tax-payer R1.9 billion in 
bridging two pristine gorges (the Mtentu and 
Msikaba Rivers). 
Wessa (2003,2004) and Davies (2004) agree with 
DEAT and SANRAL that improved road access 
could facilitate sustainable development and 
economic growth in the region, but maintain that 
the toll road, in its current form, will be more 
profit than development motivated. - Economic 
growth will accrue to the engineering and 
trucking companies, not the local population. 
A high-speed toll road, which bypasses the 
present economic centres and provides no arterial 
roads or access to the area, patently does not 
provide 'social development' as the highway 
proponents would have you believe. 
Many concur with Dr Olver (Director General for 
DEAT) that the N2 alignment cannot be placed 
any closer to the coastline, and once off the 
Msikaba rock formation, would have to traverse 
through many more river valleys. This is why 
they argue, they are calling for an upgrade of the 
existing R61 - which logically straddles the 
REBUTTAL / RETORT (DEAT, SANRAL) 
The exigency for a 'superior primary road', to 
avail access to a marginalised former homeland 
(with enormous untapped economic potential) 
was agreed upon as a key priority for the agri-
tourism Wild Coast SDL The creation of this 
highway is totally in keeping with government's 
'sustainable development' agenda. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, 90% of land commerce is 
directly dependant on roads. Delivery of goods 
and services, market access, employment 
opportunities, and household access to consumer 
goods are all dependent on an efficient transport 
(in this case - road) system. Although the Wild 
Coast is undeniably a uniquely pristine area, it is 
also one of the poorest and most economically 
undeveloped regions in the national space 
economy. Government has a responsibility to 
protect the environment, but equally so, has an 
obligation to enhance the welfare of those 
persons living in such impoverished and 
economically deprived regions. In seeking to link 
economic growth with social development, and 
implementing environmental safe-guards (such 
as the EIA and adherence to its 
recommendations) - the N2 toll road will be a 
show-case of "true sustainable development" 
(SANRAL, 2004a: 1). 
Leo-tourism was identified as a lead sector of the 
WC SDL Although some eco-tourism projects 
have developed since 1997, they are as yet, of 
insufficient scale to out-compete other 
development interests in the area - notably 
threats from dune mining. The long-term 
environmental impacts from mining will be 
conspicuously more damaging. In order to prove 
that eco-tourism is a more sustainable 
development option, creating long-term 
employment and positive multiplier spin-offs, 
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watershed, and would therefore alleviate the need 
for costly bridges. 
It is argued that the R1.9 billion saving on the 
bridges, could then be used to upgrade local 
access roads, which is really what is needed to 
give coastal communities access to the eco-tourist 
and benefit local development! 
"It would appear, that since the 1997 Wild Coast 
Spatial Development Initiative, the government 
gave the go ahead for this road and it is Dr 
Olver 's jobs to ensure that it comes about. The 
trouble is that we know that it has not been 
thought through, and that we have a better plan 
which would provide improved access [...in which 
there has been little effort by government to hear 
us out, let alone really consider the alternatives] 
(Davies, 2004: 3) 
"We are opposed to this development because the 
proposal is inappropriate development, not 
sustainable development" 
(Davies, 2004: 1; Wessa, 2004) 
2. Environmental Impacts? 
How can an 80-metre swathe of highway 
traversing through an internationally recognised 
biodiversity hotspot (IUCN, WWF and 
Conservation International all recognise this 
botanical 1 y sensitive area as one of the world's 
richest centres of biodiversity and endemism) -
possibly bring about the 'environmental 
protection' that its proponents maintain? 
The claims that a further inland routing would do 
more damage to "rare indigenous forests" 
(SANRAL, 2004 b: 1) than the Msikaba 
grasslands through which the N2 is currently 
proposed to transect, "shows complete lack of 
familiarity with the literature & environmental 
studies of the region " according to some critics 
(Dutton, 2004: 1). They point out that the area 
around the Msikaba Formation (MF), is an 
internationally acclaimed centre of endemism 
(albeit the smallest in South Africa), whilst it is 
'common knowledge' that grasslands are a 
significantly more threatened habitat than 
midland-type forest vegetation (which exists 
further inland). These forest patches are 
generally much younger and less diverse than 
MF grasslands and incised valley biomes 
access to the area needs to be considerably 
improved. (DEAT, cited in Yeld, 2004) 
Q: Why not upgrade the existing R61 instead of 
building a whole new highway? 
A: Not only is the R61 much longer (85 km 
longer), therefore defeating one of the main 
objectives of the highway, it also has 
significantly poorer alignment, both horizontally 
and vertically. In addition, it functions as a 
regional access road to towns such as Lusikisiki, 
Flagstaff and Bizana. The R61 was never 
designed to fulfil any other function. Routing 
long distance traffic through these towns would 
either require bypasses or additional safety 
structures such as overpasses. Moreover, the 
sharp corners and existing gradient of the R61, 
makes it dangerous for high-speed, long-distance 
travel. 
The new N2 toll road, on the other hand, will 
provide additional high standard infrastructure 
for long distance traffic, whilst retaining the 
function and purpose of the R61. 
The actual environmental impact of the proposed 
N2 alignment will be "minimal" (SANRAL, 
2004 b: 1) - certainly when one compares it 
against the potential socio-economic benefits. It 
will span the gorges of the Mtentu and Msikaba 
rivers in order to avoid a much larger impact on 
the indigenous forests further inland. The 
grasslands through which the N2 will traverse are 
largely already transformed through subsistence 
agriculture and grazing. The significance of 
impacts on the natural environment will be 
restricted to a small, localised area of the road 
reserve, and will not result in the loss or 
extinction of any plant species. 
According to SANRAL (2004 b: 1) the total 
environmental impact on the greenfields section 
(i.e. the virgin area through which the road will 
cut) is as follows: 
Total area affected by construction = 0.36% 
Total area surfaced = 0.12% 
Pristine area to be affected by road reserve = 0.16% 
Pristine area to be affected by construction activities = 
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(Dutton, 2004; Kay,pers comm., 2004) 
3. A Flawed EIA Process 
The whole EIA for the Wild Coast Toll Route 
has been an inherently flawed process, 
principally because it failed to: 
consider alternative road routings and/or other 
development options including a 'no go' option 
to recognise the nature of tribal trust land (not 
state land) that would effectively be traversed, 
divided and expropriated without any indication 
or mention of compensation 
to sufficiently consult with all interested and 
affected parties that would be directly impacted 
by the proposed road alignment 
to adequately consider the economic impact of 
this highway bypassing (effectively isolating), 
the inland towns of Bizana, Holy Cross and 
Flagstaff 
to adequately consider the socio-economic 
ramifications of a toll road on the poorest rural 
communities of the Eastern Cape and KZN, who 
would bear the brunt of knock-on impacts from 
human influx; associated ribbon development 
and increased taxi fares, as a result of newly 
imposed toll fees 
(Davies, 2004) 
Another source of concern is that the upgrading 
of the road had already commenced months prior 
to the issue of DEATs, Record of Decision. Kay 
(cited in Wessa, 2004 [online]) accused DEAT of 
"consistently turning a blind eye to this, which 
indicates that there is no political motive to 
0.09% 
Pristine area to be affected by actual road surface = 
0.0025% 
In addition, the DEAT has just announced that 
Pondoland will, within the next six months, have 
the Eastern Cape's first Botanical Gardens. The 
idea to create a Pondoland Botanical Garden has 
apparently been in the pipeline for some time, 
but 'fast-tracked' because it will address the 
issue of relocation of plant species threatened by 
the road, and because the road will now open up 
access to visitors. 
The allegations mat alternative routings were not 
investigated, is spurious to say the least 
(SANRAL, 2004a,b; Olver, 2003). Five possible 
alternative routes and corridors were originally 
identified for the greenfields section between 
Lusikisiki and Port Edward. These investigations 
are clearly outlined in the EIA report. A further 
six alternatives were then considered during the 
EIA phase, which included routes in closer 
proximity to the coast as well as those further 
inland. 
In balancing environmental considerations with 
social and economic considerations, a feasible 
greenfields corridor was eventually determined, 
taking both historic and recent investigations into 
account. An extensive EIA was then carried out 
for this proposed corridor. 
According to SANRAL (2004 a, b): The eco-
tourism potential of the area was certainly not 
overlooked by the EIA. Extensive discussions 
were held with SANParks and the Wildlife and 
Environment Society (Wessa) regarding 
compatibility with the proposed Pondoland Park. 
It was agreed, in principle, that the proposed 
alignment would benefit the Park as it would 
avail access for all to enjoy this scenic part of the 
country - not only those privileged few, with 4x4 
access. 
According to Rogers (2004 b [online]): DEATs 
spokesman, Wynand Fourie, told the EP Herald 
in July last year that he "could not remember any 
specific references within the EIA assessment, as 
to the possible impact of the road on established 
eco-tourism initiatives", but Roads Agency head, 
Nazir Alli, denies this allegation saying that "the 
village eco-tourism issue had been addressed as 
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implement the law of the country" 
4. Insufficient Public Participation & 
Consultation? 
Wessa's Conservation Director, Cathy Kay, 
questions why the DEAT issued its ROD at the 
beginning of the Christmas period, with only a 
month for the public to lodge appeals from then. 
"They know that academic institutions and many 
companies close over this period. Once again 
the Department has shown a complete lack of 
sensitivity and transparency in dealing with the 
South African public on sensitive environmental 
issues ". (Kay, cited in Wessa, 2004 [online]) 
Wessa motivated for an extension of the appeal 
period - which they won. The appeal period was 
extended from the 2nd to the 31* January, 2004. 
Wessa and others argue that government's 
assertion that they have consulted over 3 400 
Interested and Affected Parties (I&APs) is "far 
from the truth" and "meaningless", when key 
stakeholders like the Pondo King and Queen, 
and others living directly enroute of the 
proposed alignment have failed to be consulted 
(Dutton, 2004: 1). When asked by Kay as to 
whether those who had filed concerns in the 
public participation phase of the EIA, had been 
contacted by their departments, Dr Olver 
apparently conceded "mat no such effort had yet 
been made" (Wessa, 2004 [online]) 
Some critics have questioned Dr Olver's 
motives for castigating environmental groups 
and other N2 detractors (i.e through his media 
statement: The N2 consultation and public 
participation process was thorough and 
adequate), when an integral component of the 
EIA process is to allow for an appeal against the 
departments ROD. Is it not the duty and 
part of the (EIAs) overall economic study." 
When questioned about the road destroying the 
regions 'sense of place' and 'wilderness', he 
contested this assumption "no, we are simply 
making the area more accessible " (Alii, cited in 
Rogers, 2004i.l) 
There has been no formal response as to why 
construction had already commenced prior to 
DEATs final ROD or the public repeal period. 
According to my site investigations, this was the 
case. 
SANRAL believes they have followed all the 
necessary protocols for the Public Participation 
Process (PPP). 
More than 3 400 interested and affected 
parties were registered during the PPP. Views of 
all of these parties were documented and 
considered (SANRAL, 2004 b). 
According to Olver (08 January, 2004 [online]): 
The parties concerned "have gone the extra 
mile" with regard to the Wild Coast, in order to 
accommodate the varying needs of interested 
and affected parties in the area. These included 
newspaper advertisements, radio spots in both 
urban and rural areas, a briefing paper 
(circulated in English, Zulu and Xhosa), a 
question and answer booklet providing 
background information (again circulated in 
three languages), registration and response 
forms which provided the opportunity for parties 
to provide written comment; and a draft Scoping 
Report for comment 
He ardently disputed the allegation that certain 
prominent people and traditional leaders were 
never consulted about the construction of the 
road. 
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responsibility of registered I&APs to identify 
issues that have been ignored, overlooked or 
misrepresented in the EIA? 
5. Socio-Economic Benefits? 
The leading critics say they have repeatedly 
appealed for development which is appropriate to 
the local context and people - not multinational 
capitalists. 
How can the toll road, which is described as a 
limited access, high speed through road, possibly 
provide the access needed for tourism? Would not 
an upgrade of existing roads, which would feed 
directly to the coast, be of more logical 
precedence? Surely building these feeder roads 
would provide greater access, for tourism and 
local development? 
"A toll road is certainly not going to help a local 
get to the hospital in Lusikisiki or Holy Cross. A 
local access road will" (Davies, 2004: 1) 
6. Link between Mining and the Road? 
The one thing which both the N2 lobbyists and 
the Department of Environmental Affairs & 
Tourism (DEAT) agree upon, is that: eco-
tourism is a much more sustainable development 
option man mining. 
Yet there are still many inexplicable 
contradictions. According to the environmental 
organisations: building the highway, simply 
makes the mining that much more feasible. 
The proposed toll road will go within a couple 
of kilometres of the proposed Xolobeni mining 
area. The Australian mining company talks 
about mining 13-20 million tons/per annum for 
25 years. After wet separation, approximately 
According to its proponents, the highway will 
generate significant national and regional 
economic benefits. The estimated investment to the 
region, as cited in by SANRAL (20046:1) is as 
follows: 
Gross once-off investment in the area (during 
construction) = R 4 773m 
New business activity and income (after construction) = 
R 1666m 
Total investment in area = R 6 439 m (during and after 
construction) 
The annual increase in income in the service area of the 
proposed road during and after construction: 
Wages & salaries to local population = R 228,8m 
Income increase to local industry = R 171,6m 
Retailers = R 144,4m 
Service Providers = R 57.2m 
Number of permanent jobs created = 15 880 
According to SANRAL (2004 a, b): 
The roads construction will play an important role 
in eradicating poverty within the region. 
South African National Roads Agency and the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism have unequivocally stated on a number 
of occasions, that there is absolutely no link 
between the toll road and the proposed mining 
activities at Xolobeni. 
The DEAT is categorically opposed to mining 
and believes eco-tourism to be a much more 
sustainable development option. However, in 
order for eco-tourism to provide comparable 
economic spin-offs to mining, access to the area 
needs to significantly improved. The N2 toll 
road, in DEATs opinion, is the solution to this 
primary limiting factor. 
In a Cape Argus media report (Yeld, 2004 
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7% of extracted concentrates will need to be 
taken to the smelter, supposed to be built in East 
London. This equates to 1-1.5 million tons 
transported on this road annually or a 20-ton 
truck every two-to-three minutes (Kay, cited in 
Yeld, 2004 [online]). 
Under such a heavy loads, the road 
infrastructure will require continual 
maintenance. Who will be required to foot the 
bill for this maintenance? The South African 
tax-payer of course, says Kay (cited in Yeld, 
2004 [online]) 
Some of the unanswered questions concerning 
the link between the road and the mining, 
include: 
Is the road economically feasible without 
the mining? 
Why take the ore to East London and not 
Durban, when it states explicitly in the mining 
prospectus that East London is not the preferred 
port? (TEM, 2002) 
Detractors, commend DEAT for coming out 
strongly against the mining, but question why 
then, have they sanctioned the (miners) road? 
[online]): Olver was reported as saying "the 
Pondoland Centre of Endemism is certainly a 
unique and globally important hotspot.... but 
this is not sufficient reason, per se, for refusing 
the road" 
He also argued that: "there is a tide of illegal 
developments (along the Wild Coast) - which 
we're stemming the tide of, but cant hold on 
forever." "The only hope is a level of 
development that addresses the needs of people 
and that gives the area's natural assets a real 
economic value." - i.e. the highway. 
Sources: TEM, 2002; Bohlweki Environmental (PTY) LTD, 2003; Davies, 2003, 2004; Guy & 
Herrington, 2003; Dutton, 2004; Ngobese, 2004; Olver, 2003, 2004; Rogers, 2004ft; 
SANRAL, 2004a, b; Wessa, 2003, 2004; Yeld, 2004. 
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Appendix 6: 
Key issues constraining sustainable tourism development along the Wild Coast, as 
identified by the Wild Coast Tourism Development Policy 
ISSUE 
TOURISM 
Need for an investor-friendly and 'enabling' 
environment 
Local community participation, benefit and 
empowerment 
Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise 
Development 
Education, Training and Awareness 
Provision of Physical Infrastructure 
Tourism Marketing and Promotion 
Safety and Security 
Standards and Service 
Institutional Arrangements 
ENVIRONMENT 
Access to Natural Resources 
DESCRIPTION 
Private sector (PS) investment is essential to facilitate the 
upgrade of existing facilities and exploitation of 
development tourism opportunities along the Coast. 
Availability of, access to, financing, land tenure, tourism 
development controls, and application and approval 
procedures, all need to be addressed. 
Greater incentives required for private sector to enter into 
joint-venture partnerships with local communities. 
Communities also need secure bargaining power and 
capacity building. 
Tourism presents many opportunities for SMME 
development, which are not currently realised due to poor 
information and inadequate support mechanisms. 
The Wild Coast is characterised by a general lack of 
awareness with regard to tourism. 
The existing physical infrastructure is rudimentary or 
poor, and as result both communication and access to the 
region is limited. 
This has previously been limited by funding constraints 
but is recognised as an essential measure to sustain a 
viable tourism industry. 
The 'Wild Coast' unfortunately carries negative 
connotations that it is not a particularly safe region for 
tourists to visit 
These are traditionally low, with limited incentive for 
hotels or tourism enterprises to improve their standard or 
service levels. 
Within the tourism industry, institutional arrangements 
are 'unclear'. 
Almost all households in this rural area depend, to 
varying extent, on natural resources for their livelihood. 




Overexploitation of resources 
Impact of forestry and agricultural activities 
Uncontrolled spread of illegal holiday cottages 
The lack of an integrated planning and 
development process for the area 
Waste management and pollution control 
Alien Plant Invasion 
General lack of Environmental Management 
Capacity 
Lack of management around cultural resources 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Current Institutional Arrangements 
Capacity limitations within government 
Land issues - tenure and restitution 
Legal / regulation situation 
The Wild Coast has a great biological diversity with 
many endemic hotspots. The protection of this 
biodiversity should be a provincial, national, and even 
international priority. 
There have been some incidences of resource over-
utilisation, particularly in marine resources. 
These activities can cause soil erosion, siltation and/or 
pollution of estuaries and rivers, potential drying-up of 
water courses and loss of indigenous forest. 
This has a serious negative impact on the environment 
and future tourism development potential - as they are 
usually located in pristine environments and prime real 
estate. 
There is a fragmented and uncoordinated approach to 
coastal planning and management on the Wild Coast. 
Increased tourism development will require close 
monitoring to ensure that effective waste management 
and pollution controls are in place. 
This danger has received relatively little attention to date. 
Due to a dearth of skilled personnel and financial 
constraints, there has been a general lack of capacity for 
environmental protection, policing and management by 
the assigned provincial authorities. 
This has received relatively little attention to date. 
There are numerous institutions involved in policy 
making, financing, development processing and 
legislation - this has resulted in much confusion and 
indecisive decision -making. 
Capacity within government is limited and 
un-coordinated, resulting in lengthy procedures and poor 
response time to development applications. 
Issues around tenure reform have not been finalised but 
the Department of Land Affairs has reportedly made 
'some progress' with specific procedures for this area. 
There are many contradictory and rigorous controls and 
legislations pertaining to the Wild Coast which could 
hamper potential tourism development. 
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